Made in India: The Supply of Weapons and Ammunition to Israel

India’s expanding defence-industrial relationship with Israel has acquired a new dimension amid the war in Gaza.

A July 2026 investigation by Amnesty International, based on commercially available shipment-level trade data, identifies 2,596 shipments of small arms, ammunition, military vehicles and related components from India to Israel between 7 October 2023 and 30 November 2025.

• The investigation estimates that these shipments included at least 390,516 small-arms parts, 564,970 components of explosive ordnance, including drone warheads and artillery-shell casings and 298 military-vehicle components.

Importantly, Amnesty says these figures are conservative because shipments whose military character could not be verified, as well as items potentially intended for civilian or defensive purposes, were excluded.

The figures point to something larger than isolated commercial transactions: India has become embedded in Israel’s defence supply chains. Full diplomatic relations between the two countries were established only in 1992, but defence cooperation accelerated after the 1999 Kargil War, when Israel became an important military supplier to India.

The relationship has since evolved into joint production. Adani-Elbit Advanced Systems India Limited, established in 2016, created India’s first military-drone manufacturing facility, while the Barak-8 missile system emerged from cooperation between India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation and Israel Aerospace Industries.

The post-2023 supply chain identified by Amnesty involves both private companies and Indian state-owned enterprises.

1. Munitions India Limited (MIL), wholly owned by the Government of India, manufactures and exports artillery shells.
2. Advanced Weapons & Equipment India Limited produces and exports 81mm mortars, while India Optel Limited supplies optical and semiconductor defence products.

 On the private side, PLR Systems manufactures small-arms parts; Kalyani Strategic Systems produces artillery-shell casings; Alpha Elsec Defence & Aerospace Systems, a joint venture involving Alpha Design Technologies and Elbit Systems, manufactures drone warheads; and Premier Explosives supplies rocket parts, explosives and propellants.

One shipment illustrates the significance of the trade more clearly. Amnesty identified a shipment by government-owned MIL containing 1,000 155mm high-explosive artillery shells to Elbit Systems.

 The shipment was labelled “Defence goods 155mm Shell HE,” indicating finished high-explosive ammunition rather than merely industrial components. The report notes that Israel’s Military Industries, the importer of such shipments, is owned by Elbit Systems, a major supplier of 155mm artillery ammunition to Israeli forces.

This relationship also coincides with deliberate Indian policy to expand domestic defence manufacturing and exports. In November 2025, India and Israel signed a memorandum of understanding committing the two countries to promote co-development and co-production in defence.

Meanwhile, the Adani-Elbit partnership has involved production of the Hermes 900 unmanned aerial vehicle in India. The significance is strategic: India is not merely purchasing Israeli weapons but increasingly participating in the manufacturing ecosystem that connects Israeli defence companies with global production networks.

The central issue, therefore, is no longer simply whether India exports defence products to Israel, but whether its export-control system adequately assesses the end use of those products.

India’s defence exports require government authorization, while arms and ammunition listed under the SCOMET Category 6 regime require prior approval from the Directorate General of Foreign Trade. Applications undergo inter-ministerial review involving the Ministry of External Affairs, Ministry of Home Affairs and Ministry of Defence.

Yet Amnesty reports that the review process is confidential, leaving no public record of whether India’s obligations under international humanitarian law or the Genocide Convention were considered when relevant licences were granted.

India is a party to the Genocide Convention and all four Geneva Conventions, but it has not joined the Arms Trade Treaty. The legal question is consequently significant. Under Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions, states must respect and ensure respect for international humanitarian law, while the Genocide Convention requires states to act when they know, or should normally have known, of a serious risk of genocide.

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