India–Taliban Nexus and TTP Leverage against Pakistan

In a significant twist to the evolving narrative surrounding India’s policy towards post-Taliban Afghanistan, former Afghan Interior Minister General Masood Andrabi recently argued that “New Delhi rapidly recalibrated its Afghanistan policy after the fall of the Islamic Republic in August 2021. India has shifted its focus from supporting the former Kabul government to engaging pragmatically with the Taliban.”

The statement rekindles discussions about what India’s Afghanistan policy means for its broader strategic approach towards Pakistan’s security environment. At first glance, one might perceive this shift as an ideological change of heart towards the Taliban, a movement that India had previously viewed with suspicion.

However, according to Andrabi, the reality is more nuanced. He argues that India sees greater potential for advancing its strategic interests, particularly vis-à-vis Pakistan, through engagement with the Taliban administration. This represents a significant departure from India’s earlier approach. When the Republic of Afghanistan existed between 1973 and 1978, India remained deeply invested in supporting democratic institutions and reconstruction efforts.

With the Taliban’s return to power in 2021, however, India gradually restored diplomatic engagement with the new Taliban administration, eventually reopening its embassy in Kabul and holding meetings with Taliban officials in New Delhi. While India appears to have shifted from diplomatic isolation to pragmatic engagement, this policy can also be viewed through the prism of its strategic competition with Pakistan.

Central to Andrabi’s analysis is the claim that “India is seeking to exploit the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) through its growing relationship with factions within the Taliban administration.” This argument provides a framework for understanding why deteriorating relations between Islamabad and Kabul cannot be explained solely by the Taliban’s traditional ties with the TTP. Instead, Andrabi argues that the combination of Afghan territory being available for anti-Pakistan militant activity and India’s growing engagement with different Taliban factions has created an increasingly serious security challenge for Pakistan.

From this perspective, Pakistan’s cross-border strikes can be interpreted as more than counterterrorism operations. They also serve as a strategic signal to both the Taliban and India that Afghan territory must not be used to facilitate attacks against Pakistan. In this context, Pakistan’s operations are intended not only to disrupt militant infrastructure but also to deter any future cooperation that could strengthen anti-Pakistan militant groups operating from Afghan soil.

The military confrontation between India and Pakistan approximately two years ago also influenced the evolution of India’s strategy towards Afghanistan. The high costs of conventional escalation between two nuclear-armed states reinforced the need for alternative forms of strategic competition. Andrabi argues that India consequently expanded its engagement with Afghanistan to increase pressure on Pakistan’s western security domain rather than pursuing direct military confrontation.

A second component of Andrabi’s argument concerns the nature of India’s engagement with the Taliban. According to him, India’s relationship with the movement lacks formal institutionalization, unlike traditional bilateral relationships. Instead, it consists of “discreet contacts with senior Taliban figures and networks,” enabling New Delhi, according to Andrabi, to maintain greater strategic flexibility while avoiding the political costs associated with overt strategic alignment.

To support this argument, Andrabi points to several senior Taliban figures that are allegedly engaged in some form of cooperation with Indian intelligence agencies. Among those he identifies are Defense Minister Mullah Mohammad Yaqoob and Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi. Andrabi further claims that Indian intelligence agencies have established links with representatives from their respective factions, particularly individuals associated with the Yaqoob faction in Kabul.

Beyond senior-level engagements, Andrabi also contends that Indian intelligence networks have developed contacts with local Afghan elders and different Taliban factions, particularly in provinces along the Pakistan–Afghanistan border. According to his assessment, these relationships enable India to expand its influence across Afghanistan’s fragmented political landscape.

Whether these claims can be independently corroborated remains open to debate. Nevertheless, they highlight how Afghanistan has increasingly become an arena of strategic competition among regional powers.

As Islamabad, Kabul and New Delhi navigate an increasingly complex security environment, intelligence competition, proxy influence and cross-border militancy are likely to remain central features of regional geopolitics.

For Pakistan, the combination of Taliban rule, persistent TTP attacks and India’s expanding engagement with Afghanistan presents a significant strategic challenge that is likely to continue shaping Pakistan’s security calculus and foreign policy in the years ahead.