The Eastern Front: Inside the India-Bangladesh Water dispute

The rivers that flow from the Himalayas to the Bay of Bengal and the Indus River Delta are the lifeblood of the Indian subcontinent, weaving a common ecological tapestry across national borders. At the same time, they are a reason for immense political tensions in one of the most populous regions of the world. While the water dispute between India and Pakistan is well known and recently came into the news after India’s unilateral suspension of the 1960 World Bank-mediated Indus Waters Treaty and a subsequent statement by The Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) that India cannot unilaterally suspend this treaty, another such dispute exists on the eastern side of the subcontinent, between India and Bangladesh. There are 54 shared waterways between India and Bangladesh, but these waterways have become arteries of anxiety and sources of profound diplomatic friction. For decades, the dialogue has been dominated by disputes over flow rates, barrages, and unimplemented treaties.

The Scars of Farakka Barrage

The genesis of the contemporary water dispute lies etched in the concrete of the Farakka Barrage. Commissioned by India in 1975, its stated purpose was to divert water from the Ganges into the Hooghly River. For Bangladesh, however, this unilateral action had catastrophic downstream consequences. During the critical dry season, from January to May, the drastically reduced flow of the Ganges (known as the Padma in Bangladesh) has had a devastating, multi-generational impact. It has accelerated desertification in northern Bangladesh, increased salinity in the southwestern regions, and crippled the delicate ecosystem of the Sundarbans, the world’s largest mangrove forest. The livelihoods of millions who depend on the river’s bounty, from farmers to fisherfolk, have been systematically eroded, pushing communities into poverty and fuelling internal migration.

The Ganges water dispute traces back to the early 1950s, when India first announced its intention to build the Farakka Barrage. At the time, the region now known as Bangladesh was part of Pakistan, and India’s plans were met with concern. However, the project remained on hold. With Bangladesh’s independence in 1971 and the emergence of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s pro-India government, India found the diplomatic space to proceed. The barrage was completed in 1975. Later that same year, following the assassination of Mujib and the rise of General Ziaur Rahman, Bangladesh began to strongly oppose the barrage. In 1976, the issue was taken to the United Nations, compelling India to return to the negotiating table. For the next two decades, water sharing was managed through ad-hoc agreements until the landmark Ganges Water Treaty was signed in 1996.

This 30-year treaty was hailed as a significant achievement, establishing a formula for water sharing at the Farakka point. However, its implementation has been fraught with controversy and accusations of non-transparency. Bangladesh has repeatedly alleged that it does not receive the guaranteed quantum of water, particularly in years of low flow.

A core reason for this mistrust is the treaty’s lack of a joint monitoring mechanism. The water flow data used for the sharing formula is collected solely by India at Farakka, with no provision for Bangladeshi experts to be present upstream to verify the total volume of water arriving at the barrage. This lack of transparency forces Bangladesh to accept the provided data on faith, fueling persistent suspicion that undeclared upstream diversions by India diminish the river’s flow before it is measured. With the treaty set to expire in 2026, a deep trepidation permeates Dhaka over these unresolved transparency issues.

The expiration of the treaty in 2026

The 1996 Ganges Water Treaty between India and Bangladesh is set to expire in 2026, raising growing concern in Dhaka over the future of transboundary water sharing. Signed as a 30-year agreement, the treaty was initially hailed as a landmark achievement, establishing a formula for equitable distribution of Ganges waters during the dry season. However, as the deadline approaches, India has reportedly expressed interest in renegotiating the terms, proposing a new treaty that would allocate a lower share of water to Bangladesh. New Delhi argues that climate change, reduced river flow, and rising domestic demand necessitate a revision of the original allocations. This shift has sparked anxiety in Bangladesh, where millions depend on the Ganges for agriculture, fisheries, and daily livelihood. Officials in Dhaka fear that any reduction in their water share could exacerbate environmental degradation, intensify salinity intrusion in the southwest, and worsen water scarcity during the dry season. The Sundarbans mangrove forest, already under ecological strain, could face irreversible damage. While India insists that renegotiation is necessary to reflect contemporary realities, Bangladesh views the move as a unilateral pressure tactic that undermines the spirit of the original treaty. With time running out, the issue threatens to reignite diplomatic tensions between the two neighbours.

Teesta’s Unending Wait

Bangladehi anxiety is compounded by the unresolved dispute over the Teesta River, a crucial artery for agriculture in northern Bangladesh’s “food basket.” A meticulously negotiated water-sharing agreement has been stalled for over a decade, a victim of India’s complex federal political system. The government of West Bengal, an Indian state bordering Bangladesh, has steadfastly refused to approve the treaty, arguing that it would create water shortages in its own northern districts. While India’s central government has expressed its commitment, its inability to bring a state government on board has left Bangladeshi farmers at the mercy of a river whose flow is now heavily controlled by upstream dams and irrigation canals in India. This decade-long impasse is a stark symbol of how downstream needs are often held hostage to upstream domestic politics, leaving a trail of parched fields and broken promises.

Geopolitics and power asymmetry

This dispute is a direct product of the profound power imbalance that defines the India-Bangladesh relationship and India’s dreams of regional hegemony in the region. India, as the upper riparian nation, has often used its status to bully its neighbours, which is unlawful because substantially decreasing water flow to a lower riparian state violates the foundational principles of international law. Its decisions on dams and irrigation projects have existential consequences for Bangladesh, which has historically lacked the leverage to influence them.

However, this dynamic has been dramatically altered by recent political shifts. The 2024 ouster of the pro-India government of Sheikh Hasina, following massive public protests, has led to a new administration in Dhaka that is not aligned with New Delhi. Relations have cooled rapidly, culminating in tit-for-tat trade sanctions by mid-2025. This new government is actively improving relations with Pakistan and, most significantly, pivoting towards China. The bilateral tension is now complicated by a deep, strategic partnership between Dhaka and Beijing. China is no longer just offering to finance projects, it is now Bangladesh’s chosen partner for massive water management and infrastructure plans, seen as a direct counterweight to Indian hegemony. This has transformed the water-sharing discourse from a bilateral issue into a complex geopolitical chess match, challenging India’s long-standing regional dominance