Khalilzad on ISKP, TTP, and Pakistan

Zalmay Khalilzad’s recent interview with Tolo News provides a window into the lingering complexities of US policy toward the Taliban-led Afghanistan. While Khalilzad attempts to project a neutral diplomatic stance, his remarks, particularly regarding ISIS-K (ISKP), the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and Pakistan’s military role, betray a strategic bias that necessitates a rigorous counter-analysis.

One of the primary drivers of Khalilzad’s recent engagement appears to be the sensitive issue of US citizens currently detained by the Taliban. Khalilzad confirmed that his visit to Kabul was aimed at securing the release of these individuals, yet he noted a lack of a clear or positive response from the Taliban leadership. This highlights a cynical reality of the current diplomacy of necessity. The Taliban are effectively using human leverage to force high-level engagement with former officials like Khalilzad, attempting to normalize their administration while failing to adhere to basic international norms regarding the treatment of foreign nationals. By keeping these individuals in custody, the Taliban demonstrate that their wisdom and sensible proposals, which Khalilzad so readily praises in other contexts, are secondary to their use of hostage diplomacy as a political tool.

One of the most contentious points in Khalilzad’s interview is his assertion that ISKP members are present in Pakistan. This narrative serves as a convenient but flawed diversion. By highlighting alleged ISKP secret cells in Pakistan, Khalilzad is effectively helping the Taliban create a false equivalence to mask the overt, UN-verified presence of the TTP and Al-Qaeda on Afghan soil. To claim Pakistan supports or even provides sanctuary to ISKP is to ignore a decade of bloody history. Pakistan has been one of ISKP’s primary targets, suffering devastating attacks on its civilian and security infrastructure. In response, Pakistani security forces have conducted thousands of intelligence-based operations, killing or arresting high-profile ISKP commanders and dismantling their infrastructure. If ISKP exists in clandestine cells, it is not by invitation but despite a relentless hunt by the state. Conversely, the presence of the TTP in Afghanistan is not a matter of thinking or clandestine cells, it is an operational reality involving thousands of fighters who use Afghan territory as a safe haven to launch cross-border attacks into Pakistan. Khalilzad’s diplomacy seems aimed at legitimizing the Taliban’s efforts while unfairly shifting the burden of regional instability back onto Pakistan.

Khalilzad’s remarks on Bagram Airbase are equally revealing. His suggestion that the base’s future could be resolved through negotiations suggests that the United States is not yet ready to fully relinquish its strategic footprint in the region. The insistence on the necessity of American personnel for the protection of a potential embassy or to counter threats highlights a persistent US desire for an operational hub. Khalilzad is essentially signaling that the door remains open for a security arrangement that would allow the US to monitor the region from within.

Khalilzad’s skepticism regarding the Pakistani military is perhaps the most cynical aspect of his commentary. He suggests that the US must test Pakistan and observe its actions in practice. This rhetoric ignores the immense human and economic cost Pakistan has paid as a frontline state in the War on Terror. The Pakistani military has shed considerable blood in this conflict, more than almost any other US ally. From the mountainous terrain of Waziristan to the urban centers of Karachi and Lahore, thousands of Pakistani soldiers and tens of thousands of civilians have lost their lives fighting the radicalization. To characterize this commitment as a mere skill in showing friendship is a disservice to those sacrifices. Pakistan’s cooperation was not just a diplomatic gesture, it was a grueling, internal battle for the country’s own survival, often conducted while the US changed its regional priorities.

Furthermore, Khalilzad’s praise for the Taliban’s wisdom and sensible proposals regarding the TTP issue seems like an attempt to validate the current Afghan administration at Pakistan’s expense. The TTP is not just a border issue or a diplomatic proposal for Pakistan, it is an existential security threat. When Khalilzad questions what Pakistan wants, he ignores the simple reality that Pakistan wants an end to the export of terrorism from Afghan soil. The issues like water rights are indeed significant, but they should not be used as smoke screens to avoid the immediate problem of terrorism. By framing the Taliban as reasonable and Pakistan as uncertain, Khalilzad is performing a diplomatic sleight of hand. He is attempting to stabilize the US-Taliban relationship by making Pakistan the variable of uncertainty.