Afghan Taliban’s Al-Mirsaad’s latest attempt to deflect attention from the undeniable facts surrounding the Kabul airport attack reads like a desperate exercise in narrative gymnastics. Their argument—suggesting that Muhammad Sharif Jafar, aka Naser, Ajmal, was nothing more than an observer—collapses under the weight of its own contradictions. In an attempt to downplay Jafar’s role in the attack, Al-Mirsaad seeks to mislead the international community by shifting focus away from the real issues at hand. However, these efforts are futile in the face of overwhelming evidence that directly links Jafar to the attack and highlights the Taliban’s failures in securing Afghanistan’s borders.
Taliban’s Shifting Narrative on ISIS-K
Since taking power in August 2021, the Taliban has repeatedly revised its stance on the presence and operations of the Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISIS-K). The group’s resurgence is closely linked to the Taliban’s decision to release thousands of prisoners, including known ISIS-K operatives like Muhammad Sharif Jafar, from Pul-e-Charkhi and Bagram prisons. Jafar, a figure with multiple aliases—including Jafar, Naser, and Ajmal—was arrested in 2019 by Afghanistan’s National Directorate of Security (NDS) for orchestrating numerous attacks in Kabul. His subsequent release during the Taliban’s takeover directly contributed to ISIS-K’s growing operational strength, and yet, the Taliban continues to downplay its role in enabling the group’s activities.
Zabihullah Mujahid, spokesperson for the Taliban-led Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA), recently attempted to shift blame for ISIS-K’s activities onto Pakistan. He stated that the “arrest on Pakistani soil of an Afghan national and member of the Islamic State group shows that IS has taken refuge and established havens inside Pakistan. This issue has nothing to do with Afghanistan.” This claim is a clear deflection from the Taliban’s failure to secure Afghanistan’s borders and prevent cross-border infiltration by ISIS-K operatives. The reality is that Jafar’s arrest is not evidence of ISIS-K’s presence in Pakistan but rather a direct consequence of Afghanistan’s failure to manage its borders, allowing terrorists to infiltrate Pakistan.
Revisiting the “Mastermind” Claim
Al-Mirsaad’s report suggests that other ISIS-K figures, such as Dr. Hussain and Abdullah Kabuli, were the real masterminds behind the Kabul airport attack, rather than Jafar. However, the Taliban’s inconsistent messaging raises questions. Jafar was not a peripheral figure—he was linked to 29 suicide bombings and terror attacks in Kabul, including the Abbey Gate attack. He also played a role in targeting the Afghan Presidential Palace and the United States Embassy with rocket attacks. Yet, the Taliban continues to obfuscate his true role in the ISIS-K network, undermining its own narrative about fighting terrorism. Zabihullah Mujahid’s statements about the Taliban’s alleged efforts against ISIS-K only serve to highlight the increasing contradictions between the Taliban’s claims and their failure to control ISIS-K’s growth.
The Fallout of the 2021 Prison Releases
The Taliban’s decision to release prisoners from Afghan jails, including high-ranking ISIS-K members, significantly bolstered the group’s operational capacity. While the Taliban has claimed to be cracking down on ISIS-K, reports indicate otherwise. The Kabul Katiba unit, operating under ISIS-K leader Shahab al-Muhajir, has only grown stronger under Taliban rule. The group has also maintained close ties with Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), with reports of fighters defecting between the two organizations. These developments have only compounded the regional instability. Even as ISIS-K continues to thrive, the Taliban’s failure to disrupt these groups underscores its inability to contain terrorism within Afghanistan.
Jafar’s Arrest and Regional Counterterrorism Efforts
The arrest of Muhammad Sharif Jafar in Pakistan was the result of sustained intelligence cooperation between Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Al-Mirsaad’s suggestion that Pakistan is overstating Jafar’s role to gain favor with Washington does not hold up against the broader reality. Pakistan has been one of the primary victims of the Taliban’s inability to curb extremist activity, with ISIS-K and TTP operatives increasingly moving across its western border. Jafar’s capture in Balochistan further underscores ISIS-K’s expanding operational reach beyond Afghanistan.
The Taliban’s attempts to blame Pakistan for ISIS-K’s activities are baseless. Pakistan has repeatedly urged Afghan authorities to strengthen border controls, yet poor border management on the Afghan side allows terrorists to slip into Pakistan disguised as civilians, fueling cross-border attacks despite Pakistan’s stringent security measures.
A Contradictory Counterterrorism Approach
The Taliban asserts that it is actively fighting ISIS-K, yet reports from the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the United States, Russia, and China indicate the opposite. The 35th UNSC Sanctions Monitoring Report identifies ISIS-K as the most significant extraregional terrorist threat. The report also highlights ISIS-K’s expansion into Europe, Central Asia, and the Middle East, taking advantage of Taliban vulnerabilities. Despite the Taliban’s claims of eliminating ISIS-K operatives, the numbers tell a different story:
- ISIS-K carried out 343 attacks in 2021, killing more than 2,000 people across Afghanistan and Pakistan.
- In 2022, it conducted 196 attacks; in 2023, 48 attacks; and in 2024, 37 attacks, including operations in Iran and Russia.
- Senior Taliban officials have been directly targeted, including the assassination of multiple high-ranking figures, such as the recent attack on the Taliban’s Acting Minister of Refugees and Repatriation, Khalil Ahmed Haqqani.
In addition to its own failures, the Taliban’s narrative has been deeply undermined by the persistent threat posed by ISIS-K, whose base of operations remains firmly in Afghanistan, not Pakistan. The assassination of Khalil-ur-Rehman Haqqani by ISIS-K is undeniable proof of the group’s active operations inside Afghanistan. Even the IEA has been carrying out operations against ISIS-K, reinforcing that the group’s stronghold lies in Afghanistan.
A Security Crisis Extending Beyond Afghanistan
Beyond failing to neutralize ISIS-K, the Taliban has also inadvertently armed extremist groups by failing to secure military equipment left behind by Western forces and former Afghan security personnel. Pakistan, in particular, has suffered from this instability. The porous Afghanistan-Pakistan border has allowed ISIS-K and TTP operatives to move freely into Pakistan’s western provinces, triggering an uptick in terrorist activity in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
Also See: Afghanistan’s Fragile Taliban Rule: Internal Struggles, Border Tensions, and a Nation in Crisis
A Growing Humanitarian and Security Challenge
The Taliban’s approach to governance has also contributed to a worsening security situation. Its crackdown on Salafi groups and other religious factions has inadvertently pushed more recruits toward ISIS-K. Instead of fostering inclusivity, its policies have deepened divisions, fueling further instability.
Time for a Coordinated International Response
Al-Mirsaad’s attempt to divert attention from the Taliban’s role in enabling ISIS-K ignores a crucial reality: Afghanistan has become a hub for global terrorist networks. The international community cannot afford to overlook the evolving security threat. A coordinated security strategy involving Pakistan, the United States, China, Russia, and Iran is needed to prevent further destabilization.
The Taliban’s counterterrorism narrative remains riddled with contradictions. While it claims to be fighting ISIS-K, evidence suggests that its policies have done little to curb the group’s activities. For Afghanistan’s security crisis to be addressed effectively, international actors must move beyond rhetoric and take concrete action before the threat expands even further.
SAT Commentaries’ are social media threads by various authors, reproduced here for website use. Views are their own.
Taliban’s Shifting Storylines: Is ISIS-K Really a ‘Foreign’ Problem
Afghan Taliban’s Al-Mirsaad’s latest attempt to deflect attention from the undeniable facts surrounding the Kabul airport attack reads like a desperate exercise in narrative gymnastics. Their argument—suggesting that Muhammad Sharif Jafar, aka Naser, Ajmal, was nothing more than an observer—collapses under the weight of its own contradictions. In an attempt to downplay Jafar’s role in the attack, Al-Mirsaad seeks to mislead the international community by shifting focus away from the real issues at hand. However, these efforts are futile in the face of overwhelming evidence that directly links Jafar to the attack and highlights the Taliban’s failures in securing Afghanistan’s borders.
Taliban’s Shifting Narrative on ISIS-K
Since taking power in August 2021, the Taliban has repeatedly revised its stance on the presence and operations of the Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISIS-K). The group’s resurgence is closely linked to the Taliban’s decision to release thousands of prisoners, including known ISIS-K operatives like Muhammad Sharif Jafar, from Pul-e-Charkhi and Bagram prisons. Jafar, a figure with multiple aliases—including Jafar, Naser, and Ajmal—was arrested in 2019 by Afghanistan’s National Directorate of Security (NDS) for orchestrating numerous attacks in Kabul. His subsequent release during the Taliban’s takeover directly contributed to ISIS-K’s growing operational strength, and yet, the Taliban continues to downplay its role in enabling the group’s activities.
Zabihullah Mujahid, spokesperson for the Taliban-led Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA), recently attempted to shift blame for ISIS-K’s activities onto Pakistan. He stated that the “arrest on Pakistani soil of an Afghan national and member of the Islamic State group shows that IS has taken refuge and established havens inside Pakistan. This issue has nothing to do with Afghanistan.” This claim is a clear deflection from the Taliban’s failure to secure Afghanistan’s borders and prevent cross-border infiltration by ISIS-K operatives. The reality is that Jafar’s arrest is not evidence of ISIS-K’s presence in Pakistan but rather a direct consequence of Afghanistan’s failure to manage its borders, allowing terrorists to infiltrate Pakistan.
Revisiting the “Mastermind” Claim
Al-Mirsaad’s report suggests that other ISIS-K figures, such as Dr. Hussain and Abdullah Kabuli, were the real masterminds behind the Kabul airport attack, rather than Jafar. However, the Taliban’s inconsistent messaging raises questions. Jafar was not a peripheral figure—he was linked to 29 suicide bombings and terror attacks in Kabul, including the Abbey Gate attack. He also played a role in targeting the Afghan Presidential Palace and the United States Embassy with rocket attacks. Yet, the Taliban continues to obfuscate his true role in the ISIS-K network, undermining its own narrative about fighting terrorism. Zabihullah Mujahid’s statements about the Taliban’s alleged efforts against ISIS-K only serve to highlight the increasing contradictions between the Taliban’s claims and their failure to control ISIS-K’s growth.
The Fallout of the 2021 Prison Releases
The Taliban’s decision to release prisoners from Afghan jails, including high-ranking ISIS-K members, significantly bolstered the group’s operational capacity. While the Taliban has claimed to be cracking down on ISIS-K, reports indicate otherwise. The Kabul Katiba unit, operating under ISIS-K leader Shahab al-Muhajir, has only grown stronger under Taliban rule. The group has also maintained close ties with Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), with reports of fighters defecting between the two organizations. These developments have only compounded the regional instability. Even as ISIS-K continues to thrive, the Taliban’s failure to disrupt these groups underscores its inability to contain terrorism within Afghanistan.
Jafar’s Arrest and Regional Counterterrorism Efforts
The arrest of Muhammad Sharif Jafar in Pakistan was the result of sustained intelligence cooperation between Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Al-Mirsaad’s suggestion that Pakistan is overstating Jafar’s role to gain favor with Washington does not hold up against the broader reality. Pakistan has been one of the primary victims of the Taliban’s inability to curb extremist activity, with ISIS-K and TTP operatives increasingly moving across its western border. Jafar’s capture in Balochistan further underscores ISIS-K’s expanding operational reach beyond Afghanistan.
The Taliban’s attempts to blame Pakistan for ISIS-K’s activities are baseless. Pakistan has repeatedly urged Afghan authorities to strengthen border controls, yet poor border management on the Afghan side allows terrorists to slip into Pakistan disguised as civilians, fueling cross-border attacks despite Pakistan’s stringent security measures.
A Contradictory Counterterrorism Approach
The Taliban asserts that it is actively fighting ISIS-K, yet reports from the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the United States, Russia, and China indicate the opposite. The 35th UNSC Sanctions Monitoring Report identifies ISIS-K as the most significant extraregional terrorist threat. The report also highlights ISIS-K’s expansion into Europe, Central Asia, and the Middle East, taking advantage of Taliban vulnerabilities. Despite the Taliban’s claims of eliminating ISIS-K operatives, the numbers tell a different story:
In addition to its own failures, the Taliban’s narrative has been deeply undermined by the persistent threat posed by ISIS-K, whose base of operations remains firmly in Afghanistan, not Pakistan. The assassination of Khalil-ur-Rehman Haqqani by ISIS-K is undeniable proof of the group’s active operations inside Afghanistan. Even the IEA has been carrying out operations against ISIS-K, reinforcing that the group’s stronghold lies in Afghanistan.
A Security Crisis Extending Beyond Afghanistan
Beyond failing to neutralize ISIS-K, the Taliban has also inadvertently armed extremist groups by failing to secure military equipment left behind by Western forces and former Afghan security personnel. Pakistan, in particular, has suffered from this instability. The porous Afghanistan-Pakistan border has allowed ISIS-K and TTP operatives to move freely into Pakistan’s western provinces, triggering an uptick in terrorist activity in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
Also See: Afghanistan’s Fragile Taliban Rule: Internal Struggles, Border Tensions, and a Nation in Crisis
A Growing Humanitarian and Security Challenge
The Taliban’s approach to governance has also contributed to a worsening security situation. Its crackdown on Salafi groups and other religious factions has inadvertently pushed more recruits toward ISIS-K. Instead of fostering inclusivity, its policies have deepened divisions, fueling further instability.
Time for a Coordinated International Response
Al-Mirsaad’s attempt to divert attention from the Taliban’s role in enabling ISIS-K ignores a crucial reality: Afghanistan has become a hub for global terrorist networks. The international community cannot afford to overlook the evolving security threat. A coordinated security strategy involving Pakistan, the United States, China, Russia, and Iran is needed to prevent further destabilization.
The Taliban’s counterterrorism narrative remains riddled with contradictions. While it claims to be fighting ISIS-K, evidence suggests that its policies have done little to curb the group’s activities. For Afghanistan’s security crisis to be addressed effectively, international actors must move beyond rhetoric and take concrete action before the threat expands even further.
SAT Commentaries’ are social media threads by various authors, reproduced here for website use. Views are their own.
SAT Commentary
SAT Commentary
SAT Commentaries, a collection of insightful social media threads on current events and social issues, featuring diverse perspectives from various authors.
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