Layered Defense vs Layered Attack: The Iran-Israel Missile Contest

Missile

Iran’s ballistic missile program has emerged as one of the most advanced and expansive in the Middle East, serving as a central pillar of its strategic deterrence. Over the past two decades, Tehran has significantly enhanced its missile range, accuracy, and survivability, shifting from outdated Scud derivatives to sophisticated systems featuring manoeuvrable reentry vehicles and hypersonic capabilities. This evolution is largely driven by Iran’s need to counter technologically superior adversaries, particularly Israel.

In response, Israel has developed a highly layered air defense system, including Iron Dome, David’s Sling, Arrow systems, and U.S.-provided THAAD and Patriot units. While this shield has proven effective in many instances, recent missile engagements, particularly during the June 2025 clashes, have revealed cracks in its architecture. Iran’s ability to inflict damage through saturation attacks raise critical concerns about the long-term resilience of Israeli defenses in the face of an evolving and determined adversary

Key Iranian Ballistic Missile Systems

Iran’s ballistic missile program demonstrates steady technological advancement, particularly in range, precision, and launch readiness. The arsenal includes short- to medium-range systems, along with emerging hypersonic capabilities.

Short-Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs)

Fateh-110 Series

Operational since 2002, the Fateh-110 is a solid-fueled, road-mobile missile with a 300 km range and a 500 kg warhead. Upgraded variants like the Fateh-Mobin improve guidance accuracy, while the Fateh-313 extends the range to 500 km, reaching speeds of approximately Mach 4–5.

Zolfaghar

Introduced in 2016, this solid-fuel SRBM carries submunitions and has a claimed range of up to 700 km. While Iran reports speeds of up to Mach 7.5, independent assessments suggest lower actual velocities

Shahab-1 and Shahab-2

These liquid-fueled missiles are derived from Soviet-era Scud designs. The Shahab-1 has a range of 300–350 km and a 1,000 kg warhead, while the Shahab-2 extends to 750 km. Their Circular Error Probable (CEP) remains large by modern standards (approximately 450 m or more).

Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs)

Shahab-3 Family

In service since 2003, the Shahab-3 is a liquid-fueled missile with multiple variants (A–D), ranging between 1,200–2,000 km. Early versions had a CEP of over 2,000 meters. Later iterations, including the Shahab-3B, feature improved accuracy and support cluster warheads, with manoeuvrable reentry vehicles (MaRV).

Ghadr Series

An advanced derivative of the Shahab-3 introduced in 2005, with ranges from 1,350 km (Ghadr-S) to 1,950 km (Ghadr-F). Featuring a “baby-bottle” RV shape and enhanced guidance systems, its CEP has reportedly been reduced to 100–300 meters.

Emad

Operational since 2015, the Emad is Iran’s first precision-guided MRBM. Based on the Shahab-3, it incorporates a MaRV with steering fins, a 1,700 km range, and a CEP reportedly as low as 50 meters.

Khorramshahr Family

Based on North Korea’s Musudan design, the Khorramshahr is a liquid-fueled MRBM with a large 1,500–1,800 kg warhead. The latest variant, Khorramshahr-4 (2023), reportedly features a 2,000 km range, hypergolic propellant for rapid launch, mid-course guidance, and speeds approaching Mach 8–16.

khorramshahr missile

Sejjil Series

First tested in 2008 and believed operational since around 2014, the Sejjil is a two-stage, solid-fueled MRBM with a 2,000–2,500 km range and a warhead capacity between 500–1,500 kg. Its solid-fuel design enables rapid launch and greater survivability.

Kheibar Shekan

Revealed in 2022, this modern solid-fuel MRBM has a 1,450 km range. Its MaRV warhead is designed to maneuver during the terminal phase to evade missile defenses, and its compact design facilitates easier underground storage.

Kheibar Shekan Missile

Haj Qasem

Unveiled around 2020, this solid-fuel MRBM has an estimated range of 1,400 km. Equipped with a MaRV, it reportedly re-enters at Mach 12 and strikes at Mach 5, though these figures are based on Iranian claims.

Haj Qassem Missile

Hypersonic Missile Systems

Fattah-1

Introduced in June 2023, Fattah-1 is Iran’s first publicly revealed hypersonic missile. It is solid-fueled, with a claimed range of 1,400 km and peak speeds between Mach 13–15. Iran asserts that it can evade all known missile defense systems, although these capabilities remain unverified by independent sources.

Fattah-2

Unveiled in November 2023 as the successor to Fattah-1. While specific technical details remain limited, Tehran claims improved maneuverability and guidance. There are also unverified suggestions of potential nuclear payload compatibility.

Technological and Operational Advancements

Iran’s missile program has strategically embraced key technological upgrades. The shift to solid-fuel systems, seen in missiles like Sejjil, Kheibar Shekan, and Fattah-1, significantly reduces launch time and enhances mobility, making them harder to detect and destroy before launch.

Iran has also improved guidance and precision. The Emad missile, with a reported CEP of 50 meters, marks a major leap from the Shahab-3’s 2,500-meter CEP. The integration of maneuverable reentry vehicles (MaRVs) in systems like Emad, Haj Qasem, and Kheibar Shekan enables complex evasive maneuvers, designed to penetrate advanced missile defense networks.

The development of hypersonic missiles such as Fattah-1, with claimed speeds of Mach 13–15, signals a new dimension in Iran’s arsenal. These systems exploit high speed, maneuverability, and short detection windows to bypass most air and missile defenses. Iran frames such advancements, particularly MaRVs and hypersonics, as direct countermeasures to U.S. and Israeli missile shield systems.

On the operational side, Iran has built extensive underground missile bases to shield its arsenal from aerial attacks. These hardened facilities support rapid dispersal via mobile launchers, often disguised as civilian vehicles, complicating detection and pre-emptive targeting.

Israel’s Multi-Layered Air Defense System

Israel operates a sophisticated, multi-layered air defense system, developed over decades and significantly augmented by collaboration and support from the United States . This system detects incoming fire and strategically deploys interceptors only when a projectile is determined to be heading towards populated areas or critical infrastructure . While U.S. military assets, including THAAD, Aegis-equipped warships with SM-3 interceptors, and Patriot systems, have provided crucial support , the bulk of interceptions during recent conflicts have been carried out by Israeli forces . The multi-layered nature of Israel’s defense and the distinct roles of different systems for varying ranges (short, medium, long, and exoatmospheric) clearly indicate a deliberate strategy to create overlapping defensive envelopes.

Core Defense Systems

Israel’s air defense architecture comprises several key systems:

Iron Dome: Short-Range Interception

Iron Dome specializes in intercepting short-range rockets and artillery shells, with an operational range typically between 4 and 70 kilometers, though its capabilities have reportedly expanded. It has demonstrated a success rate of over 90% against incoming rockets, including during the June 2025 Iranian attack. However, it is vulnerable to saturation tactics and performs poorly against high-speed, manoeuvrable missiles like the Haj Qasem, with an interception rate of only around 30%. Each Iron Dome interception costs approximately $50,000.

How Irom Dome Works?

David’s Sling: Medium-Range Coverage

David’s Sling, jointly developed with the United States, is designed to counter medium-range threats such as tactical ballistic missiles, large-caliber rockets, drones, cruise missiles, and enemy aircraft. It bridges the gap between Iron Dome and the long-range Arrow systems, with a range of 70 to 300 kilometers and altitude coverage up to 15 kilometers. In 2024 trials, it intercepted about 62% of medium-range threats. The cost per interceptor is roughly $1 million.

Arrow System: Long-Range and Exoatmospheric Defense

The Arrow missile defense system, consisting of Arrow 2 and Arrow 3, was developed in collaboration with the U.S. for long-range ballistic missile interception. Arrow 2 operates within the atmosphere, reaching up to 93 miles in altitude, while Arrow 3 is designed for exoatmospheric engagements, with a range exceeding 100 kilometers and altitudes up to 186 miles. Arrow 3 can engage ICBMs and hypersonic threats but struggles with terminal-phase maneuvers, particularly against solid-fuel missiles, resulting in a 40% interception success rate. Each Arrow 3 interceptor costs approximately $2.5 million.

US-Provided Systems

The U.S. has deployed the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system to Israel, which intercepts short- to intermediate-range ballistic missiles in their terminal phase . U.S. Navy destroyers armed with Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) interceptors have also supported Israel . The Patriot missile defense system, while widely deployed, has faced limitations against newer, high-maneuverability threats .

Assessing Success Chances: Iranian Offense vs. Israeli Defense

Both Systems at work – 14-16 June 2025

Recent direct engagements between Iran and Israel have revealed critical vulnerabilities in Israel’s air defense architecture, despite its overall effectiveness. Since June 13, 2025, Iran has escalated its missile campaign, launching an estimated 150–250 ballistic and cruise missiles across at least eight waves. These attacks followed Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear and military infrastructure and marked a shift toward sustained retaliation.

Iranian Missile Hitting targets in Tel Avis – June 14th

Iranian missiles struck multiple buildings in Tel Aviv, damaged the Haifa power plant, and hit sensitive facilities such as the Weizmann Institute of Science and the Ministry of Defense headquarters. These strikes caused substantial material and symbolic damage, underlining the vulnerabilities of even well-defended urban centers.

Though most incoming projectiles were intercepted, with Israel reporting an 80–90% overall success rate , the fact that high-value targets were struck underscores critical gaps. 

Most notably, Iran has yet to deploy many of its most advanced missile systems. Missiles such as hypersonic platforms and the Khorramshahr-4, with greater speeds, maneuverability, and warhead capacities, remain unused. Their future deployment in high-volume saturation strikes could further strain Israeli defenses, increasing the likelihood of overwhelming critical nodes and inflicting substantial casualties and infrastructure losses.

The broader implication is clear, while Israel’s missile shield remains one of the most advanced globally, it is not impenetrable. As Iranian missile technology evolves toward greater precision and complexity, and if Tehran decides to unleash its full arsenal, the attritional limits of Israel’s defense architecture may be tested in ways not yet seen.

Iranian Offensive Tactics

Iran employs several offensive tactics designed to challenge Israel’s defenses:

Saturation Attacks: A primary tactic involves firing synchronized waves of ballistic missiles and drones to overwhelm and exhaust Israeli air defense systems. This strategy recognizes that every air defense system has a finite capacity ceiling. A coordinated barrage of hundreds of short-range missiles can deplete interceptor stocks, potentially leaving cities exposed. This was evident in both the October 2024 and June 2025 strikes.

Combined Drone and Missile Barrages: Deploying drones alongside missiles forces Israeli systems to split targeting priorities, aiming to guarantee higher hit rates for incoming projectiles. Iran’s joint warfare strategy integrates drones to neutralize radars, ballistic missiles for blunt impact, and cruise missiles for stealth precision.

Effectiveness of MaRVs and Hypersonic Missiles: The use of Maneuverable Reentry Vehicles (MaRVs) in missiles like Kheibar Shekan, Emad, and Haj Qasem is specifically designed to evade defense systems . For instance, the Haj Qasem’s MaRV re-enters the atmosphere at Mach 12 and strikes at Mach 5, posing a significant challenge to the Iron Dome. Similarly, the Qassem Basir’s MaRV reduces the Arrow-3 system’s intercept window to a mere 6 seconds. Furthermore, Iran’s development of hypersonic missiles like the Fattah-1, which travel at extreme speeds (Mach 13-15) , are considered nearly impossible to intercept due to their rapid reentry, directional changes, and extremely short warning times. These hypersonic weapons are designed to cruise or glide above most air-defense systems and below most ballistic-missile-defense systems.

Israeli Defense Effectiveness and Limitations

Israel’s multi-layered air defense system has demonstrated high overall interception rates, with reports indicating that the “vast majority” of incoming projectiles were intercepted . Success rates have been cited between 80-90%  in the June 2025 engagements. 

Israeli interceptors engaging Iranian missiles in the skies over Tel Aviv.

Despite these impressive figures, no defense system is 100% guaranteed , and some Iranian missiles have indeed managed to break through the shield. The system remains vulnerable to saturation attacks, where a high volume of incoming threats can overwhelm its capacity . Additionally, systems like THAAD and Patriot have faced limitations when confronting newer, high-maneuverability threats . The Arrow 3, while highly capable, struggles with the terminal-phase maneuvers of solid-fuel missiles, and hypersonic missiles are considered nearly impossible to intercept by current systems .

A critical challenge for Israel’s defense is the cost-exchange ratio and the potential for interceptor depletion in a sustained conflict. While Iron Dome interceptors cost approximately $50,000 each , other systems like Arrow and David’s Sling utilize interceptors costing over $1 million. This cost disparity, where relatively inexpensive Iranian munitions are countered by significantly more expensive interceptors, creates a severe economic sustainability problem. Iran’s capacity to produce thousands of missiles  and its use of saturation tactics directly exploit this vulnerability. The fundamental question in a prolonged conflict becomes “who runs out of weapons first?”

In Summary

While Israel’s multi-layered air defense remains among the most advanced globally, recent Iranian missile barrages have exposed its vulnerabilities, particularly to saturation attacks and maneuverable or hypersonic projectiles. Iran’s restraint in deploying its most advanced systems, such as Khorramshahr-4 and Fattah-class missiles, suggests that future confrontations could be far more destructive. The conflict reveals a shifting balance, where offensive missile capabilities are increasingly able to challenge even the most sophisticated defensive shields. In a prolonged war of attrition, Israel’s ability to sustain costly interceptions may ultimately determine the durability of its deterrence.

Usama Khan holds a degree in International Relations from the University of Exeter and works as an academic. His research focuses on South Asian history, political dynamics, militancy, and civil conflicts.

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