India’s recent announcement to suspend the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), followed by inflammatory remarks from senior ministers including Amit Shah’s conceited statement about never restoring the treaty and Indian Defense Min Rajnat Singh affirming that Operation Sindoor Not Over, marks a dangerous departure from both diplomatic prudence and legal responsibility. For over six decades, the IWT has remained a cornerstone of peacebuilding in South Asia, outlasting wars, political upheavals, and prolonged standoffs. To now treat it as expendable in the wake of a dreary incident and that too without evidence, transparency, or engagement is deeply concerning.
The IWT is Not Optional
What needs to be cleared here is that Indus Waters Treaty is not a favor from one country to another. It is a binding international agreement, brokered by the World Bank, and recognized under international law. It cannot be walked away from on a whim, nor held hostage to domestic political compulsions. India’s claim that the Treaty is now “irrelevant” following the attack in Pahalgam not only contradicts the Treaty’s own provisions—particularly Article 12—but also sets a dangerous precedent. Unilateral withdrawal from a multilateral arrangement is not just poor diplomacy; it is a violation of legal norms governing international treaties. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties makes this clear.
A Precedent with Regional Fallout And The Human Cost
Moreover, the implications go beyond India and Pakistan. The precedent being set here could impact regional hydro-politics far more broadly. If water treaties are now to be treated as political leverage, what is to stop other upper riparian states from doing the same? Will China respond in kind on the Brahmaputra? Will Bangladesh be next in line?
The environmental and human consequences of suspending the IWT are severe. For Pakistan, whose agrarian economy and food security depend on the waters of the Indus Basin, the stakes are existential. But for India too, this escalation invites diplomatic isolation and reputational damage. There is no moral high ground to be claimed by holding back water from 240 million people.
India’s Brinkmanship, Pakistan’s Restraint
While India’s political leadership may believe this posture reflects strength, the opposite is true. Power is measured not by the ability to coerce, but by the willingness to uphold responsibility even in times of crisis. Weaponizing water is a shortsighted strategy — one that may win headlines but loses the larger narrative of stability, responsibility, and leadership.
Pakistan has responded with measured firmness. It has reiterated its commitment to the Treaty, offered cooperation in any impartial investigation into the Pahalgam incident, and signaled intent to pursue the issue diplomatically and legally. These are the hallmarks of a state acting within the framework of international norms.
Don’t Let Rivers Turn Into Frontlines
India must reconsider what it is projecting and aiming at. Disputes and crises are not new in South Asia. What matters is how states choose to manage them. Abandoning the IWT would not merely escalate tensions, it would erode the very principles that have helped the subcontinent avoid water wars for over half a century. This is not a matter of territorial contestation. It is a question of shared survival. India may be able to build canals, but credibility, once lost, is far harder to restore. The Indus Waters Treaty should not be the first casualty of revenge politics.
