India Has Stopped Black Mass Exports. Now it Must Make Domestic Recovery Pay.

India can prohibit the export of a battery-recycling intermediate. It cannot order that intermediate to become a profitable domestic industry.

That is the next test for its decision to ban exports of lithium-ion battery black mass, the powder produced from shredding used batteries and manufacturing scrap. The policy can help retain a source of critical minerals. Its success will depend on whether collecting and processing that material becomes a dependable business, including when the batteries contain less valuable metals.

The Directorate General of Foreign Trade’s November 10 notification changed the export policy for the specified material under ITC HS code 85491400 from “Free” to “Prohibited”, with immediate effect until further orders. The government says the Foreign Trade Policy’s transitional arrangements apply. This is a restriction on a specified category, not a ban on every recovered mineral or battery product.

The government’s explanation is straightforward: Indian recycling capacity is underused because feedstock is scarce, while black mass generated domestically has been going abroad and some recyclers have imported material. Keeping more material available at home could support domestic processing.

But the evidence needs careful handling. The Global Trade Research Initiative says India recorded no exports under the code in FY2026. That does not fit neatly with the government’s account of material leaving the country. GTRI founder Ajay Srivastava has raised the possibility of declarations as cobalt powder or nickel intermediates. That is an enforcement concern, not proof that particular shipments occurred.

Policymakers should not bridge that gap with an assumption. They should establish what is being generated, how it is classified and where it goes. A policy designed around an uncertain material balance needs better records, not a more confident slogan. Publishing a baseline by battery chemistry, processing stage and destination would make it easier to test whether the restriction changes real material flows.

Customs enforcement is one part of that work. Officers need ways to examine composition and production history when a declaration is questionable. Exporters and processors need clear classification guidance. A different commercial description should neither provide an easy escape from the restriction nor become grounds for treating every legitimate processed product as prohibited waste.

The harder economic question begins before material reaches a port. A recycler needs batteries to be collected, transported safely and sorted into streams it can process. Those activities cost money. A prohibition does not pay the collector, reduce transport costs or make a scattered supply of used batteries predictable.

Producer responsibility should therefore finance and verify the operating chain, not merely create paperwork showing that a recycling obligation has changed hands. Producers should be able to demonstrate where batteries were collected, which facility received them and what happened to the material. Regulators should test those records against actual processing, while protecting workers and controlling hazardous residues.

Battery chemistry makes that discipline more important. Nickel-manganese-cobalt batteries contain nickel and cobalt whose recovery can help support the business case. Lithium-iron-phosphate batteries do not. As Down To Earth’s analysis explains, recovering value from LFP black mass is harder economically because lithium is the principal high-value metal in its cathode.

There is no single margin called “battery recycling”. Collection distance, chemistry, recovery yield, treatment costs and metal prices change the calculation. A system that works only for the most valuable material can leave the difficult waste behind.

That creates a concrete decision for government and battery producers: how will the cost of handling lower-value streams be covered? Support should be based on a transparent gap between responsible processing costs and recoverable revenue, with evidence of performance. It should not reward firms for choosing only the easiest material while presenting their results as a solution for the entire waste stream.

The Rs 1,500-crore Critical Mineral Recycling Incentive Scheme, approved in September 2025, gives India another policy tool. Its implementation should make the distinction between installed equipment and functioning recovery visible. Public reporting should separate capacity, actual throughput, recovered output, treatment of residues and commercial sales. Announced investment is not a substitute for those results.

Startups have room to help with collection, chemistry identification, traceability and processing. But their financing must match their work. A collection business needs cash to pay suppliers before it is paid downstream. A processing company may need equipment finance and time to demonstrate repeated performance. Neither problem is solved simply by calling both companies critical-mineral innovators.

Keeping black mass in India can support industrial development. It can also shift costs onto collectors and processors if the rest of the system cannot use the retained material economically. That trade-off deserves measurement, not denial.

The test is what happens to the next difficult batch: is it collected safely, recorded accurately, processed responsibly and paid for through a viable operating model? If India can answer that question across different battery chemistries, the export restriction will support a domestic industry rather than become its substitute.

Jackie Omotalade
Jackie Omotalade

Jackie Omotalade is a Chief Programs & Impact Officer at a global nonprofit, where she works on artificial intelligence and climate programs. She advises executives and boards on climate finance, responsible supply chains and technology policy, and has moderated a main-stage panel at Greentech Festival Berlin.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of South Asia Times.