Axis of Alignment: India-Israel Ties in the Shadow of Iran’s Isolation

India’s muted response to Israel’s preemptive military action against Iran in June 2025, and its recent decision to abstain from endorsing the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s (SCO) joint statement condemning Israeli airstrikes on Iran has raised questions about its evolving strategic posture. Despite having long-standing economic, energy, and cultural ties with Tehran—and having chaired the SCO when Iran was admitted as a full member—New Delhi’s decision to stay silent signals a carefully calculated diplomatic move, rooted in complex geopolitical balancing.

Despite Iran’s entry into the SCO under India’s own chairmanship in 2023, New Delhi chose to distance itself from a multilateral consensus at a time when Israeli aggression faced near-universal condemnation among SCO member states. India’s justification—that it had “procedural concerns” over the joint language—rings hollow in the face of its growing strategic and commercial ties with Tel Aviv.

India’s stance in this crisis illustrates how geopolitical pragmatism increasingly shapes its Middle East policy. With extensive energy, trade, and diaspora links to Iran, India has traditionally pursued a careful equidistance. However, the growing convergence with Israel—spanning defense, technology, and infrastructure—is redefining those parameters. This shift, while not abrupt, has accelerated under the Modi government.

The optics of neutrality, particularly when juxtaposed with India’s silence on the targeting of Iranian nuclear facilities and military assets, underscore a tilt toward strategic alignment with Israel. This inclination appears rooted in both ideological proximity and evolving geopolitical interests. Both states share common ground on counterterrorism, border security, and strategic surveillance—and have deepened their intelligence cooperation over the past decade.

From Tactical Cooperation to Strategic Alignment

A case-in-point is India’s increasing commercial footprint in Israel. The acquisition of a major stake in the Haifa Port by the Adani Group in 2023 signified more than just business expansion—it marked a strategic alignment of maritime and trade logistics in the eastern Mediterranean. The deal was portrayed as a node in the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), which aims to bypass traditional chokepoints controlled by rivals such as Pakistan.

However, the recent escalation has placed such ventures under risk. Mediterranean shipping lanes are now exposed to greater security threats, undermining confidence in the long-term viability of Indian investments. Yet, despite the volatility, India’s broader commitment to its Israeli partnerships appears unshaken—a testament to how deeply strategic imperatives now shape its foreign policy calculus.

At the defense-industrial level, the collaboration between Indian and Israeli firms in joint arms production, particularly drones and surveillance systems, continues to grow. These partnerships reinforce an operational synergy that increasingly blurs the line between commercial cooperation and strategic alignment. While these engagements offer India access to cutting-edge defense technology, they also position it in proximity to Israeli military posture, making diplomatic neutrality harder to sustain in regional crises.

India’s evolving posture in the Middle East must also be read in the context of its broader strategic aspirations. Seeking to position itself as a pivotal power in an emerging multipolar world, India aims to preserve relations with the U.S., Israel, and the Gulf, while managing ties with traditional partners like Iran. Yet, in times of conflict, this balancing act becomes visibly asymmetric.

Limits of India-Iran Connectivity

For Iran, who stayed carefully balanced in the Pak-Indo crisis a month ago and appeared increasingly India centric, India’s abstention from condemnation may be perceived as betrayal—or at least an erosion of trust. While trade and energy ties are still substantial, Tehran may increasingly view India as unreliable in times of strategic need. This sentiment could impact bilateral cooperation, particularly in areas like the Chabahar Port, energy security, and regional connectivity.

In this context, India’s long-standing connectivity strategy has hinged on Iran’s geographical centrality, especially via the Chabahar Port and the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), offering a gateway to Afghanistan, Central Asia, and Russia. However, this approach now confronts growing headwinds as Iran deepens its strategic and economic alignment with China under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The 25-year China-Iran strategic partnership signed in 2021, which envisions up to $400 billion in Chinese investments across Iran’s energy, infrastructure, and industrial sectors, is gradually edging India out of influence.

China has cemented its position as Iran’s largest trading partner, while India’s trade with Iran has plummeted—from $17 billion in 2018–19 to just $2.3 billion by 2022–23—largely due to U.S.-driven sanctions that curtailed Iranian oil imports. Although India signed a 10-year agreement in May 2024 to further develop Chabahar, the project remains susceptible to renewed U.S. pressure, especially in light of Washington’s return to maximum pressure policies under Trump. This geopolitical volatility continues to threaten India’s long-term access to Chabahar, weakening its broader regional connectivity objectives just as IMEC ambitions come under increased scrutiny.

Erosion of Consensus Diplomacy On Multilateral Forums

In multilateral settings such as the SCO, India’s selective engagement risks undermining its credibility as a bridge-builder. The organization, comprising powers like China, Russia, Pakistan, and now Iran, increasingly positions itself as a counterweight to Western and Israeli-led coalitions. India’s unwillingness to endorse collective positions on sensitive geopolitical crises could limit its influence in shaping alternative global narratives.

Regionally, India’s posture complicates its ties with the Muslim world at large. While Gulf states maintain close economic relations with India, public opinion in these countries remains sensitive to issues involving Israeli military aggression. India’s ambiguity—while diplomatically safe—may not be sustainable if the conflict escalates into a wider regional war.

For Pakistan, India’s apparent tilt toward Israel reaffirms longstanding concerns about the latter’s use of foreign partnerships to project influence in the region—sometimes through non-state and private sector proxies. India’s involvement in strategic infrastructure projects in Israel, its abstention from multilateral criticism, and growing military-industrial linkages point toward a gradual realignment in its regional calculus.

Yet, this alignment also brings exposure. In times of war or crisis, overreliance on partners embroiled in regional conflicts exposes India to reputational and strategic risks. The Iran-Israel confrontation has already disrupted regional energy flows, pushed oil prices upward, and shaken investor confidence—developments that directly impact the Indian economy.

Conclusion

In the final analysis, India’s response to the Israel-Iran escalation illustrates a shift from strategic balancing to selective alignment. While maintaining the façade of neutrality, India’s silence signals deeper currents of ideological affinity, economic integration, and strategic convergence with Israel. If India seeks to uphold its image as a democratic, multipolar actor advocating global equity, it will need to reconsider the long-term viability of such asymmetrical alignments—especially as the global order becomes increasingly sensitive to the optics and outcomes of conflict.