From old-school pagers to advanced cyber warfare, the 2024 Hezbollah incident reveals the shocking evolution of modern conflict.

From Pagers to Cyber Attacks: The Evolution of Warfare

Remember in Die Hard 4 when a hacker’s paradise turns into a full-blown “fire sale,” or in Kingsman when a secret code in a SIM card triggers global chaos? Well, it turns out reality isn’t far behind!

In the 2024 Hezbollah incident, operatives rigged old-school analog Motorola pagers—yes, the kind your dad probably used—with explosives to eliminate targets, merging retro tech with modern warfare. This stark reminder demonstrates that operatives can weaponize any device, whether a pager or the latest smartphone.

Let’s have a look at how today’s covert operations blend analog nostalgia with cyber espionage, flipping the script on what we thought was obsolete.

The Lebanon-Hezbollah Pagers Incident: A Case Study in Technological Penetration and Cyber Warfare

In recent years, Israel’s clandestine operations targeting Hezbollah have demonstrated a highly sophisticated approach to intelligence gathering and covert warfare. The September 18, 2024, explosions involving thousands of pagers, allegedly rigged by Israeli intelligence, mark another chapter in the longstanding conflict between Hezbollah and Israel.

The targeting of Hezbollah operatives through pagers highlights two distinct areas of concern: the dangers posed by both analog and digital devices in modern warfare.

Israeli media report that the recent attack in Lebanon was a Mossad operation. Operatives planted 20 grams of PETN in Motorola pagers in Tel Aviv 5 months ago and then sent them to Lebanon. They rigged these pagers, used mainly by hospital staff, to explode.

History of Technological Exploitation in Assassinations

The use of technological means to carry out targeted assassinations is not a new phenomenon. Israel has a history of utilizing various forms of technology to track and eliminate key figures within hostile organizations.

In 1996, Israeli operatives killed Yahya Ayyash, a senior Hamas bomb-maker, using a mobile phone rigged with explosives. This attack set a precedent for using personal communication devices as tools of assassination.

Israel’s Evolving Tactics

Israel refined this strategy further in the years that followed, adopting more complex techniques. For instance:

  1. Mahmoud Hamshari Assassination (1972): In response to the murder of 11 Israeli athletes by Palestinians at the Munich Olympics, Mossad operatives orchestrated an assassination attempt on Mahmoud Hamshari, the PLO’s representative in Paris. They replaced the marble base of his phone with a replica containing explosives. On December 8, when Hamshari answered the phone, the explosives detonated, resulting in severe injuries. Hamshari lost a leg and later died from his injuries.
  2. Yahya Ayyash Assassination (1996): Shin Bet, Israel’s internal security agency, assassinated Yahya Ayyash, a prominent Hamas bombmaker known for killing many Israelis, by tricking him into using a Motorola Alpha cell phone that a Palestinian collaborator had brought into Gaza. This phone contained about 50 grams of explosives. When Ayyash answered a call, the device exploded, killing him instantly.
  3. Mahmoud al-Mabhouh Assassination (2010): Mossad assassinated a high-ranking Hamas official in Dubai, using extensive cyber espionage and physical surveillance. The use of digital means, including the cloning of credit cards and passports, allowed the operatives to execute the plan undetected until after the assassination.
  4. Iranian Nuclear Scientist Assassinations (2010-2012): During this period, attackers assassinated various Iranian nuclear scientists through a combination of cyber warfare and physical sabotage. Israel’s Mossad often took the blame for these killings, which involved planting bombs on vehicles or within devices close to the targets. For instance, a remote-controlled bomb attached to Majid Shahriari’s car exploded and killed him.
  5. Fouad Shukr Assassination (2023): As part of a series of targeted assassinations, Israel reportedly killed Hezbollah’s top military commander, Fouad Shukr, using sophisticated surveillance and tracking methods, including potential cyber breaches.

These incidents highlight Israel’s growing reliance on technological infiltration to gain access to enemy networks and devices. Whether through analog means such as pagers or digital networks, the method of delivery is becoming increasingly varied and hard to detect.

In Beirut's southern suburbs on August 1, 2024, Hezbollah members carry the coffin of senior commander Fuad Shukr, who was killed in an Israeli strike. [REUTERS]

At their home in the Jebaliya refugee camp, northern Gaza Strip, the father of Palestinian militant Mahmoud al-Mabhouh displays a family photo of Mabhouh. [AP]

Mahmoud Hamshari

A child holds up a picture of Yahya Ayyash during a demonstration in Palestine.

Penetration in the Manufacturing Supply Chain

This latest Hezbollah pager incident exemplifies an evolution in covert operations where supply chain penetration plays a crucial role. This is not just another ‘oops’ moment!

Foreign intelligence agencies likely tampered with the explosive-laden pagers, imported from Taiwanese manufacturer Gold Apollo, before they even entered Lebanon. This represents a new frontier in cyber warfare, where agencies compromise products during the manufacturing or distribution phase, weaponizing them before they reach their targets.

This technique has historical precedence:

  1. The Stuxnet Cyberattack (2010): Although this was primarily a digital operation, Stuxnet stands as an example of a supply chain attack in the context of industrial sabotage. Israeli and U.S. intelligence designed the malware to sabotage Iran’s nuclear program by infiltrating and compromising centrifuges at the Natanz facility.

Siemens—involved through its SCADA systems—was key in this supply chain attack. The malware spread undetected for years by exploiting vulnerabilities in both hardware and software systems.

  1. CIA’s Crypto AG Scandal (1970s-1990s): In a Cold War-era operation known as “Operation Rubicon,” the CIA and the German BND secretly owned a Swiss company, Crypto AG, that sold encrypted communication devices to governments around the world. Unbeknownst to the customers, the CIA had backdoor access to the devices, allowing them to eavesdrop on encrypted communications. This operation is one of the earliest examples of a government using the supply chain to infiltrate foreign governments’ communications.

These cases illustrate how infiltrating the supply chain can lead to devastating breaches in security, compromising the trust that even the most secure organizations place in their communication devices.

Beyond Stuxnet

Israel’s moves in getting into the supply chain of tech companies, like Gold Apollo (Taiwan), or bigger players like Motorola and Siemens, show that this game’s not just about planting bombs but about planting codes, malware, you name it, before these products even hit the shelves.

Stuxnet was just a start—those Siemens systems were the gateway, and guess what? Siemens and Motorola both have their roots in Germany. So, are we overlooking Germany’s role as a tech playground for these shady operations? Is it just a coincidence that so much of this game-changing tech comes from the same country?

Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs stated that it has no records of Gold Apollo pagers being sent to Lebanon. [THE STRAITS TIMES]

Natanz Nuclear Facility in Iran

Bombe computing device

portable M-209 cipher machine

Also See: What’s Behind India Explaining Modi’s Ukraine Visit to Russia?

Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities and the Digital Landscape

Analog devices, such as pagers, can be compromised by physical tampering. The digital age has introduced new avenues of exploitation. Organizations like Hezbollah have shifted away from using digital devices such as mobile phones due to vulnerabilities. Instead, they have increasingly relied on low-tech solutions like pagers. However, even these devices are not immune to tampering, as demonstrated by the recent explosions.

The broader cyber landscape is rife with examples of digital vulnerabilities being exploited for similar purposes:

  1. The Flame Virus (2012): Israeli intelligence designed the cyber espionage tool Flame to gather intelligence from Iranian networks. It did this by recording conversations, capturing screenshots, and stealing data. At the time, Flame was one of the most sophisticated pieces of malware ever discovered. It was capable of remotely activating a device’s microphone or camera without detection.
  2. Kaspersky Hack (2015): Israeli intelligence reportedly hacked into the systems of cybersecurity firm Kaspersky Lab, using it as a backdoor to monitor Russian espionage activities. The attack exploited the company’s own antivirus software, highlighting the risk of cybersecurity solutions being turned into espionage tools.
  3. Pegasus Spyware (2016-2021): The Israeli company NSO Group developed Pegasus, a highly advanced spyware that can infiltrate mobile phones and grant access to messages, cameras, microphones, and GPS data. This software has tracked and eliminated targets worldwide, further blurring the line between physical and digital warfare.
  4. Breach of Cybersecurity: Internet-based devices, while encrypted, are susceptible to hacking, malware, and tracking by advanced intelligence agencies. Hezbollah has been a target of cyber espionage by Israel’s Unit 8200 and the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA), which reportedly intercepted communications and deployed malware to track their movements. This ongoing cyber threat underscores the challenges Hezbollah faces in securing their digital communications.

Analog vs. Internet-Based Devices in Modern Warfare

The use of both analog and internet-based devices presents distinct advantages and risks. People often see analog devices, such as pagers, as more secure due to their simplicity and lack of internet connectivity. However, as the Hezbollah incident illustrates, attackers can still tamper with these devices in ways that are nearly impossible to detect.

Supply chain attacks, physical sabotage, and remote-triggered explosives all pose significant risks, even to low-tech communication methods.

On the other hand, hostile actors can exploit the wealth of data provided by internet-based devices like mobile phones and computers. Digital devices present numerous vulnerabilities, such as location tracking and communication interception, that hostile actors can weaponize. The widespread use of spyware like Pegasus shows how easily even encrypted digital communications can fall victim to compromise.

quantum warfare employing different quantum technology systems

Pagers

Implications for Future

The targeting of Hezbollah through tampered pagers reflects a broader trend in modern warfare. This trend involves blending analog and digital techniques to exploit weaknesses in communication networks.

Intelligence agencies have demonstrated a remarkable ability to penetrate even the most secure systems. They achieve this through physical sabotage in the manufacturing supply chain or by using sophisticated malware to infiltrate digital systems. This is particularly evident in regions with prevalent anti-Israeli and anti-Western sentiment, such as Iran, Lebanon, Syria, and Russia.

Take for instance—the assassinations of key figures, from Iranian president to military leaders and affiliates like Ismail Haniyeh. Israel’s not just playing with bombs anymore, they’re playing in the digital space too. Their foothold in companies like Siemens and Motorola has given them front-row access to Iran’s vulnerabilities, both on the ground and online.

The fact that these companies are German-based just adds another dimension to the puzzle. Germany’s tech hubs are pumping out tools that seem to keep winding up in the wrong hands—or maybe the right ones, depending on who you ask. It makes you wonder if Germany’s tech industry has unintentionally become the go-to launchpad for espionage. 

Israel’s sophisticated penetration into companies like Motorola and Siemens has paved the way for its larger operations. For example, Stuxnet crippled Iran’s nuclear program by infiltrating the very centrifuges crucial to uranium enrichment.

This raises questions about how deeply compromised Iran’s critical infrastructure is. Israeli intelligence consistently finds vulnerabilities, whether through companies providing hardware or through cyber espionage. Tech meets espionage, and Iran’s on the losing side.

Blurring Physical and Cyber Threats

This incident serves as a critical reminder that in the 21st-century battlefield, no communication device—whether analog or digital—can be considered truly safe. Organizations like Hezbollah, Hamas, or Iranian-backed militias face a growing challenge in securing their operations amidst an ever-evolving technological landscape. Countries with interests in these regions are also at significant risk, as they too become targets of such covert operations. The lesson from this latest incident is clear: modern warfare blurs the line between physical and cyber threats. Exploiting technology, whether analog or digital, remains a potent tool for conducting covert operations and targeted assassinations. This impacts not just organizations but entire nations engaged in the geopolitical struggle.

SAT Commentaries’ are social media threads by various authors, reproduced here for website use. Views are their own.

SAT Commentaries, a collection of insightful social media threads on current events and social issues, featuring diverse perspectives from various authors.

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