Miscalculation or Inevitable? The Lal Masjid Siege and its Legacy

The Siege of Lal Masjid in July 2007 was a pivotal moment in Pakistan’s struggle against militancy. The Pakistani government’s decision to launch Operation Sunrise against the Lal Masjid was not an isolated response. Instead, it was a culmination of years of strategic missteps and geopolitical calculations.

The events at Lal Masjid echo historical confrontations between state authority and radical forces. Moreover, it draws stark parallels to the Siege of Kabbah in 1979.

Seventeen years on, let us explore the motivations behind the state’s actions, the consequences of the operation, the hostile narratives it inspired, and the lessons—or lack thereof—that continue to shape Pakistan’s approach to extremism today.

Lal Masjid as Strategic Asset

Lal Masjid was established shortly after Pakistan’s capital was moved from Karachi to the newly built Islamabad in 1965. It was named for its red walls and interiors as Lal Masjid. It had been used for the recruitment and mobilization of volunteers to fight in Afghanistan and Kashmir. This also brought its chief cleric closer to the intelligence and security establishment.

The first Imam of this state-controlled mosque was Maulana Muhammad Abdullah, who was known for his radical sectarian views. Moreover, Islamabad’s political and military elite would come to offer their prayer in this mosque wherein Maulana Abdullah formed linkages with the Govt. officials. Now, his influence began to grow.

Also See: Al Qaeda, TTP and IS-KP: The Convergence and Divergence

In 1977, a political movement ‘Nizam-e-Mustafa’ was launched the Maulana Abdullah played a key role in it. Afterward, General Zia-ul-Haq rose to power. Under General Zia’s military rule, he rose to prominence and General Zia appointed Maulana Abdullah as the member of his Majlis-i-Shura. After the Taliban’s victory in Afghanistan, Maulana Abdullah became closely associated with the movement and with Al Qaeda.

In 1998, he traveled to Kandahar to pay homage to Mullah Omar. He took his younger son, Abdul Rashid, with him. During that visit, the father and son met with Osama bin Laden. After the assassination of Maulana Abdullah, his older son Abdul Aziz was appointed the head cleric of the mosque and Abdul Rashid officiated as his deputy. The two brothers continued to enjoy state patronage despite their growing links with the jihadi and sectarian groups.

From Jan 2006- June 2007, a movement for Nifaz–e–Shariat started in Red mosque Islamabad.

Lal Masjid and The State of Pakistan: Why the Relations Turned Hostile?

The long-standing links between the Pakistani military establishment and Lal Masjid turned hostile after Pakistan allied itself with the United States following the 9/11 attacks. For the militants, this change of tack was a betrayal of jihad. The Lal Masjid became the center of anti-government and anti-American protests. Many students of the madrasahs affiliated with the mosque joined the Afghan Taliban resistance against the American invasion.

On 24 June 2007, led by fearsome, stick-wielding, burqa-clad young women, radicals poured out of the mosque and the two madrasahs affiliated to it. They raided houses allegedly used as brothels, kidnapping suspected prostitutes, and making bonfires of videocassettes and DVDs that they regarded as un-Islamic. Moreover, police were kidnapped, the Ministry of Environment was burnt and the Children’s Library was captured.

The military-led government of Pakistan finally took action after the Lal Masjid squad kidnapped three Chinese girls and accused them of prostitution.

The situation escalated to a point that some feared the militants might take over the capital itself. Before 3 July 2007, the Government tried to negotiate with the authorities of Lal Masjid, but the negotiations failed. Nonetheless, On July 3, 2007, army troops backed by tanks and artillery guns surrounded the mosque. However, the final onslaught was held off to allow time for the students to surrender.

Why Did the State Carry Out the Operation?

The state’s decision to launch Operation Sunrise against Lal Masjid was driven by multiple factors. Years of state patronage had emboldened the mosque’s clerics, allowing them to amass significant influence and militancy. The Lal Masjid phenomenon did not emerge overnight; it was the product of decades of using extremist clerics and militancy as tools of Pakistan’s foreign policy in Afghanistan and Kashmir. The mosque had been a recruitment and mobilization center for volunteers fighting in these regions, bringing its chief cleric, Abdul Aziz, and his brother, Abdul Rashid Ghazi, closer to the intelligence and security establishment.

Despite this long-standing relationship, the situation became untenable by 2007. The kidnapping of Chinese nationals by militants from the mosque was a significant turning point. China, already grappling with its militancy issues in Xinjiang, exerted pressure on Pakistan to take strict action. Fearing the diplomatic and security ramifications of inaction, the Pakistani government had little choice but to respond decisively.

Additionally, the escalating defiance of the Lal Masjid clerics and their open calls for an Islamic revolution against the state posed a direct challenge to Pakistan’s sovereignty. The establishment of a parallel system through force and incitement to public revolt was unacceptable for any government. The militants’ actions, including issuing fatwas against the military and forming anti-vice squads, further exacerbated the situation, leaving the state with no option but to intervene militarily.

What were the Post-Operation Consequences?

The immediate aftermath of the operation was devastating, with over 100 militants and 11 armed forces personnel killed. The operation’s impact extended far beyond the physical destruction of the Lal Masjid complex:

Rise in Terrorist Attacks

More than 88 bombings killed 1,188 people and wounded 3,209 in the first year following the siege. A significant attack occurred two months later when an 18-year-old boy blew himself up inside the high-security base of Zarrar Company, killing 22 soldiers.

Formation of TTP

6 months after Operation Sunrise, some 40 militant leaders formed the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in South Waziristan, uniting disparate Taliban groups under one banner. However, due to Pakistan alignment with US anti- Pakistan sentiments were already there. The TTP included representatives from all seven tribal regions and parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, marking a major turning point in the rise of insurgency.

Militant Mobilization

The operation galvanized militant factions, leading to sophisticated attacks on military and intelligence personnel and installations in high-security zones in Rawalpindi, Islamabad, and Lahore. The Ghazi Force, organized by Abdul Rashid’s disciples, played a critical role in these attacks.

How do Hostile Narratives from Radicals such as TTP and Al Qaeda Erupt?

The Post 9/11 events, USA and Pakistan nexus and finally siege provided a powerful narrative for groups like TTP and Al Qaeda. They portrayed it as a brutal crackdown on Islam and the martyrdom of innocent Muslims. Osama bin Laden hailed Ghazi as a hero and called for revenge, fueling anti-government propaganda and bolstering recruitment efforts. The storming of the mosque and subsequent military operations inspired disparate militant groups to unite, strengthening their resolve against the Pakistani state.

 Where Do We Stand Today?

Today, Lal Masjid remains a symbol of radical Islam, with Abdul Aziz still wielding significant influence despite his radical views and past actions. Most cases against Aziz have been quashed by the courts or dropped by the government, highlighting the ongoing challenge of dealing with radical clerics. The impunity enjoyed by such figures raises fears of a potential return to a 2007-like situation, especially with the growth of madrassa populations in the capital.

The state’s failure to learn from past mistakes is evident in its patronage of other radical outfits, such as Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP). Despite the TLP’s history of violent protests and extreme rhetoric, has received state patronage and political support. This emboldens such groups, perpetuating a cycle of extremism and violence. The state’s reluctance to confront these elements decisively reflects a deeper institutional hesitation to dismantle networks it once fostered for geopolitical purposes. This ongoing patronage of extremist groups mirrors the previous mistakes made with Lal Masjid and highlights the state’s inability to adopt a consistent policy against radicalism.

Was It a Miscalculation or Something Inevitable?

Miscalculation

• The state’s heavy-handed approach and the resulting martyrdom narrative played into the hands of radical groups, exacerbating the problem.
• Earlier and more strategic interventions, rather than a full-scale assault, might have mitigated some of the fallout.
• The state underestimated the symbolic power of the mosque and the extent to which the operation would unite and galvanize militant factions.

Inevitability

• It may be argued that the massive use of force by the state was avoidable, but the military action cannot be described as unprovoked.
• Given the escalating threat and the audacious actions of the Lal Masjid clerics, some form of intervention was inevitable.
• The kidnapping of Chinese nationals and the militants’ open defiance left the government with limited options to restore law and order.
• The operation was necessary to reassert state control and prevent further militant actions that could have posed a greater threat to the capital and national security.

Similarities Between the Siege of Kabbah and Lal Masjid

The Siege of Kabbah (1979) and the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) siege in Islamabad, Pakistan (2007) share several similarities, despite occurring in different contexts and regions. Both events involved armed insurgencies by radical Islamist groups and resulted in significant confrontations with state forces. Here are some key similarities:

Ideological Motivations

The Siege of Kabbah (1979): Led by Juhaimaan al-Utaiby, the siege was driven by a belief in the imminent arrival of the Mahdi, a messianic figure in Islamic eschatology. Juhaimaan and his followers sought to overthrow the Saudi regime and establish a puritanical Islamic state. They utilized the sanctity of the Kaabah to legitimize their cause, arguing that the existing state was corrupt and deviating from true Islam.

The Siege of Lal Masjid (2007): The Lal Masjid clerics’ ideology was rooted in a vision of an Islamic state governed by strict Sharia law. They rejected the Pakistani state’s secular framework and sought to establish an alternative system of governance. Their actions, including issuing fatwas against the military and forming anti-vice squads, reflected a similar desire to overthrow the existing state order and replace it with a regime based on their interpretation of Islam.

Charismatic Leaders

The Siege of Kabbah: Juhayman al-Otaybi was a former member of the Saudi National Guard and a prominent preacher who led the takeover of the Grand Mosque.

The Siege of Lal Masjid: Abdul Rashid Ghazi and Abdul Aziz Ghazi were influential clerics who led the mosque and its affiliated madrassa, promoting a radical Islamic agenda.

Use of Sacred Spaces

The Seige of Kabbah: Juhaimaan al-Utaiby used the sanctity of the Kaabah to stage a violent uprising, believing that the mosque’s sacred status would inspire followers and challenge the ruling regime. The Kabbah, as a symbol of unity and sanctity in Islam, was turned into a battleground to advance their revolutionary agenda.

The Seige of Lal Masjid: Similarly, the Lal Masjid was used as a symbol of resistance against the state. The clerics exploited the mosque’s status as a religious institution to challenge the state’s authority and promote their radical agenda. The mosque became a center for militant activities and defiance against the government’s secular policies.

The Use of Force

The Siege of Kabbah: The Saudi government, after obtaining a fatwa, launched a military operation to reclaim the Grand Mosque, involving Saudi troops and foreign commandos.

The Seige of Lal Masjid: The Pakistani government, led by President Pervez Musharraf, conducted a military operation to retake the mosque after failed negotiations, involving Special Forces and significant firepower.

Aftermath and Impact

The Siege of Kabbah: In the aftermath, the Saudi government made concessions to religious hardliners, leading to stricter enforcement of Islamic law and more conservative policies.

The Siege of Lal Masjid: The operation intensified radicalization and resentment among Islamist groups in Pakistan, leading to an increase in terrorist activities and further polarization in society.

The Takeaway

The Siege of Lal Masjid was a complex and multifaceted event with significant implications for Pakistan’s struggle against militancy. The operation addressed the immediate threat but had long-term consequences that underscored the deep-rooted challenges of dealing with extremism. The state’s delayed response and years of patronage contributed to the complexity of the situation. A nuanced understanding of the event, combined with comprehensive and strategic policy measures, is essential to prevent similar incidents in the future. Does the alleged state patronage or not enough action of radical outfits like TLP indicate that the lessons from Lal Masjid have not been fully learned? Would it lead to risking further destabilization in the future?

The views expressed in this write-up are the author’s own. They do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of the South Asia Times.

Simran Saeed Janjua

Simran Saeed Janjua is an International Relations Researcher from National Defense University Islamabad, currently serving as research intern at South Asia Times (SAT). Her areas of research interest include traditional and non traditional security issues and foreign policy analysis. She can be reached at simransaeedjanjua@gmail.com and on X (formerly Twitter) @i_simranjanjua.

Mishaal Malik

Mishaal Malik, presently pursuing a Bachelor of Science in International Relations at Quaid-e-Azam University (QAU), serves as a Research Associate at South Asia Times (SAT). Mishaal demonstrates a commitment to scholarly inquiry, particularly focusing on research related to South Asia and East Asia. She can be reached on X, formerly Twitter at @MishaalMalik502.

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