The eighteenth BRICS summit is scheduled to take place on September 12 and 13 at Bharat Mandapam, New Delhi, with India hosting the bloc for the fourth time since its inception two decades ago. Leaders from member countries seldom find themselves in such a predicament.
Though Vladimir Putin has confirmed his participation in the event—which comes amidst continuing sanctions on Russia following its invasion of Ukraine—China’s president, Xi Jinping, is anticipated to join, although he has not officially announced his visit as of now.
Hosting both men under one roof is a balancing act for India specifically — caught between its Western partnerships and a guest list that includes a leader Washington has sanctioned.
However, it is not an easy event to organize. India, in its capacity as chair, has conducted over 350 government and sector meetings across 25 cities throughout the year to lead up to these two days.
The backdrop matters. After a devastating offensive against Iran by US and Israeli forces began on February 28—resulting in the death of Iran’s supreme leader within hours and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz for months—questions have been raised by several states about the effectiveness of the US security umbrella.
As a Lancaster University professor explained to Al Jazeera, the US umbrella is now perceived as “moribund at worst, or ineffective at best”. Three major regional powers whose security fears were triggered by that conflict—Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan—found their own answer on August 7 by entering into a mutual defence treaty in Makkah, entirely outside any BRICS or Western framework.
The inability to overcome internal dilemmas has been evident since May. During the meeting of foreign ministers at the same location, the group was unable to come to an agreement on a joint statement for the first time in many years. This resulted instead in a statement by the chair, which openly acknowledged reservations about three points: how to refer to the situation in West Asia, whether Gaza should be considered “an inseparable part of the Occupied Palestinian Territory,” and passage through the Red Sea and the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait.
This breakdown extended beyond mere semantics; reports from the same period highlighted a direct diplomatic confrontation between Iran and the UAE—two BRICS member nations arguing amongst themselves rather than with the West. September’s leaders face essentially the same challenge, but at a level higher.
The largest issue of ambiguity remains expansion, which has not reached a consensus even among insiders. While some media reports claim a “second batch of countries” is in the pipeline—backed by confirmation from Russia’s deputy foreign minister that expansion is on this year’s agenda—the Carnegie Endowment takes an opposing view, suggesting new admissions are unlikely because priority is being given to the “integration” of existing members.
Regardless, over 30 countries have lined up, including Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Serbia, Sri Lanka, Syria, Turkey, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe, with Nigeria considered the leading candidate for an African seat.
The situation is deeply complicated: founding member Brazil advocates for stricter admission criteria, while Russia pushes to speed up the process. Furthermore, Colombia successfully joined the New Development Bank despite not being a full BRICS member, while Venezuela’s application remains stuck in the same pending pile as Pakistan and Turkey.
In the case of South Asia, the country of interest is Pakistan. It entered the queue back in November 2023, and while most applicants are only interested in one of the five founding members, Pakistan has both Russia and China on its side.
However, this may not make a difference if there is even one objection. BRICS operates on consensus, and Indian commentary ahead of the chairship has suggested New Delhi is prepared to use exactly that veto. Turkey is another candidate in the same queue; despite reports saying it lobbied Beijing directly for support, it has reportedly rejected mere partner status out of dissatisfaction.
Where India can claim to have seen progress, however, is in the financial plumbing. Foreign ministers have developed a cross-border payments system connecting each country’s financial networks for local currency transactions, using India’s own UPI platform as an example rather than seeking a unified BRICS currency.
The New Development Bank is moving towards local-currency funding, aiming to shift from one-quarter to 30 percent of its portfolio this year, backed by over $40 billion in loans issued since its inception. These are tangible, if incremental, steps away from dollar-based finance.
Because this progress is not sufficient to form the sole subject of a joint communique, it helps explain why India’s chairmanship theme—”Building for Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability”—focuses heavily on internal cooperation rather than conflict with the West.
The organization BRICS was largely founded to balance against—the International Monetary Fund—remains a theme in name rather than substance for the summit. Alongside that sits another highly uncomfortable challenge: Washington has directly threatened 100% tariffs on any BRICS nation that attempts to create a new currency or undermine the U.S. dollar.
Given these geopolitical realities and increasingly divergent interests of the member states, the upcoming BRICS summit will show whether the organization grows or shrinks in relevance. The summit will test whether BRICS can uphold the goals it meant to acheive, or will it will get overshadowed by other regional alliances and groupings.
Syed Talha Shah
Syed Talha Shah is an undergraduate student pursuing a Bachelor's degree in Defence and Strategic Studies at Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad. His research interests include National security, Strategic affairs, International Affairs, and Socio-Economic Challenges.
