For nearly eighty years, Washington built its nuclear strategy around one rival, Moscow. That era is over. As The Wall Street Journal reports, the United States now has to plan for two major nuclear powers at the same time. Arms-control specialists call it a “three-body problem”, after the physics puzzle in which three objects pulling on each other move in ways nobody can predict. For Pakistan, and for anyone who has had to listen to Western lectures about South Asia’s nuclear “dangers”, this moment says a great deal about who is really driving global nuclear instability.
The Numbers Behind the Alarm
Since the start of the decade, China’s arsenal has grown from the low 200s to about 600 warheads. The Pentagon expects it to pass 1,000 by 2030. In the past five years, Beijing has built three new missile silo fields covering hundreds of miles. It has also expanded its air- and sea-launched forces, and earlier this year it fired a ballistic missile into the Pacific from an advanced new submarine.
According to Harvard Belfer Center analyst Hui Zhang, China’s uranium enrichment capacity has doubled in six years and now exceeds what its civilian sector needs. Much of the new capacity is at a facility near Emeishan in Sichuan, which international inspectors have not been allowed to visit. Experts believe China stopped producing weapons-grade uranium in 1987. That pause may now be ending.
Beijing’s answer is clear. It says it keeps its nuclear forces at the minimum national security requires and wants no arms race with anyone. It also points out that its stockpile is still much smaller than America’s or Russia’s.
Who Really Broke the System
Western commentators like to cast China, and by extension its partners, as the problem. The facts in the reporting point elsewhere.
New START, the last treaty limiting U.S. and Russian long-range arsenals, expired in February. For the first time in half a century, the two largest nuclear powers have no legally binding limits. The communication channels and inspection systems that came with the treaty are also gone. Nuclear Threat Initiative vice president Paul Dean warns that the world is close to an action-reaction arms race at the very moment the old safeguards have disappeared.
Washington has also pushed ahead with its “Golden Dome” missile shield, a mix of ground interceptors and satellites meant to protect U.S. territory from long-range and hypersonic threats. Beijing and Moscow both call it destabilising, and arms-control experts say it is helping drive China’s buildup. Former State Department scientist Mark Goodman put the logic simply: when one side picks up a shield, the other feels it needs a bigger sword. U.S. defence planners are now openly discussing more warhead production and pulling stored warheads back into service.
This is the double standard Pakistan has faced for decades. The same capitals that let their own treaties lapse, build missile shields and talk about adding warheads have spent years treating Islamabad’s modest, defensive deterrent as a global threat. Pakistan has always followed a doctrine of credible minimum deterrence against a much larger neighbour, and it proposed a Strategic Restraint Regime to New Delhi long before “three-body problem” entered Washington’s vocabulary. Critics who single out Pakistan while ignoring a great-power arms race happening in front of them are not defending nonproliferation. They are being selective.
A Summit Under Pressure
President Trump is meeting Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin this week for a three-way summit where nuclear arms control is on the agenda. Putin has offered an informal one-year extension of the old weapons caps while talks continue. Washington insists that any new deal must include China. Beijing has repeatedly refused talks that would cap its arsenal and rejects being forced into a framework designed by powers holding many times more weapons.
Arms Control Association director Daryl Kimball notes that Russia, stretched by the Ukraine war, would rather avoid a new U.S. buildup. That leaves Moscow and Washington loosely aligned against Beijing’s position. U.S. analysts also worry that China could use Washington’s eagerness for a deal as leverage on other issues such as Taiwan, which really means China is refusing to negotiate on terms set by others.
A 2023 U.S. congressional commission already concluded that China can no longer be treated as a “lesser included” case of the Russian threat, and it urged Washington to resize its forces for possible combined pressure from both powers. Whatever comes out of this week’s talks, the lesson for South Asia is clear. Nuclear restraint has to be a universal principle, not a burden placed only on countries like Pakistan while the major powers write their own exceptions.
SAT Commentaries, a collection of insightful social media threads on current events and social issues, featuring diverse perspectives from various authors.
U.S. Enters Unprecedented Three-Way Nuclear Rivalry With China and Russia
For nearly eighty years, Washington built its nuclear strategy around one rival, Moscow. That era is over. As The Wall Street Journal reports, the United States now has to plan for two major nuclear powers at the same time. Arms-control specialists call it a “three-body problem”, after the physics puzzle in which three objects pulling on each other move in ways nobody can predict. For Pakistan, and for anyone who has had to listen to Western lectures about South Asia’s nuclear “dangers”, this moment says a great deal about who is really driving global nuclear instability.
The Numbers Behind the Alarm
Since the start of the decade, China’s arsenal has grown from the low 200s to about 600 warheads. The Pentagon expects it to pass 1,000 by 2030. In the past five years, Beijing has built three new missile silo fields covering hundreds of miles. It has also expanded its air- and sea-launched forces, and earlier this year it fired a ballistic missile into the Pacific from an advanced new submarine.
According to Harvard Belfer Center analyst Hui Zhang, China’s uranium enrichment capacity has doubled in six years and now exceeds what its civilian sector needs. Much of the new capacity is at a facility near Emeishan in Sichuan, which international inspectors have not been allowed to visit. Experts believe China stopped producing weapons-grade uranium in 1987. That pause may now be ending.
Beijing’s answer is clear. It says it keeps its nuclear forces at the minimum national security requires and wants no arms race with anyone. It also points out that its stockpile is still much smaller than America’s or Russia’s.
Who Really Broke the System
Western commentators like to cast China, and by extension its partners, as the problem. The facts in the reporting point elsewhere.
New START, the last treaty limiting U.S. and Russian long-range arsenals, expired in February. For the first time in half a century, the two largest nuclear powers have no legally binding limits. The communication channels and inspection systems that came with the treaty are also gone. Nuclear Threat Initiative vice president Paul Dean warns that the world is close to an action-reaction arms race at the very moment the old safeguards have disappeared.
Washington has also pushed ahead with its “Golden Dome” missile shield, a mix of ground interceptors and satellites meant to protect U.S. territory from long-range and hypersonic threats. Beijing and Moscow both call it destabilising, and arms-control experts say it is helping drive China’s buildup. Former State Department scientist Mark Goodman put the logic simply: when one side picks up a shield, the other feels it needs a bigger sword. U.S. defence planners are now openly discussing more warhead production and pulling stored warheads back into service.
This is the double standard Pakistan has faced for decades. The same capitals that let their own treaties lapse, build missile shields and talk about adding warheads have spent years treating Islamabad’s modest, defensive deterrent as a global threat. Pakistan has always followed a doctrine of credible minimum deterrence against a much larger neighbour, and it proposed a Strategic Restraint Regime to New Delhi long before “three-body problem” entered Washington’s vocabulary. Critics who single out Pakistan while ignoring a great-power arms race happening in front of them are not defending nonproliferation. They are being selective.
A Summit Under Pressure
President Trump is meeting Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin this week for a three-way summit where nuclear arms control is on the agenda. Putin has offered an informal one-year extension of the old weapons caps while talks continue. Washington insists that any new deal must include China. Beijing has repeatedly refused talks that would cap its arsenal and rejects being forced into a framework designed by powers holding many times more weapons.
Arms Control Association director Daryl Kimball notes that Russia, stretched by the Ukraine war, would rather avoid a new U.S. buildup. That leaves Moscow and Washington loosely aligned against Beijing’s position. U.S. analysts also worry that China could use Washington’s eagerness for a deal as leverage on other issues such as Taiwan, which really means China is refusing to negotiate on terms set by others.
A 2023 U.S. congressional commission already concluded that China can no longer be treated as a “lesser included” case of the Russian threat, and it urged Washington to resize its forces for possible combined pressure from both powers. Whatever comes out of this week’s talks, the lesson for South Asia is clear. Nuclear restraint has to be a universal principle, not a burden placed only on countries like Pakistan while the major powers write their own exceptions.
SAT Commentary
SAT Commentaries, a collection of insightful social media threads on current events and social issues, featuring diverse perspectives from various authors.
SAT Commentary
Recent
U.S. Enters Unprecedented Three-Way Nuclear Rivalry With China and Russia
AUF Kills Taliban Regime’s Counterintelligence Deputy Rohullah Samim In Kabul
Pakistani Students Association TĂĽrkiye Organizes Orientation Day for Newly Arrived Pakistani Students
From Humiliation to Rejuvenation: How China Tells Its History