Playing the Victim: How the Taliban Endorse and Amplify Online Propaganda Against Pakistan

The October 2025 border skirmishes between Pakistan and Afghanistan have reignited not only physical hostilities but also a battle of narratives. In the digital age, disinformation has become the Taliban’s most potent weapon, reshaping public perception and deflecting accountability for escalating cross-border violence.

The collapse of truce negotiations in Istanbul, mediated by Qatar and Turkey, marked the latest diplomatic failure in a relationship long defined by mistrust. Pakistan’s Information Minister confirmed on 29 October that talks “failed to bring about any workable solution,” citing Kabul’s unwillingness to address militant sanctuaries and its indifference to Pakistan’s security losses. Within hours, Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid countered Pakistan’s statement with a selective reinterpretation of the talks, arguing that “certain elements within Pakistan” were responsible for undermining bilateral understanding. His remarks reframed the diplomatic collapse as a by-product of Pakistan’s internal instability rather than Kabul’s unwillingness to address the issue of militant sanctuaries.

By claiming respect for the “Pakistani people” but contempt for their leaders, the Taliban are crafting a false moral divide that fuels anti-state sentiment. Similarly, Pakistani voices like Mahmood Khan Achakzai amplify negative sentiment through historical revisionism. By invoking colonial-era imagery, calling Pakistan an “extension of the British army”, and invoking a collective memory of past invasions, they are trying to turn the issue at hand into a simple story of right and wrong based on the past. This reflects a broader communication pattern: externalising blame while retaining moral high ground.

A clear pattern has emerged in which Afghan Taliban supporters invoke historical invasions and past grievances to deflect responsibility for their present actions. This is evident in Mawlawi Mohammad Nabi Omari’s (First Deputy Minister of Interior) claim that external forces are attempting to impose war on Afghanistan, portraying the Taliban as inherently peaceful but forced to respond defensively. By referencing past invasions and colonial interventions, they shift blame for ongoing instability and present Afghanistan as an eternal victim, reinforcing a narrative of historical suffering to justify their current policies.

Correspondingly, at the heart of this propaganda war lies a line drawn more than a century ago, the Durand Line. Once a colonial demarcation separating British India from Afghanistan, has evolved into a potent political symbol. In October 2025, social media conversations around the Durand Line surged alongside the clashes. Sentiment analysis revealed a sharp rise in anti-Pakistan rhetoric, particularly posts using phrases like “Colonial Fraud” and “Reclaim Land” to frame Pakistan as a colonial impostor or occupying power. By contrast, posts focused on factual military updates or ceasefire developments showed lower negativity. The data exposes a clear pattern: emotional, identity-driven narratives provoke greater hostility than factual reporting. The Taliban and their online networks exploit this dynamic, reviving old colonial grievances to frame Pakistan as an illegitimate successor of British imperialism.

One recent video that surfaced online in late October, shows Afghan students presenting a “Greater Afghanistan” map that includes Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan to Taliban Deputy Interior Minister Muhammad Nabi Omari. Although Afghanistan’s state broadcaster Radio Television Afghanistan English covered the event, it omitted this segment from televised footage, yet the full clip later appeared on Taliban-linked accounts. The timing and selective release suggest a controlled narrative, a calculated attempt to gauge reactions, normalize expansionist imagery within, and subtly institutionalise anti-Pakistan symbolism.

Similarly, anti-Pakistan content spiked by over 200 percent in the week following the Bajaur shelling on 18 October, with a high number of replies supporting anti-Pakistan narratives, predominantly from Pashtun nationalist or pro-Taliban accounts. This content is often bilingual, Persian and Pashto for domestic legitimacy, English for international consumption, reflecting a calculated media strategy.

The Taliban’s information strategy is not random. It follows a deliberate dual-track approach. To domestic audiences, they promote victimhood, sovereignty, and anti-Pakistan defiance, all to sustain internal unity and legitimacy. To international audiences, they project moderation, claiming to respect borders and deny interference in Pakistan’s affairs. Statements like Zabihullah Mujahid’s recent claim that relations were “smooth” during Imran Khan’s tenure exemplify this selective framing, designed to evoke nostalgia and shift blame for the current breakdown.

What emerges from this evolving disinformation campaign is a strategy of weaponised history, one that turns a colonial boundary into a modern battlefield. By exploiting the emotional symbolism of the Durand Line, repackaging colonial grievances, and manipulating both domestic and international perceptions, the Taliban have transformed propaganda into statecraft. The result is a hybrid conflict that extends beyond military skirmishes into the digital and psychological domains.