Originally published by The News. Featured by South Asia Times (SAT) for informational purposes, with attribution to the original author and publisher.
The Taliban captured Kabul in August 2021, but Afghanistan’s political conflict did not end with their victory. Five years later, armed opposition is becoming more geographically dispersed and organisationally diverse. Former soldiers, established resistance fronts and newer local formations are challenging a regime that has secured control without resolving the question of national inclusion.
Kandhari Pashtun Taliban have continued with policy of excluding other ethnic groups from power as they had done during their earlier rule in 1990s. Their rule based on coercion, loyalty to Shaikh Haibatullah and Taliban is increasingly seen as an occupation rather than representing majority of Afghans.
The resistance initially associated with Panjshir and northern Afghanistan now has a broader footprint. Ahmad Massoud’s National Resistance Front has claimed operations beyond its original stronghold, including in Baghlan, Kapisa, Kabul and Badakhshan. The Afghanistan Freedom Front, led by former Afghan army chief Yasin Zia, draws on former security personnel and has reported activity across northern and eastern provinces.
The Afghanistan United Front, led by Lieutenant General Sami Sadat, former commander of the Afghan army’s 215th Corps, announced its armed campaign in August 2026. Its claimed operations in Kandahar and Helmand extend the challenge into the Taliban’s southern heartlands. This development complicates any explanation of resistance as exclusively a northern or ethnic minority phenomenon.
Compiled resistance accounts for August and September claim 119 attacks across 26 provinces, with 256 Taliban personnel killed and another 256 injured. The United Front accounts for 59 claimed attacks, the Freedom Front 29 and the National Resistance Front for 11. These figures remain claims rather than independently verified battlefield totals. Different monitoring exercises produce different counts.
The geographical pattern nevertheless warrants attention. Resistance operations extend across northern, northeastern, central, eastern, southern and western Afghanistan. Badakhshan has emerged as a particularly active theatre, while attacks in Kabul and southern provinces suggest that opposition is no longer confined to isolated mountain strongholds.
Smaller formations add another dimension. Qayyum Malang, a former army commando, leads the Homeland Soldiers Front in Badakhshan. His group reportedly briefly seized the Yaftal district centre on July 17, disarmed Taliban personnel and raised its flag. A temporary seizure does not establish durable territorial control but it challenges the impression of unbroken local authority.
Amrullah Saleh’s Afghan Green Trend has also claimed armed activity. The Afghanistan Republican Front, led by former Bamyan governor Tahir Zamir, reported attacks in Kabul and Ghor. In Baghlan, the Andarab Resistance Front and the newer New Horizon organisation claimed a joint operation on September 5. Local networks appear to be developing alongside established leadership structures.
There are vulnerabilities within this opposition. Taliban forces killed senior National Resistance Front commander Hasib Panjshiri in August. The front subsequently announced leadership replacements, including Saleh Mohammad Registani as its general operational commander in September. Its comparatively limited September activity illustrates how dependent resistance organisations can remain on individual commanders.
These developments do not establish that Taliban rule is approaching collapse. Ambushes, assassinations and attacks on checkpoints differ fundamentally from the ability to hold territory and govern. Organisational diversity may indicate widening opposition but it can also reveal fragmentation and competing ambitions.
The deeper question is why reconciliation has failed to absorb this opposition.
Authority remains concentrated around Supreme Leader Hibatullah Akhundzada and his Kandahar circle. Communities outside that structure face restricted influence over appointments and decisions. For Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras and others, this reinforces longstanding concerns about access to state power.
The distinction must remain political. Pashtuns are not synonymous with the Taliban and no resistance organisation represents an entire ethnicity. The participation of Pashtun opponents underlines the danger of treating Afghanistan’s conflict as a simple contest between communities. The central problem is a narrow governing structure that offers insufficient space for a diverse society.
The promised general amnesty could have provided a foundation for reconciliation. Instead, violations have weakened confidence among former officials and security personnel.
The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan or UNAMA is the UN’s special political mission in the country. Established by the Security Council in March 2002, it undertakes political engagement and human rights monitoring, supports inclusive governance and promotes humanitarian assistance.
Between August 2021 and June 2023, UNAMA recorded credible reports of 218 extrajudicial killings, 424 arbitrary arrests and detentions, more than 144 instances of torture and ill treatment and 14 enforced disappearances involving former officials and security personnel. These occurred despite the amnesty announcement.
An amnesty cannot facilitate reintegration if those covered by it fear detention or death. Former soldiers and intelligence personnel possess training, knowledge of terrain and institutional networks. Where peaceful civilian life appears unsafe, some may join or establish armed formations. Repression can therefore, replenish the opposition it seeks to eliminate.
Economic pressures make this political failure more consequential. The World Bank’s May 2026 assessment estimated growth of 4.8 per cent in 2025, yet GDP per capita declined by 5.6 per cent as population expansion, including approximately 3.7 million returning Afghans, outpaced recovery. Inflation reached 7.6 per cent by March 2026. Aggregate growth has not translated into improved living standards.
UNICEF estimates that 21.9 million people require humanitarian assistance in 2026, including 11.6 million children. Restrictions on girls’ education and women’s participation further weaken the country’s capacity to recover. Afghanistan needs skills, employment and functioning services alongside security.
Resistance organisations also owe Afghans answers. They need credible political programmes, protection for civilians and commitments against revenge. Replacing one exclusive order with another would perpetuate the conflict. Their activities must also be distinguished from Islamic State Khorasan Province, whose terrorist violence presents a separate threat.
For Pakistan, the appropriate objective is an Afghanistan that neither exports insecurity nor descends into renewed civil war. Regional engagement should combine clear security expectations with pressure for enforceable amnesty protections, accountability and meaningful political participation.
The Taliban can treat expanding resistance solely as a problem of military enforcement or recognise the grievances beneath it. Sharing authority and allowing peaceful participation would give more Afghans a stake in the state.
Afghanistan’s stability will ultimately depend on whether people can trust the government with their safety and future. Territorial control cannot settle that question. Reconciliation can.
Amir Jahangir
The writer is a strategic communications expert, media executive, and policy adviser
