Khalil Haqqani’s Death: Kabul Blast Shocks Afghanistan

Afghanistan’s acting minister for refugees, Khalil Ur-Rahman Haqqani, died in an explosion in Kabul, along with five others, local media reported, and the Afghan interim government confirmed on December 11, 2024. The Islamic State group (IS) later claimed responsibility for the attack. According to a report from IS’s “news agency,” Amaq, an IS militant waited outside the minister’s office and detonated explosives as he exited, resulting in Khalil Haqqani’s death. An Afghan interim government spokesperson also confirmed that IS killed Haqqani.

Khalil Haqqani’s Death: Who Was the Influential Leader?

Khalil Haqqani, a senior leader of the Haqqani Network and uncle of Afghanistan’s interior minister Sirajuddin Haqqani, became a minister after the Afghan interim government’s 2021 takeover. 

Haqqani was the brother of Jalaluddin Haqqani, the late founder of the infamous Haqqani Network. Renowned for his pivotal role in the insurgency, his death marks a significant blow to both the Afghan interim government and the Haqqani Network, which are grappling with internal power struggles. The Haqqani Network, closely affiliated with the Afghan interim government, was responsible for some of the most violent attacks during the two-decade insurgency that followed the United States-led 2001 invasion to overthrow the US-backed previous Afghan government.

Internal Rifts or External Threats? Theories Behind Khalil Haqqani’s Death

Initial reports suggested that Khalilur Rahman Haqqani’s death might have resulted from internal leadership tensions within the Afghan interim government or a targeted attack by ISIS. However, ISIS’s confirmation established the latter as the cause. In response, the Afghan interim government condemned the attack at the Ministry of Refugees as “cowardly” and described Haqqani’s death as a “great loss.” Authorities have also urged the media to characterize his death as “martyrdom” rather than “killed,” reflecting attempts to shape the narrative amid growing instability and divisions within the leadership.

This development comes despite the Afghan interim government’s repeated claims of eradicating Daesh operations. Over the past three years, ISIS has executed numerous deadly attacks across Afghanistan, targeting government officials, civilians, and minorities to undermine the authority of the interim government. 

ISKP’s Role in Afghanistan: Context to Khalil Haqqani’s Killing

In the two and a half years since the Afghan interim government takeover, ISKP has succeeded in assassinating Afghan interim government figures, striking multiple international targets in secure locations in Kabul, targeting Shia in the capital and other major cities, and even recently conducting an attack that penetrated the Afghan interim government de facto capital of Kandahar. Notable attacks include a 2022 bombing near the interior ministry and a 2023 strike outside the foreign ministry which collectively resulted in the deaths of at least ten people, including three Spanish tourists, with IS-K claiming credit for them at the time.

Transnational Nature of ISKP Threat

Since its emergence in 2015, ISKP has primarily targeted Afghanistan and Pakistan while also conducting multiple attacks in Iran in recent years. To date, it has only launched small-scale attacks in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, but it encourages violence there as well as in India. It is an international threat. It has been implicated in multiple plots in Europe and aims to expand its operational reach to strike within the United States. Additionally, it seeks to target the United States’ strategic competitors, including China and Russia.

Unique in South Asia, ISKP rejects all regional governments and lacks state backing, though some nations view it as a rival’s proxy, complicating counterterrorism efforts. ISKP distinguishes itself in the crowded militant landscape of the region with its indiscriminate targeting, including attacks on girls’ schools and a maternity ward. The group has consistently shown an ability to adapt under pressure and re-emerge as a significant threat. Despite some setbacks in Afghanistan, ISKP remains one of the largest and most dangerous affiliates of the Islamic State. However, conventional measures of strength do not fully capture the scope of the group’s threat. Its adaptability, willingness to target indiscriminately and transnational ambitions make it a threat that extends far beyond its size and well beyond Afghanistan.

Why ISKP Penetrates: The Impact of Regional Instability and Discord

In South Asian countries, governments’s irresponsible and opportunistic responses have led to ISKP’s rise. The Afghan interim government’s counterterrorism capabilities remain weak due to limited foreign support, ongoing tensions with Pakistan, and other priorities. The Afghan interim government and the Iranian government have both portrayed ISKP as a client of the United States. In India, ISKP is often dismissed as merely a proxy for Pakistan, while Pakistan accuses India of supporting the group. This mutual suspicion is fueled by the region’s history of state involvement with militant groups, which has reinforced a tendency to view ISKP through the lens of proxy warfare, albeit inaccurately.

Globally, counterterrorism efforts have waned amid geopolitical rivalries and conflicts in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa.  ISKP exploits these gaps, using Afghan territory to evade detection and strike across borders. However, its transnational network and indiscriminate targeting make it a continued threat to South Asia and beyond as evidenced by Moscow’s Crocus City Hall, killing over 150, spotlighted the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP). 

Also See: Pakistan Condemns Attack That Killed Khalil Rahman Haqqani

Misplaced Priorities: Pakistan as a Scapegoat

Afghanistan’s tensions with the Pakistani government have further complicated efforts against ISKP. The Afghan interim government has allowed the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), an anti-Pakistani group, to use its territory to target Pakistan. This freedom of movement not only facilitates TTP operations but also enables ISKP to cross the Pak Afghan to evade Afghan authorities and conduct attacks in Pakistan. A recent United Nations security assessment identified the TTP as the largest terrorist group in Afghanistan, with thousands of operatives. The report also highlighted rising ISKP activities and an increase in cross-border attacks on Pakistan since the Afghan interim government’s return, allegedly supported by Afghan authorities.

Several sources report nearly 1,000 civilian and security personnel fatalities in Pakistan during the first nine months of 2024, primarily attributed to TTP and Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) violence. In response, Pakistani authorities have urged Kabul to extradite TTP leaders, a request consistently denied by the Afghan interim government, which asserts that no foreign groups operate from Afghan soil.

In the wake of Khalil Haqqani’s death, Pakistan’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Ishaq Dar, extended condolences in a post on X, expressing grief over the loss of lives in the attack. “Pakistan unequivocally condemns terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. We are contacting the Interim Afghan Government to ascertain further details,” he stated.

Moreover, Pakistan’s reappointed special envoy to Afghanistan Ambassador Mohammad Sadiq Khan, condemned the attack, calling it a “heinous act of terrorism.”

In a statement on X, Khan expressed his condolences regarding Khalil Haqqani’s death, saying Pakistan was “shocked and saddened” by the attack, which occurred at the Ministry of Refugees compound in Kabul.

International Factors Driving ISKP’s Rise

Although ISKP poses a significant threat to multiple governments, it is not a top priority for any. Pakistan remains preoccupied with its political and economic crises, as well as the escalating threats from the TTP and Baloch separatist groups. Iran is focused on the war in Gaza and managing its client groups’ responses to that conflict. Though ISKP threatens India, it has not been able to attack there yet, so India’s efforts against the organization are limited to disrupting plotsat home. Even the Afghan interim government’s efforts against ISKP have waxed and waned during its rule as it grapples with governing the desperately poor country.

Since its withdrawal, the United States has shown limited interest in counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan, though it has retained some intelligence collection capabilities. Despite having sufficient intelligence to warn both Iran and Russia of impending ISKP threats, both countries—particularly Russia, with questionable claims regarding the intelligence—argued that the information was not actionable. Furthermore, the United States has not utilized its “over-the-horizon” counterterrorism capabilities against ISKP or in Afghanistan since the 2022 operation that killed Ayman al-Zawahiri in Kabul.

Meanwhile, the threat from ISKP remains persistent. It maintains its transnational network and ability to inspire plots. It will keep its foothold in South Asia. 

A Call for Regional Cooperation to Counter ISKP

The killing of Khalil Haqqani should serve as a wake-up call to the Afghan interim government and the international community alike. ISKP is not merely a domestic problem for Afghanistan; it is a regional and global threat. Its ambitions stretch far beyond Kabul, and its attacks against foreign nationals and neighbouring states highlight the urgency for collective action.

For Afghanistan, reclaiming control from ISKP is not just about preserving the Afghan interim government’s authority; it is about ensuring a future where the country does not become synonymous with terrorism once again. Only by confronting the ISKP challenge head-on, rather than diverting attention toward external scapegoats, can Afghanistan hope to secure lasting peace and stability.

The Taliban’s preoccupation with blaming Pakistan not only alienates a potential ally in the fight against terrorism but also emboldens groups like ISKP to exploit the growing rift between Afghanistan and Pakistan. By allowing groups like the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) to operate from Afghan soil, the Taliban undermines regional security while inadvertently creating operational safe havens for ISKP.

To counter the ISKP threat effectively, the Taliban must prioritize counterterrorism efforts within Afghanistan and work toward mending its strained relations with neighbouring countries, particularly Pakistan. A regional approach—backed by intelligence sharing, border security cooperation, and joint operations—is essential to dismantling ISKP’s networks.

The broader international community also has a role to play. While strategic rivalries dominate global attention, counterterrorism cannot be sidelined. Countries like China, Russia, and India, which have vested interests in Afghanistan’s stability, must extend support—whether through diplomatic engagement with the Taliban or indirect assistance to bolster its counterterrorism capabilities.

SAT Editorial Desk

Your go-to editorial hub for policy perspectives and informed analysis on pressing regional and global issues.

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