Scholars have used wars that never happened to measure the effectiveness of deterrence over the past 80 years. The first four waves of deterrence were defined by threats shaped by timely events. The fifth wave of deterrence, centered on multi-domain operations and new instruments, remains unsettled.
The fifth wave is distinguished by the interaction of traditional military deterrence with cyberspace, artificial intelligence, economic coercion, and hybrid threats. The theory of deterrence is in an interregnum: the old narratives of deterrence exist within the broader perspectives of evolving deterrence. How much deterrence will extend or overextend is not yet measurable.Â
The “3 Cs” (capability, credibility, and communication) remain the foundation of deterrence and its core logical conception. However, the conduct, implementation, and nature of deterrence have evolved from the beginning. The first wave, in the 1940s, was characterized by the clear domination of nuclear power.
The second wave, during the 1950s and 1960s, linked rational choice, game theory, and strategic thinking to understanding conventional military conflict. The third wave, during the Cold War era, drew on historical case study analysis to examine deterrence within a bipolar order.
From the 1990s onward, as threats shifted to non-state actors and rogue leaders, deterrence expanded into a cross-domain, non-traditional form. The fifth wave, emerging globally, is a debate in its own right.Â
After the early 2000s, the scope of deterrence grappled with the growing interdependence of military, economic, technological, and informational domains. Jeffrey H. Michaels, in his article
“Deterrence Studies: A Field Still in Progress,” demonstrates the overlap between the fifth wave and the fourth. This is because earlier conceptual and predictable deterrence frameworks intersect with new developments. These advancements are not yet measurable, as the fields of economics, war and peace, nuclear strategy, cyberspace, and space are all in progress, with no clear ends.
Thus, it is uncertain to build a specific rationale for deterrence. Although the arguments of predecessor waves remain and can be applied where applicable, contemporary challenges in cyber security, AI and digital systems, space competition, and hybrid threats pose a new form of deterrence.Â
What shape will deterrence take? This is the main question accentuating the field of deterrence. Depending on the circumstances of broader societal and technological conditions and continuous changes in capabilities, deterrence is, in most cases, shaped by the function of resilience.
A report by the Stimson Center on “Beyond Denial: Toward a Credible Cyber Deterrence Strategy” argues that cyber resilience can function as a mechanism of deterrence but needs greater accountability. Resilience, alongside credible defense and actionable methods, contributes to deterrence, as systems that are defendable enough to absorb and recover from attacks reduce the adversary’s expected gains.
Moreover, deterrence is being shaped by profound changes in its capability, credibility, and communication. Although these foundations exist, multidimensional and innovative modernization is converging their operationalization and implementation.Â
The extension of deterrence relies primarily on new domains and instruments of coercion, denial, attribution, and escalation within them. The mutually perceived logic that persuades an actor not to take certain actions is a mindset associated with conventional warfare.
The contemporary international system is marked by the entry of deterrence into new domains: cyberspace and outer space, digital and AI competition, technical communication, conventional and irregular forces, advanced undersea infrastructure, and information networks.
These new domains are strategically consequential because of newly emerged and emerging instruments of deterrence: artificial intelligence and technological statecraft, cyberspace power and operations, outer-space projections, rapid attribution, anti-jamming and anti-spoofing systems, and so on.
Artificial intelligence is one of the most sensitive and consequential tools, because if digital systems or other technologies gain significant momentum in strategic or global affairs, unpredictable escalation may occur.Â
Because the scope and nature of deterrence are not simple phenomena with clear objectives, the fifth wave represents a continuous shift in evolution, stretching deterrence theory to an unknown extent.
Michael RĂĽhle argues that extending deterrence into new domains risks stretching the concept beyond recognition. On the other hand, deterrence may remain a stable and mutually understood concept if it achieves compatibility across emerging domains.Â
To keep the future of deterrence sustainable, alongside the means of peaceful existence, all states, international institutions, policymakers, and other actors in the international system need to maintain an attainable marker for deterrence.
Through a disciplined approach, threats to national security, critical infrastructure, outer space developments, and other existential red lines demand firm deterrence. Resilience, alongside attribution, accountability, and calibrated responses, is essential to address cybersecurity. Given the traditional emphasis, deterrence should be understood as a multidimensional, dynamic concept, with attention to the complexities of composite challenges.Â




