Originally published by Dawn. Featured by South Asia Times (SAT) for informational purposes, with attribution to the original author and publisher.
Pakistan is ranked first in the latest Global Terrorism Index (GTI), 2026.
That ranking, and the wider relationship between terrorism and Pakistan, cannot be explained without factoring in Afghanistan. The country’s proximity to Kabul and its hostile neighbourhood make it a victim of transnational terrorism emanating with Indian involvement.
Since 2021, New Delhi has maintained diplomatic ties with the Taliban regime and has also armed Baloch terrorist groups from Afghan territory, who have been responsible for an uptick in attacks on Pakistani soil.
Proximity remains a critical factor: Pakistan shares a border of approximately 2,600km with Afghanistan, which has resulted in sustained militant violence, and 97 per cent of deaths from terrorism occur in concentrated areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. On this basis, the GTI score suggests that the country is exposed to a geographical frontier rather than any societal sympathy for terrorism.
A Wider Threat
Pakistan’s GTI ranking can also be understood through Kabul’s promotion and harbouring of militant networks, which affect the wider region, including Central Asia. The narratives of the secular, post-Soviet regimes of the C5 states [post-Soviet independent republics in Central Asia] need to be factored in, as the region has previously experienced attacks, including the 1999 Tashkent bombings, which were perpetrated by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU).
The IMU is one of 28 UN-designated terrorist groups operating on Afghan soil, alongside the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which targets the Pakistani state. To date, Kabul has not taken any action against the IMU to address the existential threat it poses to Tashkent.
Based on these shared concerns, Central Asian states view Pakistan and its role in combating terrorism through an Afghanistan-Pakistan-C5 prism, in which the deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan contributes to instability in the latter. This is evident from the challenges posed by the transnational Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), which also operates from Afghanistan.
UN Security Council assessments document the ISKP’s efforts to recruit Tajiks and Uzbeks in Afghanistan and to expand into Central Asian states by publishing vernacular content. This includes the ‘Sadoi Khorasan’ radio and audio network, which publishes in Tajik, and the Al Azaim Foundation’s Sadoi Khorasan magazine, which condemns the Mirziyoyev government in Tashkent and the Putin administration in Moscow.
Scepticism has been directed at Kabul’s role, for example by Tajikistan, whose foreign ministry called on the international community in 2026 to carry out coordinated action against extremism and border-related challenges in Afghanistan. This statement suggests that Central Asian states, particularly those sharing borders with Kabul, are concerned over the Taliban government’s role in fomenting discord, which is consistent with Islamabad’s stance.
Even countries adopting softer approaches, including Uzbekistan with its ’Tashkent Formula’, have neither recognised the Kabul government nor turned a blind eye to its role in promoting terrorism. Instead, the emphasis is on operational and tactical ties, driven by strategic necessities such as cooperating on border security, tackling human smuggling and conducting feasibility studies on ongoing projects, including the 573km, $4.8 billion Uzbekistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (UAP) railway project.
Combatting Terrorism Together
Central Asian counterterrorism architectures, including the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), also view Pakistan as an important partner. Islamabad gained membership of the SCO in 2017 and assumed its chairmanship in 2026 during the Bishkek summit in September. RATS held its 45th session in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, in April 2026, chaired by Pakistan. The meeting focused on terrorist threats emanating from Afghanistan, with all member states, including Uzbekistan, agreeing that enhanced regional cooperation with Pakistan, as an important stakeholder, is warranted to address them.
Bilaterally, countries including Uzbekistan have also agreed to expand cooperation with Pakistani law enforcement agencies to address joint threats, including cybersecurity challenges, human trafficking and organised crime. Joint understandings reached in January 2026 also include interagency exchanges between Tashkent and Islamabad to tackle terrorism.
Another example of Pakistan’s bilateral understandings on counterterrorism with Central Asian states is Kyrgyzstan, which issued a joint statement with Pakistan in September 2026 on cooperating via the United Nations, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation and the SCO to address instability emanating from Afghanistan. Both countries emphasised that regional connectivity is contingent on resolving the Afghanistan quagmire. Such views reveal how Islamabad’s stance on terrorism is consistent with Central Asian threat perceptions.
Islamabad and major C5 capitals also share concerns about recruitment by transnational terrorist organisations and the extremist ecosystem that enables it, which is also based in Afghanistan. The UN’s 2026 assessments point to concerns about Tajik nationals joining ISKP, including the existence of sleeper cells and transnational networks that pose a threat to Dushanbe, Islamabad and the wider region. For example, the 2024 Crocus City Hall attack in Moscow involved Tajik nationals recruited by ISKP, who were then apprehended by Russian authorities.
Chief among the terrorist groups posing a threat to Pakistan, alongside Baloch militants, is the TTP, which has hideouts in Afghanistan. The 2026 GTI links Pakistan’s deteriorating security situation to an increase in attacks by these groups. The victim-perpetrator relationship makes the distinction clearer. Responsibility is attributed solely to groups such as the TTP, which attack Pakistani civilians, security agencies and institutions, and the total number of deaths makes the Pakistani state and its civilian population victims of terrorism.
It is evident, therefore, that Pakistan’s top ranking in the GTI 2026 makes Islamabad a victim rather than a generator of terrorism. The Central Asian perspective on regional terrorism and Pakistan’s role also provides a contextual framework that vindicates Islamabad’s position, with C5 scepticism centred on porous borders, militant activity and transnational extremism as shared threat perceptions.
With the majority of attacks taking place in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Islamabad remains at the centre of the fight against Afghanistan-based terrorism, with a Kabul regime harbouring UN-designated terrorist groups that pose a threat to the entire region.
This makes Pakistan increasingly vulnerable as a front-line state rather than culpable, as Islamabad’s adversaries in India and Afghanistan wish the international community to believe.
That is what its GTI ranking for 2026 suggests.
Syed Hamzah Rifaat
The author is head of the Central Asia Programme for Regional Cooperation and Connectivity at the Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad.
