Tenure Extension: Stability or Institutional Overreach

On Monday, November 4, 2024, Pakistan’s National Assembly approved six bills aimed at tenure extension of armed services chiefs from three to five years and increasing the number of judges in the Supreme Court. These bills will now be sent to the president for approval. The passed legislation includes:

1. The Supreme Court Number of Judges (Amendment) Bill, 2024
2. The Supreme Court Practice and Procedure (Amendment) Bill, 2024
3. The Islamabad High Court (Amendment) Bill, 2024
4. The Pakistan Army (Amendment) Bill, 2024
5. The Pakistan Air Force (Amendment) Bill, 2024
6. The Pakistan Navy (Amendment) Bill, 2024

Earlier, on October 21, 2024, the National Assembly passed the 26th Amendment, a significant set of constitutional changes comprising 27 clauses that aim to reshape several key judicial and governance frameworks. Among the notable changes is the fixture of the Chief Justice’s term, along with amendments to the Federal Shariat Court and the Council of Islamic Ideology (CII).

For instance, Article 203C now includes criteria for appointing the Chief Justice of the Federal Shariat Court (FSC), specifying that an FSC judge must also be qualified to serve as a Supreme Court judge. Additionally, Article 203D has introduced a new provision requiring appeals against FSC decisions made under the 26th Amendment to be disposed of within 12 months, ensuring a more expedient judicial process.

Furthermore, other amendments include modifications to Articles 229 and 230 that lower the threshold for parliamentary references to the CII and set a timeline for considering reports on Islamic principles, respectively. Moreover, the amendment aims to completely eliminate riba (interest) by January 1, 2028, and establishes the right to a clean, healthy environment in a newly inserted Article 9A. The Fourth Schedule has also been adjusted to clarify local governance in cantonment areas, including the regulation of taxes and fees.

Overall, these legislative reforms, including the recent bills, may signal a trajectory towards strengthening institutional frameworks in Pakistan, focusing on accountability and governance.

Concerns Over Institutional Independence and Democratic Health

Prima facie, the bills appear to focus primarily on extending the terms of office for armed services chiefs and increasing the number of Supreme Court judges. However, they raise significant concerns regarding institutional independence and the overall health of democracy in Pakistan.

To understand the significance of these tenure extensions in a broader context, it is helpful to look at how other countries approach similar roles. For example, in India, the standard tenure for service chiefs is three years or until the age of 62, whichever comes first, with only the newly established Chief of Defence Staff allowed to serve until age 65. This maintains continuity in leadership without allowing any single individual excessive influence over time. 

Similarly, in the United States, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff serves a four-year term, renewable once, designed to balance stability with a regular infusion of fresh perspectives. In contrast, in China, however, the People’s Liberation Army does not have fixed tenures for its top generals, aligning military appointments closely with the political landscape. Russia’s approach is similarly flexible, with officials like General Valery Gerasimov remaining in power for over a decade, reflecting a system where prolonged tenures are common and institutional influence often overlaps with political loyalty.

Nevertheless, calls for tenure extensions have recently gained momentum in Pakistan’s politics, however, the implications of such extensions are far-reaching. In the past, similar measures led to controversies that often eroded public confidence in these institutions, particularly when linked to political or personal motives. 

Previous tenure extensions for military leaders in Pakistan, such as those for Zia-ul-Haq and Pervez Musharraf, and more recently Qamar Javed Bajwa, were perceived by many as politically motivated moves. 

Consequently, such actions contributed to a long-standing perception of power imbalance, fueling mistrust among civilian institutions and the public alike. This backdrop adds complexity to recent changes, as they risk being viewed through the same lens of personalised power consolidation. On the other hand, proponents argue that longer terms allow these senior officials to implement long-term policies and reforms.

Experienced leaders in critical positions may enhance Pakistan’s capacity to address internal and external threats. It would also decrease the political turmoil that usually surrounds the appointments of the army chief every three years.

Also See: Faiz Hameed Case: Pakistan Military Accountability

Increasing the Judiciary’s Capacity for Better Governance

With regards to increasing the number of Supreme Court judges, improved efficiency in handling a backlog of cases and greater representation of diverse perspectives are apparent pros. A larger judiciary could enhance access to justice, ensuring the timely resolution of cases, which is crucial in a country where the legal system faces considerable delays. Moreover, additional judges could help distribute workloads more evenly, reducing burnout among the judiciary and potentially improving decision quality.

When comparing the judicial capacity with other nations, Pakistan’s current structure highlights potential areas for reform. India, for instance, increased its Supreme Court’s capacity to 34 justices in 2019 to address a substantial case backlog, with a focus on improving efficiency. By contrast, the U.S. Supreme Court maintains only nine justices but operates with strict control over its docket, taking fewer cases each year. China’s Supreme People’s Court has hundreds of judges divided across numerous tribunals, enabling it to manage high case volumes while reflecting China’s larger population and regional diversity. Russia’s Supreme Court has over 150 judges across various panels, further illustrating how judicial capacity and structure vary internationally.

However, some lawmakers and political parties have voiced their concerns about the bills, arguing that they were hastily passed without allowing comment from the opposition. “It is neither good for the country nor for the armed forces,” the leader of the opposition, Omar Ayub said.

The Public Trust Factor

For citizens, confidence in national institutions stems from transparency, fairness, and adherence to established rules. 

Changes to the tenure framework should be grounded in a broader, institutionally focused vision rather than catering to specific individuals.  Smart and inclusive tenure extensions can pave the way for better teamwork between civilian governments and the military, ultimately strengthening our democratic setup.

In a diverse country like Pakistan, with its vibrant mix of cultures and identities, we need a governance model that celebrates unity instead of division. Decisions that affect key institutions should be made with fairness in mind, helping to avoid any vibes of favouritism. 

The Way Forward

Countries around the world offer models that illustrate the value of balanced, limited terms in developing institutional strength. For example, 

• Germany enforces four-year rotations for its Bundeswehr (armed forces) leadership, supporting a culture of continuous improvement and new perspectives while preventing the concentration of power. 
• In the United States, the military’s strict rotation and mandatory retirement policies promote both neutrality and adaptability, allowing fresh leaders to bring new ideas without undermining stability. 
• China’s approach, where military leaders often serve lengthy tenures due to alignment with party goals, reflects a contrasting model in which long tenures align military loyalty with political interests, but at the risk of limiting institutional flexibility.

Therefore, instead of focusing on extending tenures, Pakistan could benefit from reforms that address the root issues these extensions aim to tackle. Strengthening training and succession planning within the military and judiciary could ensure that qualified leaders are ready to step into senior roles without institutional disruption.

In Pakistan’s polarised political climate, reforming these institutions would require engagement from both the opposition and stakeholders to create a framework that supports governance continuity without concentrating power. Globally, shorter tenures, combined with strong institutional policies, have shown that term limits can foster resilience and institutional loyalty. Examples from around the world suggest that effective succession planning, continuous professional training, and inclusive policies contribute significantly to democratic robustness, accountability, and public trust.

Pakistan can also follow suit to reinforce its democratic institutions, ensuring they remain credible, impartial, and accountable to the people. Moreover, opposition must be taken on board before making such amendments for long-term stability and garnering wider public support.

Notably, the implications of these reforms extend beyond immediate governance concerns; they have the potential to redefine Pakistan’s political landscape. While the recent legislative changes are significant, they must be seen as part of a larger reform agenda aimed at strengthening Pakistan’s institutions. The success of this agenda will depend on a collective commitment to democratic principles, engagement with diverse voices, and a focus on long-term sustainability.