At the eighth Moscow Format consultations on Afghanistan, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov called for helping the Taliban government strengthen its counterterrorism capabilities. He said Moscow supports material, technical and expert assistance for Kabul, along with cooperation between intelligence and security services, and he rejected any NATO troop deployment for that purpose. The remarks came during his meeting with Afghan Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi. What matters most in the speech is what Lavrov left out.
A Narrow Definition of Terrorism
Russia appears satisfied with the Taliban’s actions against the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), a group that threatens Russian interests directly, as the 2024 Crocus City Hall attack showed. But treating ISKP as the whole terrorism problem in Afghanistan is a selective reading of the security landscape. Lavrov said nothing about other militant networks that operate in what is, at best, a permissive environment on Afghan soil.
His silence also extended to the internal conduct of the Taliban government. He did not mention the exclusion of minorities from political life, the restrictions on women and girls in education and public life, or the religious and jihadi indoctrination that can sustain extremist recruitment. This is particularly striking because Moscow has itself warned in the past about terrorist and extremist networks operating from Afghanistan.
Geopolitics Before Security
The pattern suggests that Moscow is more interested in drawing Afghanistan into its geopolitical orbit than in confronting the Taliban’s full security and human rights record. The logic is familiar and transactional. While the Taliban remain close to Russia, terrorism and human rights concerns risk being downplayed. If Kabul tilts toward the United States or other Western interests, Moscow can revive the same concerns as instruments of pressure.
Security narratives that rise and fall with alignment are not a stable basis for regional counterterrorism. They also weaken the credibility of the forums that host them.
The Cost for Pakistan
For Pakistan, this selectivity has a direct human cost. According to figures cited by Pakistani authorities, terrorism emanating from Afghan soil in 2026 has killed 1,327 Pakistanis and injured 2,484, while 1,865 militants have been killed in counterterrorism operations. Pakistan says it has identified 260 Afghan nationals killed while involved in terrorist activity inside Pakistan, with names, addresses and family details established, and that around 70 per cent of militants infiltrating from Afghanistan are Afghan nationals. These figures come from official Pakistani sources and should be read as such, but the trend they describe is a serious and sustained threat.
For neighbouring states, cross-border terrorism from Afghanistan is not an abstract geopolitical question. It is a daily security reality, and a regional forum that cannot address it fails the states most exposed to it.
What the Moscow Format Needs
If the Moscow Format is to remain relevant, it should do three things:
Adopt a comprehensive definition of terrorism. Counterterrorism cooperation cannot be limited to groups that threaten the host or its partners while others operate with impunity.
Link engagement to verifiable commitments. Material and technical assistance should be tied to measurable action against all militant networks using Afghan territory, not only ISKP.
Give the most affected neighbours a real voice. Pakistan and other frontline states should have a meaningful role in setting the forum’s counterterrorism agenda.
Conclusion
Assisting Kabul against ISKP is not in itself objectionable. The problem is the pretence that this addresses Afghanistan’s terrorism challenge. By staying silent on the wider militant landscape and on the Taliban’s governance record, Russia has let down the Moscow Format. Regional security cannot be reduced to one group while other networks operate in a permissive environment, and a forum that avoids this question risks becoming a venue for diplomatic signalling rather than collective security.
SAT Commentaries, a collection of insightful social media threads on current events and social issues, featuring diverse perspectives from various authors.
Moscow Format’s Blind Spot: Counterterrorism Without Accountability
At the eighth Moscow Format consultations on Afghanistan, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov called for helping the Taliban government strengthen its counterterrorism capabilities. He said Moscow supports material, technical and expert assistance for Kabul, along with cooperation between intelligence and security services, and he rejected any NATO troop deployment for that purpose. The remarks came during his meeting with Afghan Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi. What matters most in the speech is what Lavrov left out.
A Narrow Definition of Terrorism
Russia appears satisfied with the Taliban’s actions against the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), a group that threatens Russian interests directly, as the 2024 Crocus City Hall attack showed. But treating ISKP as the whole terrorism problem in Afghanistan is a selective reading of the security landscape. Lavrov said nothing about other militant networks that operate in what is, at best, a permissive environment on Afghan soil.
His silence also extended to the internal conduct of the Taliban government. He did not mention the exclusion of minorities from political life, the restrictions on women and girls in education and public life, or the religious and jihadi indoctrination that can sustain extremist recruitment. This is particularly striking because Moscow has itself warned in the past about terrorist and extremist networks operating from Afghanistan.
Geopolitics Before Security
The pattern suggests that Moscow is more interested in drawing Afghanistan into its geopolitical orbit than in confronting the Taliban’s full security and human rights record. The logic is familiar and transactional. While the Taliban remain close to Russia, terrorism and human rights concerns risk being downplayed. If Kabul tilts toward the United States or other Western interests, Moscow can revive the same concerns as instruments of pressure.
Security narratives that rise and fall with alignment are not a stable basis for regional counterterrorism. They also weaken the credibility of the forums that host them.
The Cost for Pakistan
For Pakistan, this selectivity has a direct human cost. According to figures cited by Pakistani authorities, terrorism emanating from Afghan soil in 2026 has killed 1,327 Pakistanis and injured 2,484, while 1,865 militants have been killed in counterterrorism operations. Pakistan says it has identified 260 Afghan nationals killed while involved in terrorist activity inside Pakistan, with names, addresses and family details established, and that around 70 per cent of militants infiltrating from Afghanistan are Afghan nationals. These figures come from official Pakistani sources and should be read as such, but the trend they describe is a serious and sustained threat.
For neighbouring states, cross-border terrorism from Afghanistan is not an abstract geopolitical question. It is a daily security reality, and a regional forum that cannot address it fails the states most exposed to it.
What the Moscow Format Needs
If the Moscow Format is to remain relevant, it should do three things:
Adopt a comprehensive definition of terrorism. Counterterrorism cooperation cannot be limited to groups that threaten the host or its partners while others operate with impunity.
Link engagement to verifiable commitments. Material and technical assistance should be tied to measurable action against all militant networks using Afghan territory, not only ISKP.
Give the most affected neighbours a real voice. Pakistan and other frontline states should have a meaningful role in setting the forum’s counterterrorism agenda.
Conclusion
Assisting Kabul against ISKP is not in itself objectionable. The problem is the pretence that this addresses Afghanistan’s terrorism challenge. By staying silent on the wider militant landscape and on the Taliban’s governance record, Russia has let down the Moscow Format. Regional security cannot be reduced to one group while other networks operate in a permissive environment, and a forum that avoids this question risks becoming a venue for diplomatic signalling rather than collective security.
SAT Commentary
SAT Commentaries, a collection of insightful social media threads on current events and social issues, featuring diverse perspectives from various authors.
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