Al-Qaeda Affiliates Targeting Weak States: Implications for Pakistan

A former Somali deputy intelligence chief and current security analyst has issued a stark warning about the potential for Al-Shabaab fighters to overthrow the Somali government. Drawing comparisons to the swift collapse of the Syrian government forces in less than a week against HTS insurgents, he cautioned that Al-Shabaab could achieve similar gains if supported by international actors seeking to destabilize Somalia. This scenario raises a critical question: Are we witnessing the emergence of a new pattern in international terrorism—one where Al-Qaeda offshoots and affiliates are systematically targeting weak states for domination?

Al-Qaeda Affiliates Targeting Weak States: A Global Threat

The phenomenon is not entirely unprecedented. The Arab Spring, beginning in 2010, led to the overthrow of several stable regimes across the Middle East and North Africa. Although heralded as a democratic awakening, the movement inadvertently paved the way for chaos in certain regions, allowing extremist organisations to flourish in the power vacuums created. Today, a similar destabilising dynamic appears to be taking shape, but with a key difference: the central actors are no longer populist movements but transnational jihadist networks like Al-Qaeda 2.0.

Al Qaeda (AQ) is a transnational Sunni Islamist terrorist organization known for its global network of affiliates. Osama bin Laden founded Al Qaeda in 1988, uniting Arab veterans of the Afghan insurgency against the Soviet Union. Initially focused on Islamist causes globally, the group turned its attention to the U.S. after the 1991 Gulf War, citing grievances like U.S. troop presence in Saudi Arabia. Bin Laden moved from Saudi Arabia to Sudan and then Afghanistan under Taliban protection.

Al Qaeda carried out major attacks, including the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in East Africa and the 2000 USS Cole bombing. After the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. launched counterterrorism (CT) campaigns, killing Bin Laden in 2011. Under Ayman al Zawahiri’s leadership, AQ focused on fostering regional affiliates, with Sayf al Adl believed to be its current leader.

Also See: How United States Aid to Afghanistan Fuels Terrorism Risks

The Rise of Al-Shabaab and Other Key Affiliates

Once hierarchical, Al Qaeda now relies on affiliates for resources and influence. These affiliates, including groups in Yemen, Somalia, and the Sahel, exploit local conflicts, maintaining AQ’s global relevance despite reduced operational capabilities. While constrained in Afghanistan under the Taliban, AQ remains a threat regionally and inspires global terrorism.

Iraq’s post-2011 instability and the Arab Spring protests created opportunities for Al Qaeda (AQ) affiliates across the Middle East and North Africa, with local conflicts and crises fueling their expansion in Somalia and the Sahel. According to the Statistical Information 2022 report, Al Qaeda-affiliated groups include Al Shabaab, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam Wal-Muslimin (JNIM), Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Ahrar al-Sharqiya, Ahrar al-Sham, Ansaru, Al-Badr Mujahideen, Ansar Ghazwat-ul-Hind, Ansar al-Islam, and Katibat al-Tawhid wal Jihad. These affiliates collectively conducted 792 attacks in 2018 and maintained significant operational capabilities in subsequent years, despite a decline in the number of attacks in 2021 and 2022.

Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) was founded in 2004 by Abu Musab al Zarqawi. Renamed the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) in 2006, it expanded into Syria during the 2011 conflict, forming the Nusra Front. In 2013, AQI/ISI leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi attempted to merge Nusra into the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), but Nusra and AQ rejected this. By 2017, Nusra rebranded as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which has distanced itself from AQ and has recently toppled the Syrian government in Bashar-ul-Assad.
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) was formed in 2009 by uniting Saudi and Yemeni AQ operatives. AQAP thrived amid Yemen’s civil war, attempting attacks in the West but facing setbacks from counterterrorism efforts.
Al Shabaab, a Somali faction allied with AQ in 2012, controls central and southern Somalia. Known as AQ’s largest affiliate, it has 7,000-12,000 fighters and generates over $100 million annually, despite stalled Somali government offensives.
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) arose from Algeria’s civil war and pledged to AQ in 2007. Its offshoot, JNIM (formed in 2017), operates in Mali, Burkina Faso, and parts of coastal West Africa, exploiting instability caused by military coups and regional tensions.
Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) originated in 2011 as Jabhat al-Nusra, an al-Qaeda affiliate. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, leader of the Islamic State (IS), also played a role in its formation. Known for its effectiveness and lethality against President Assad’s forces, Jabhat al-Nusra was designated a terrorist organization by the UN, US, Turkey, and others—a status it retains. However, its leader, Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, later severed ties with al-Qaeda, dissolved Jabhat al-Nusra, and established HTS, which adopted its current name after merging with other groups in 2017. This affiliate has been the most successful, toppling Assad’s decade-long regime in parts of Syria and establishing significant control over territory.

Al Qaeda-affiliated terrorist groups conducted 792 attacks in 2018 and maintained its operational capacity in 2019 and 2020. However, its attacks declined to the same numbers in 2021 and 2022.

Source: https://www.hstoday.us/featured/al-qaedas-regional-affiliates-continue-to-threaten-the-global-security/

Despite decreases in the number of attacks, Al Qaeda groups killed and wounded an increasing number of people in 2021 and 2022. The number of people killed rose from 1,953 in 2021 to 2,260 in 2022. Moreover, claiming responsibility —an action of a terrorist group to take credit— is another indicator of a group’s operational capacity. Contrary to ISIS, whose incidents of claiming responsibility reduced in 2021 and 2022, Al Qaeda groups’ incidents of claimed responsibility rose in the same period.

Al-Qaeda’s Strategy: Exploiting Power Vacuums in Weak States

What factors have enabled al-Qaeda to survive and achieve such success? Al Qaeda’s adaptive strategies have allowed it to survive and continue threatening regional and global security. Unlike ISIS, which relies on a centralized structure and conducts attacks primarily in Syria and Iraq, Al Qaeda operates through decentralized regional affiliates. Its localization strategy integrates local groups into regional networks across Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. This decentralized approach allows Al-Qaeda and its affiliates to exploit power vacuums in weak states, targeting governments that lack the resources or infrastructure to counter their insidious tactics effectively.

Combating Extremism: Root Causes and Solutions for Pakistan

For Pakistan and the broader Central and South Asian region, the implications of Al-Qaeda’s resurgence are profound. Afghanistan’s fragile stability and the interim government’s tenuous grip on power, highlighted by the recent assassination of Acting Minister for Refugees Khalil Ur-Rahman Haqqani in a Kabul explosion claimed by the Islamic State (IS), underscore the persistent risk of Al-Qaeda and its affiliates regaining a foothold. History offers stark lessons: unchecked extremism within neighbouring countries invariably spills over borders, threatening internal security and regional cohesion

What can Pakistan learn from this evolving threat? The first crucial lesson is the urgent need for a stable domestic political environment. In recent months, political instability has not only enabled groups like the TTP to strengthen their hold but has also exposed the state’s vulnerabilities in addressing its internal issues. This instability has eroded confidence in the government’s ability to maintain control and security.

On the international front, Pakistan’s interest in a stable and inclusive Afghanistan is more pressing than ever. The Taliban’s return to power, despite their promises of peace and moderation, has exacerbated the regional crisis. As long as Afghanistan remains a sanctuary for jihadist networks, the entire region will remain vulnerable to their influence. Pakistan must collaborate with regional stakeholders—China, the U.S., and other global powers—to promote stability in Afghanistan and prevent the further rise of transnational terrorism.

Furthermore, Pakistan must confront the root causes of extremism, which include poverty, lack of education, and ideological radicalization. These factors provide fertile ground for terrorist organizations to recruit and radicalize vulnerable populations. To effectively combat the spread of extremist ideologies, Pakistan must invest in long-term solutions such as educational reforms, economic development, and counter-radicalization programs. Only through a holistic approach can Pakistan hope to diminish the appeal of extremism and secure its future against the growing threat of terrorism.

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South Asia Times

Al-Qaeda Affiliates Targeting Weak States: Implications for Pakistan