Explained: Pakistan Bans Iran-Linked Zainebiyoun

Pakistan recently took action against the Zainebiyoun Brigade, a militant group comprising Pakistani nationals and backed by Iran, labeling it a “terrorist” organization due to concerns over its activities endangering national security. This decision coincided with an anticipated visit by Iran’s President Ebrahim Raisi likely on April 22nd, intended to mend ties after recent tensions.

Threat Posed by Zainebiyoun Brigade to Pakistan’s Security

The Pakistani government’s move stemmed from suspicions that the Zainebiyoun Brigade was involved in activities detrimental to Pakistan’s peace and security. Consequently, Pakistan’s National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) updated its list of proscribed organizations to include the Zainebiyoun Brigade at the 79th spot.

While the decision followed Iran’s condemnation of an attack on its consulate in Damascus on April 1st, 2024, and subsequent threats against Israel, raising fears of retaliation through groups like the Zainebiyoun Brigade, reports also suggest the designation stemmed from high-level discussions after Iranian attacks within Pakistan itself, particularly in Balochistan (January 2024). Pakistan retaliated with strikes, further escalating tensions between the two countries.

Also Read: Behind the Unprovoked Iranian Strike

In 2019, the United States Treasury blacklisted the Zainebiyoun Brigade, and since then, Pakistani authorities have apprehended several militants associated with the group, particularly in Karachi and other recruitment hotspots.

Security analysts warn that the Zainebiyoun Brigade’s activities could exacerbate sectarian tensions within Pakistan, posing a significant threat to the country’s stability. Members who returned from fighting in Syria and Iraq reportedly replaced banned sectarian outfits in Pakistan, becoming a primary militant group targeting opponents.

Moreover, recent arrests, including one individual gathering intelligence for a “hostile neighboring country,” underscored the group’s threat to Pakistan’s security.

In January of this year, the Counter-Terrorism Department (CTD) in Pakistan’s southern Sindh province announced the apprehension of Syed Muhammad Mehdi, a suspected militant linked to the Zainebiyoun Brigade. Mehdi was allegedly involved in an assassination attempt on Mufti Taqi Usmani, a prominent Pakistani cleric, in Karachi in 2019, resulting in the deaths of two of Usmani’s guards.

In July 2022, the former Pakistani Interior Minister, Rana Sanaullah Khan, informed the Senate that members of the Zainebiyoun Brigade were among the militants actively engaged in terrorist activities within the country between 2019 and 2021.

Over recent years, Pakistani authorities have disclosed the arrest of several individuals believed to be affiliated with the Zainebiyoun Brigade and trained in Iran.

In February 2021, Pakistani security forces reported the apprehension of a Zainabiyoun Brigade member in Sindh province, Pakistan. This marked the fourth individual detained within two months on charges of association with the Zainabiyoun Brigade. Security officials stated that these detainees had undergone military training in Iran.

In November 2020, an Associated Press report revealed that some Pakistanis were among 19 militia fighters supportive of Iran killed in eastern Syria.

In March 2020, reportedly, approximately 50 Pakistani fighters had been killed by the Turkish army and Syrian forces in a significant rebel stronghold in northwest Syria.

Hence, Pakistan’s strained relations with Iran have raised concerns about Iran’s support for armed groups within Pakistan, including the Zainebiyoun Brigade. Pakistan’s move to designate the group as a militant outfit is likely to increase pressure on Iran in upcoming bilateral talks.

Analysts view Pakistan’s decision as not only a response to the Zainebiyoun Brigade’s activities but also a strategic maneuver to prevent potential sectarian attacks aimed at destabilizing the country amid growing tensions with Iran.

The Zainebiyoun Brigade has emerged as a dangerous organization, attracting youths from other militant outfits and implicating its members in terrorist attacks against rival sects within Pakistan. Its involvement in the assassination attempt on a prominent cleric in Karachi in 2019 underscores the group’s violent activities within the country.

Reports of Pakistanis killed while fighting alongside pro-Iran militia in Syria, along with the group’s historical ties to Iranian religious militants, highlight Iran’s exploitation of Pakistanis for its own purposes, fostering militant groups like the Zainebiyoun Brigade. Additionally, Pakistani media reports uncovering a money laundering network transferring huge funds between Pakistan, Iran, and Iraq during the past seven years, nearly two years after the arrest of Zainebiyoun-affiliates, further underscore Iran’s manipulative tactics and the Zainebiyoun Brigade’s involvement in illicit activities.

Origins and Recruitment Tactics of the Zainebiyoun Brigade

Notably, the ties between the religious militants from Iran and Pakistan had roots predating the 1979 revolution in Iran which were solidified by individuals like Arif al-Husayni, a student of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini known as “the spiritual father of the Zainebiyoun.” Originally from Pakistan’s Shiite region of Parachinar, al-Husayni played a significant role in maintaining the Khomeinist network even after his assassination in 1988.

Based on the already well-established connection, the formation of the Zainebiyoun Brigade finds its origins in the aftermath of the 2001 United States invasion of Afghanistan. A Zeynabiyoun Brigade commander also acknowledged that ties with the Quds Force already existed around the time of the 2001 U.S. invasion of Afghanistan.

Furthermore, the Syrian Civil War, which erupted in 2011, quickly became a melting pot of Islamist groups vying for control and influence, either aligning themselves with Bashar al-Assad’s regime or against it. Amidst this chaotic landscape, a staggering array of foreign fighters from 81 nations, as estimated by the Soufan Group in 2014, flocked to Syria, each driven by a unique combination of sectarian loyalty, proxy agendas, or mercenary incentives. This influx transformed Syria’s conflict into a global battleground where regional and international powers pursued their strategic interests through various armed groups.

Then in 2014, amid the conflict in Syria, the militia’s formation was officially announced, tapping into existing networks within Pakistan and exploiting sectarian tensions exacerbated by violence perpetrated by Sunni extremists in regions like Parachinar.

Parachinar, bordering Afghanistan and subjected to violence during the War on Terror (WoT) and owing to the ethno-religious fissures, served as a focal point motivating Shiite fighters to join the brigade.

Before recruitment, a considerable number of prospective members were residing in Iran, many of whom were enrolled in religious seminaries in Qom. Recruitment efforts, including advertisements on social media platforms like Facebook in 2015, targeted physically fit men aged 18-35, offering promises of training, regular salaries, and benefits for their families.

In a statement following the announcement of victory against the Islamic State in Syria in 2017 by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), also called Sepah or Pasdaran, the Zainebiyoun Brigade reaffirmed its allegiance and readiness to engage in conflict wherever directed by the IRGC. This highlights the enduring nature of the ties between religious militants in Iran and Pakistan, which continue to shape events in the region.

The Zainebiyoun Brigade’s ties to Iran’s Quds Force further facilitated recruitment and training, with members receiving military training in Iran before being deployed to conflict zones like Syria and Iraq. Despite being initially perceived as an “indirect threat” while fighting abroad, the group’s return to Pakistan has elevated its status as a significant domestic threat, replacing banned sectarian outfits and targeting opponents within the country.

Notably, Pakistan’s involvement in this multifaceted conflict emerged relatively late, with Pakistani jihadis beginning to arrive on the scene around 2013. Their catalyst was a brazen rocket assault by Salafi militias on the revered Zainab shrine in Damascus, a seminal event for Shia Muslims akin to the historical desecration of Jerusalem’s Church of the Holy Sepulcher. This egregious attack galvanized Pakistani Shia into action, particularly in response to the Islamic State’s (ISIS) relentless campaign targeting Shia holy sites across Syria and Iraq.

It’s essential to underscore that the participation of Pakistanis in the Syrian conflict wasn’t orchestrated by its government; rather, it was the result of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) leveraging existing sectarian fault lines and exploiting Pakistani Shia sentiment. The IRGC capitalized on the grievances and vulnerabilities of Pakistani Shia communities, enticing them into the Syrian theater through groups like Sipah-e-Muhammad.

Sipah-e-Muhammad, originally formed in 1993 by Allama Mureed Abbas Yazdani and later led by his nephew Malik Muhammad Wasi Ul Baqar, allegedly maintained close ties with Iran. Initially established to counter the sectarian violence perpetrated by groups like Sipah-e-Sahaba and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi against Shia Muslims in Pakistan, Sipah-e-Muhammad later came under scrutiny for its own militant activities. The organization’s designation as a terrorist entity by the Pakistani government and the United States underscored the severity of its actions.

The formation of the Zainebiyoun Brigade in 2014 marked a significant turning point in Iran’s efforts to mobilize Shia fighters from Pakistan. With extensive support from the IRGC and the Al-Quds Force, the Zainebiyoun Brigade recruited primarily from Shia-dominated regions such as Parachinar in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Offering financial inducements and framing participation as a religious duty, Iran effectively transformed the conflict in Syria into a sectarian rallying cry for Pakistani Shia.

Iranian officials and state media frequently credit former IRGC commander Qassem Soleimani as the man behind launching, training and funding all these militant groups.

Soleimani, who served as the Iranian regime’s top military and intelligence operator in the Middle East, was killed in a US drone strike in January 2020 in Iraq’s capital, Baghdad.

Observers contend that Tehran’s attempts to mobilize Shiite militant groups, such as Zainebiyoun, and their active participation in the Syrian war fanned the flames of sectarian violence in the Middle East, provoking Sunni communities to employ a similar strategy in the region.

Operating primarily in Damascus, the Zainebiyoun Brigade’s mission focused on defending Shia holy sites, particularly the shrine of Zainab, and engaging in battles alongside Syrian government forces. However, this involvement exposed its members to significant risks, including combat casualties and reprisal attacks against Shia communities in Pakistan.

The brigade’s formation coincided with a surge in anti-Shia violence within Pakistan, exemplified by the bombing of Parachinar, a Shia-majority town, claimed by Lashkar-e-Jhangvi as retaliation against Iranian and Syrian actions.

Zainebiyoun’s Sister Concerns

Iran’s recruitment tactics mirrored its successful efforts with Afghan Shia fighters, offering citizenship, financial incentives, and promises of religious martyrdom. Despite these inducements, many fighters faced disillusionment and inadequate support, highlighting the human cost of Iran’s geopolitical ambitions and proxy warfare strategies.

In parallel, Liwa Fatemiyoun, an Afghan Shia militia formed in 2014 and operating under Iranian patronage, played a significant role in Syria. With an estimated strength of 10,000 to 20,000 fighters by late 2017, Liwa Fatemiyoun defended Shia shrines and engaged in battles against Sunni extremist groups. However, accusations of recruiting child soldiers and designations as a terrorist organization by the United States and Canada tarnished its reputation.

In conclusion, Iran’s exploitation of Pakistani and Afghan Shia fighters in the Syrian conflict underscores the complex interplay of sectarian tensions, geopolitical interests, and recruitment incentives. The formation of proxy militias like the Zainebiyoun Brigade and Liwa Fatemiyoun exacerbates existing sectarian divisions within Pakistan and Afghanistan, while also underscoring the human cost of proxy warfare in the Middle East. This calculated exploitation of sectarian divides, particularly through the creation of groups like the Zainebiyoun Brigade, raises serious concerns about the potential for further escalation in the region, especially in light of the recent attack on the Iranian consulate in Syria.

Pakistan’s decision to designate the Zainebiyoun Brigade as a terrorist organization comes at a critical juncture. Tensions between Iran and Israel are already high, with Iran vowing retaliation. Pakistan’s decision to brand the Zainebiyoun Brigade a terrorist organization throws a monkey wrench into the already tense security calculus between Pakistan and Iran. The potential impact on the broader regional security landscape hinges on how Iran reacts. Will it prioritize detente with Pakistan to manage a more unified security posture against other adversaries, or will it lash out and further destabilize the region through its proxy network? The upcoming visit by Iranian President Raisi could be a crucial indicator of the future trajectory of not only Pakistan-Iran relations but also the broader regional security landscape.

The case of the Zainebiyoun Brigade highlights a dangerous trend. Iran’s support for the group, alongside its recruitment of Afghan fighters through Liwa Fatemiyoun, demonstrates a calculated strategy to exploit sectarian divides for its own geopolitical gains. This not only destabilizes the region but also inflicts a heavy human cost, as evidenced by the disillusionment and casualties faced by fighters. Pakistan’s efforts to counter this threat underscore the need for regional actors to prioritize peace and stability over sectarian divides.

Moreover, Pakistan’s move to designate the Zainebiyoun Brigade as a terrorist organization appears to be part of a broader trajectory prioritizing its national security interests. This is further evidenced by Pakistan’s recent retaliatory airstrikes against Iranian attacks within its own territory and its targeted operations against Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) safe havens in Afghanistan. These actions demonstrate a newfound assertiveness in safeguarding Pakistan’s borders and deterring threats emanating from both its western and eastern flanks. Additionally, reports suggesting a neighboring adversarial state potentially using either Iran or Afghanistan as launching pad for proxies against Pakistan highlight the complex geopolitical landscape that Pakistan is navigating. By taking a firm stance against the Zainebiyoun Brigade, Pakistan not only counters a potential Iranian proxy threat but also sends a strong message to other actors who might seek to undermine its security.

SAT Commentary

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