Bangladesh is currently engulfed in a political crisis. Sheikh Hasina has stepped down, but the political instability is far from over. The agitators are students. They protested against the unjust quota system imposed by the government. This system favored the children and grandchildren of veterans of the First Civil War, which led to the establishment of an independent Bangladesh.
Roots of Political Instability
The Awami League-led government has often been criticized for implementing policies that some believe do not align with the public’s interests. The quota system has been one such policy. Though the Supreme Court had repealed the law, the protestors initiated a civil disobedience movement, causing the crisis in Bangladesh. They urged people to stop paying utility bills and cooperating with the government unless their demands were met. In the ensuing violence, government agencies cracked down nationwide, killing hundreds, injuring hundreds more, and arbitrarily detaining thousands.
This cycle of turmoil is not new to Bangladesh. Since its separation from Pakistan, a race to consolidate power has begun between the pro-Indian and nationalist forces.
Time and again, multiple military coups have shaken this country. These coups have caused a crisis in Bangladesh. Countercoup forces have killed the perpetrators on sight or executed them for not complying when captured alive.
On the fateful day of August 15, 1975, assassins killed Sheikh Mujib, a pro-Indian and secessionist leader. On November 3 of the same year, a countercoup deposed Khondakar Mushtaq. People believed Khondakar Mushtaq sympathized with the assassins due to his tilt towards India.
Sheikh Mujib was the first leader to conspire against United Pakistan and landed in India in 1972 while returning from England after prolonged imprisonment in West Pakistan. He addressed a public rally and thanked the Indian establishment for their support against Pakistan.
Power Struggles and Assassinations
Four days later, on November 7, a military coup killed Brigadier Khaled Mosharraf, who had ousted Khondakar Mushtaq. Major General Ziaur Rahman then took power after his release from house arrest, leading to another crisis in Bangladesh.
Sheikh Mujib had established his government on secular principles and had submitted completely to New Delhi. However, after assassins killed him and his family members, an Islamist took power but faced removal by a military coup. Left-wing army personnel, in collaboration with the left-wing Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal, then killed Khaled Mosharraf, a close confidant of Sheikh Mujib, triggering yet another crisis in Bangladesh.
Until 1981, General Zia held absolute power but faced assassination in the Chittagong Circuit House, where military loyalists of Lieutenant. General Ershad killed him and six bodyguards. During the 1971 civil war, West Pakistan held Lt. General Ershad, who returned to Bangladesh in 1973 after Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto signed the Shimla Agreement with Indira Gandhi.
Also See: Bangladesh Protests Lead to Death Count of 90
Ershad and Results of His Politics
Ershad had a different personality, thought process, and ideas than those who deserted the Pakistan army and fought against it in East Pakistan. This lineage of Ershad made him unique from others known for their loyalty to Bengali nationalism and pro-Indian inclination. Ershad waited patiently instead of seizing power immediately. When Abdus Sattar served as acting Vice President, Ershad removed him after ten months. At the first opportunity he got, he proclaimed himself Chief Martial Law Administrator and suspended the constitution.
This was seemingly a bloodless coup but at the expense of the earlier ruler Ziaur Rahman’s corpse. Both the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and the Awami League (AL) led a mass uprising against Ershad, forcing him to resign in 1990. Bangladesh, being a volatile country, initially struggled to achieve a peaceful transition of power and plunged into political chaos.
By that time, there had been enough spilled blood, and Bengalis began to question whether they needed to gain freedom from Pakistan. These bloody events brought their country to the brink of political and economic meltdown.
Bangladesh’s Struggles and Economic Decline
Bangladesh was impoverished and could not generate enough capital to alleviate the public’s poverty. In the 1990s, their per capita income was abysmal compared to India or even Pakistan. They were at 990 dollars (PPP), whereas Indians had 1190 dollars, and they were far behind Pakistan, which was leading in per capita income at 1880 dollars per annum. Amid the growing population and limited opportunities, they were on the brink of bankruptcy. The rising foreign debt, famine, and cyclones added insult to injury.
It is pertinent to mention an interesting fact here: India surpassed Pakistan in Purchasing Power Parity only in 2009, after sixty years of partition—a feat we must all celebrate and a fact we must not overlook.
With this sudden degeneration on every front, the common Bengali became frustrated and hopeless. When their failure to run the affairs became evident, signs of mutiny began to surface.
In 2009, Bangladesh Rifles revolted, and the lower-profile and ranking officers took high-ranking officers and their families hostage in the BDR Headquarters and killed their Director General, General Shakil Ahmed. Many others also met their fate. This event marked the zenith and pinnacle of the deterioration of the Bangladeshi political entity, as the ruling elite failed to devise a unanimous national objective. In contrast, Pakistan’s early establishment of the Objective Resolution set a clear supreme objective for the state, which still serves as the preamble of the Pakistan Constitution.
The Need for a New Beginning
Perhaps the time of military coups is over in Bangladesh. The elite in Bangladesh have strategically aligned themselves with India’s interests to mitigate the risks of diplomatic discord. Historically, India has employed various forms of intimidation and coercion to influence regional dynamics, prompting a cautious approach from Bangladeshi leaders. This alignment can be understood as a pragmatic response to India’s previous attempts at exerting pressure, thus reflecting a broader strategy of avoiding potential conflicts and ensuring stable bilateral relations.
The Bangladeshi people face the irony and great loss of having been misled with false pretenses and promises of fighting against Pakistan. They were led to believe in the vision of Sonar Bangla—The Golden Bangla—as a self-sufficient, economically independent, and vibrant Bangladesh.
India has shattered their dreams by strangling their economy with ruthlessly high tariffs and disgraceful conditions. The Teesta River dispute and Bangladeshi capitulation are evidence of this. These river tributaries are responsible for giving livelihood to 73% of the agrarian population of Bangladesh, and India is proposing several dam constructions in the upstream areas of West Bengal and Sikkim, attempting to drench the whole of Bangladesh.
India also wishes to attain a land and rail transit corridor from Bangladesh to connect its seven sister states to ease the pressure on the Siliguri Corridor, the only land link with mainland India, which is otherwise a major choke point for India in the event of war. Besides that, India wants sea access for these landlocked northeastern states through the Chittagong port.
From the above reasons, it is evident that Bangladesh faces existential threats, and its territorial integration can only remain intact if its leadership alters its dishonest policies based on stubbornness and animosity with Pakistan. These relations should not be derailed by the scars of the past. Dhaka should mend its ways and start a rapprochement for a fresh beginning that is mutually beneficial for both countries—a win-win situation for Bangladesh. This could help them deal with India more assertively if they reset their course in the best interest of their people.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own. They do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of the South Asia Times.
Sohail Ahmed is a keen observer of current affairs & has an interest in solution-based approaches to national security. He can be reached at sohailahmed1@gmail.com
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