When China launched the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), it envisioned more than a network of roads, railways, ports and commercial projects. Stretching from Yunnan Province to the deep-sea port of Kyaukphyu on Myanmar’s western coast, the corridor represents a strategic artery within the Belt and Road Initiative. It gives China access to the Bay of Bengal. Besides, it strengthens its economic presence in Myanmar. Furthermore, it provides an alternative route for energy and trade with an aim to reduce Beijing’s dependence on the strategically vulnerable Strait of Malacca.
For Bangladesh, CMEC raises a question whether China’s growing economic interests in Myanmar give Beijing greater leverage to help advance a resolution to the Rohingya crisis. The question has gained renewed relevance amid discussions of extending regional connectivity through a Bangladesh-China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCMEC). On June 26, 2026, the meeting between Prime Minister Tarique Rahman and Chinese President Xi Jinping also brought regional connectivity back into focus. After almost nine years of the Rohingya crisis, it is understandable that such developments would generate optimism in Dhaka. If China’s economic interests in Rakhine continue to expand, Beijing could have a stronger incentive to promote the stability. But the central issue is whether Beijing’s understanding of stability is compatible with what a sustainable resolution to the crisis actually requires.
China has substantial interests in Myanmar, particularly in Rakhine. Its oil and gas pipelines already connect Kyaukphyu with Yunnan. CMEC envisages major investments in infrastructure, industrial zones and transportation. Rakhine is strategically important to Beijing because it forms part of China’s broader effort to establish an alternative route to the Indian Ocean. Prolonged conflict in the region threatens strategic infrastructure and creates uncertainty around projects that are important to China’s regional ambitions. There is therefore a clear economic rationale for Beijing to favour a more stable Rakhine.
China also possesses a degree of diplomatic leverage that few other external actors can match. It is Myanmar’s largest trading partner and one of its most important investors. Beijing has previously facilitated dialogue between Bangladesh and Myanmar over the Rohingya issue and supported efforts surrounding repatriation. But economic leverage does not translate into humanitarian diplomacy. Since the mass displacement of the Rohingya in 2017, China has consistently advocated dialogue, humanitarian assistance and voluntary repatriation. It has supported bilateral discussions and attempted to facilitate a framework for return. At the same time, Beijing has remained reluctant to apply sustained public pressure on Myanmar over the deeper political questions at the heart of the crisis. This cautious approach is consistent with China’s broader foreign policy principle of non-interference. Beijing generally prefers pragmatic engagement and economic cooperation without reshaping the domestic political order of its partners.
This is why connectivity should not be mistaken for a solution to the Rohingya crisis. At the same time, it would be equally short-sighted to dismiss connectivity as irrelevant. China’s economic interests could create incentives for China to become more engaged with the political conditions that sustain insecurity. That possibility deserves serious consideration. The political landscape of Rakhine is considerably more complicated today than it was when the Rohingya crisis escalated in 2017. The rise of the Arakan Army has fundamentally altered the balance of power. The Myanmar military is no longer the only actor capable of determining political and security outcomes in Rakhine. Any durable settlement will have to account for those exercising effective authority on the ground. This presents a difficult challenge for China. Much of its earlier engagement on repatriation was conducted through Myanmar’s central authorities. So diplomacy focused exclusively on Naypyidaw may no longer be sufficient.
For Bangladesh, the situation is more complicated. The Arakan Army has itself faced allegations of abuses against Rohingya communities. Consequently, any future discussion of safe return may require engagement with an actor that is increasingly influential in Rakhine while also facing serious allegations concerning its treatment of the Rohingya. This makes the crisis fundamentally different from a conventional bilateral dispute between Dhaka and Naypyidaw. The appropriate response is therefore neither to place excessive faith in China nor to dismiss the opportunities created by Chinese engagement. BCMEC should be viewed as a potential instrument of diplomacy. Dhaka should welcome greater regional connectivity while ensuring that the conditions for sustainable repatriation remain part of its engagement with Beijing. At the same time, Bangladesh should continue to diversify its diplomatic efforts. ASEAN, the United Nations, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation and other international actors remain essential to any sustainable response.
Therefore, the challenge for Bangladesh is to recognise both realities at once. The corridor presents an opportunity, but it also carries a risk. Economic connectivity could move forward while the Rohingya question remains indefinitely postponed. Unless economic connectivity is accompanied by meaningful diplomatic engagement on rights and security, it will not remain as a pathway home for the Rohingya.
