The Jirga That Spoke, and Said Nothing About Terror

A grand jirga of the Dawar and Wazir tribes convened on July 4th in Mirali, North Waziristan, issuing a stark demand: the Pakistani state must halt any impending military operation in the area. The call, confirmed by tribal elders, comes against the backdrop of escalating violence orchestrated by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the state’s subsequent counter-terrorism measures. This grim reality is underscored by the 502 terror attacks that have claimed 737 lives in Pakistan in the first half of 2025 alone, with North Waziristan being the epicenter of this bloody conflict. The June 28th suicide bombing in Mirali, which claimed the lives of 13 soldiers and was carried out by the Hafiz Gul Bahadur faction of the TTP, is the latest incident.

The Insider Threat: The local Support

While the absolute majority of the local populationI opposes any form of terrorism or violence, it is a logistical and tactical impossibility for the TTP to operate with such impunity without some level of local support. To assume the group functions in a social vacuum ignores the complex realities of insurgency. This network, whether cultivated through coercion, ideological alignment, or tribal loyalties, provides the TTP with critical intelligence, shelter, manpower, and logistical aid.

The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has deep historical and leadership roots in Waziristan and its neighboring tribal districts. Long before the TTP’s formal creation in 2007, local militant groups provided sanctuary to anti-Pakistan militants. A prime example was the infamous Uzbek commander Tohir Yo’ldosh, who, along with hundreds of his Central Asian fighters, was hosted by factions within the Mehsud tribe. These foreign militants were responsible for killing hundreds in Waziristan and, alongside local Mehsud fighters, fiercely resisted the Pakistani army’s entry into Wana in 2004 but were eventually defeated after a week of fighting.

This entrenched militancy coalesced into the TTP in 2007, with its leadership dominated by local tribes. The first two emirs, Baitullah and Hakimullah Mehsud, hailed from the Mehsud tribe of South Waziristan, while Hafiz Gul Bahadur, whose faction claimed a recent deadly attack, is from the Utmanzai Wazir tribe of North Waziristan. At its peak in 2013-14, these two tribes formed the core of the TTP’s fighting force.

The dominance of the Waziristani factions was so critical that when Mullah Fazlullah, an outsider from Swat, became emir in 2013, it triggered massive internal splits. Many prominent Mehsud and Wazir commanders broke away to form their own factions. Following Fazlullah’s death, the leadership returned to the traditional power base, with Noor Wali Mehsud becoming the head, reaffirming the deeply local and tribal dynamics that continue to define the TTP’s command structure.

Compounding Crises: Afghanistan and Border Tensions

This internal challenge is compounded by external factors that have reversed some of the previous security successes. The hard-won gains from past military operations like Zarb-e-Azb were affected by the 2021 change of government in Afghanistan. The Taliban’s return to power has, in effect, transformed the country into a sanctuary for the TTP, with the new regime proving either unwilling or unable to control the group. This refusal to dismantle TTP safe havens is now a primary driver of regional instability.

This is exacerbated by local pressures. When the Pakistani state attempts to enforce stricter border controls to mitigate this threat, it faces fierce opposition, such as the lengthy protests at the Chaman border against visa requirements for Afghan citizens. This creates a dangerous paradox: a “loose” border facilitates terrorism, while a “hard” border incites local resistance, complicating the state’s efforts to secure its territory.

A Calculated Restraint: Why Pakistan Avoids Another Grand Operation

The Pakistan Army is consequently caught in a strategic dilemma. It faces a TTP campaign from its safe havens in Afghanistan, while a large-scale military operation, akin to 2014’s Zarb-e-Azb, risks alienating the local population. The people of Waziristan have suffered immensely from past conflicts, and their apprehension is understandable. Previous operations led to widespread displacement, the destruction of homes and livelihoods, and significant infrastructure loss.

It is precisely the attempt to avoid this collateral damage that has seen the Pakistani state shy away from a grand operation in the face of increasing terror attacks. The state has, instead, opted for intelligence-based operations and targeted strikes.

However, when and if decided, it won’t be a difficult task for the state to crush every last stronghold of the TTP, much like they did in Swat in 2009 and Waziristan in 2014. The Pakistani military has also demonstrated its capability and willingness to target TTP hideouts in Afghanistan, signaling a readiness to cross international borders to neutralize threats. The decision to launch a full-scale offensive is, therefore, not a question of capacity, but a complex strategic calculation weighing the potential for civilian suffering against the urgent need to eradicate the terrorist threat.

The Jirga’s Omissions

The jirga’s resolution is most notable for what it omits. While vehemently opposing a military operation, it offered no parallel condemnation of the TTP. The tribal elders did not demand that the TTP cease its attacks or vacate their territory. This selective criticism undermines the jirga’s moral standing by portraying the state as the sole aggressor while ignoring the violence perpetrated by the non-state actor.

Such public demonstrations, framed as local grievances, can function as a political tool for the TTP. By fostering a hostile environment for the military and challenging state authority, these jirgas create operational space for the TTP to regroup and consolidate its position. This pressure on the state, combined with an absence of pressure on the militants, effectively forms a political shield for the terrorist group. This effect is magnified by campaigns, such as those by the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM), for the removal of military checkpoints. While often rooted in legitimate concerns and a desire for the restoration of normalcy, this opposition can inadvertently weaken the state’s ability to monitor militant movement, creating security vacuums that benefit the TTP and its allies.

Ultimately, the jirga’s demand to halt military action, without proposing a viable alternative for curbing TTP violence, places the state in an untenable position. If the army stands down, it remains unclear who will protect the populace from extremist groups. As the tribes do not have the capacity to counter the militants themselves, demanding a halt to military action is, in effect, a call to cede territory to a terrorist organization, risking the creation of a permanent militant stronghold on Pakistani soil.

The path forward requires a delicate balance of decisive security action and a comprehensive strategy to address the legitimate grievances of the local population, a challenge that will define the future of peace and stability in the region.