Terrorists get banned… unless they host a Space on X? So, rules take a nap while extremists get the mic??
On July 2, 2019, the U.S. State Department designated the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) organization, citing its involvement in lethal attacks on civilians and security personnel. Pakistan had already banned the BLA in 2006, condemning its reign of terror. Yet, in 2025, X (formerly Twitter) allowed TBalochCircle_, a BLA-affiliated platform run by terrorist Nadir Baloch, to host a Space session discussing the recent Kalat incident—drawing over 3,200 live participants and 25,000+ listeners across other platforms. The event was framed around Pakistan’s military media wing ISPR’s statement on the Mangochar, Kalat unrest.
So, how does X justify giving a globally designated terror outfit a platform to amplify its propaganda while enforcing stringent policies against Hamas, Hezbollah, and other proscribed groups? This selective application of rules raises serious questions about platform integrity.
The Kalat Incident: A New Chapter in Baloch Militancy
Between January 31 and February 1, 2025, BLA militants launched a deadly attack on Pakistani forces in Mangochar, Kalat district, reigniting discussions about fractures within Baloch insurgent groups. However, in a surprising shift, the attack was claimed not by Bashir Zeb Baloch’s faction but by Hyrbyair Marri’s London-based group. The Pakistan Institute for Peace and Security Studies (PICSS) highlighted this in a recent report, indicating growing divisions within the militant landscape. Marri’s faction, once dominant, had suffered setbacks after the defection of key commander Aslam Achu in 2016-17, followed by his assassination in 2019. The Kalat attack suggests that Marri’s faction is attempting a resurgence.
The BLA’s Internal Power Struggle
For years, the BLA was the dominant Baloch insurgent group, but internal rifts between Bashir Zeb Baloch and Hyrbyair Marri have fragmented the movement. Marri’s faction, once powerful, declined after key leaders defected or were eliminated. The Mangochar attack, in which militants reportedly held the town for hours, burned a bank, and killed 18 Frontier Corps (FC) personnel, suggests an attempt to reassert dominance. But who is funding this revival?
Digital Platforms & Terrorist Propaganda: The Double Standard
Social media platforms have enforced sweeping bans on designated terrorist groups like Hamas and Hezbollah, citing compliance with international counterterrorism laws. Yet, X allowed a BLA-affiliated account to host a live Space session. If policies against terrorist propaganda exist, why is the BLA an exception?
Pakistan’s Response: A Nationwide Crackdown
Pakistan’s security apparatus is reportedly preparing for its most extensive counterterrorism operation yet, targeting BLA’s command and control in both urban and rural areas. Intelligence and law enforcement agencies (LEAs) are set to launch a sweeping crackdown spanning Karachi, Kalat, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK). This campaign will be reinforced by stricter border control measures to disrupt militant movements.
The Larger Geopolitical Web: India’s Alleged Role
The resurgence of BLA factions has also reignited concerns about external support. In December 2023, Sarfraz Ahmed Bungulzai, a surrendered Baloch National Army (BNA) commander, revealed that India was actively supporting terrorist activity in Balochistan. His statement aligns with earlier confessions from Indian intelligence operative Kulbhushan Yadav, who was arrested in Pakistan for espionage and terror financing. Sources tracking the terrorist groups activities in the western region of Pakistan have also linked BLA-TTP cooperation to external backing, with reports suggesting that Mehsud tribe members from the TTP are assuming leadership roles within the BLA.
The Killing of Mushtaq ‘Kohi’ in Kabul: A Warning Sign?
The recent assassination of Mushtaq alias Kohi, a senior commander of the BLA’s Majeed Brigade, in Kabul further suggests that the group’s safe havens are shrinking. With top operatives being eliminated in Afghanistan, the question arises: Is BLA losing its stronghold? And if so, why is X giving them a digital one?
Also See: Major Blow to BLA: Key Commander Mushtaq “Kohi” Taken Out in Kabul
What Lies Ahead?
The events unfolding in early 2025 paint a volatile picture. The resurgence of BLA-Azad, the targeted killings of its senior commanders, and Pakistan’s imminent counterterrorism sweep indicate a critical moment in the fight against terrorism. With Pakistan now moving to dismantle these networks, will digital platforms finally start holding all terrorist entities to the same standard, or will the selective enforcement continue?
@X, care to explain?
So, here’s a thought: Has the Government of Pakistan launched a formal complaint about a designated terrorist group (BLA) getting a digital podium on a platform owned by a current US government representative, especially when that X Space was used to amplify propaganda directly opposing the Pakistan Army’s statement on the Kalat incident? After all, whether it’s BLA or any other terrorist group, shouldn’t the rules be universal—consistently applied for all designated groups? Just a thought!
SAT Commentaries’ are social media threads by various authors, reproduced here for website use. Views are their own.
Banned Terrorists, Unbanned Voices? X Hosts BLA Propaganda Space
Terrorists get banned… unless they host a Space on X? So, rules take a nap while extremists get the mic??
On July 2, 2019, the U.S. State Department designated the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) organization, citing its involvement in lethal attacks on civilians and security personnel. Pakistan had already banned the BLA in 2006, condemning its reign of terror. Yet, in 2025, X (formerly Twitter) allowed TBalochCircle_, a BLA-affiliated platform run by terrorist Nadir Baloch, to host a Space session discussing the recent Kalat incident—drawing over 3,200 live participants and 25,000+ listeners across other platforms. The event was framed around Pakistan’s military media wing ISPR’s statement on the Mangochar, Kalat unrest.
So, how does X justify giving a globally designated terror outfit a platform to amplify its propaganda while enforcing stringent policies against Hamas, Hezbollah, and other proscribed groups? This selective application of rules raises serious questions about platform integrity.
The Kalat Incident: A New Chapter in Baloch Militancy
Between January 31 and February 1, 2025, BLA militants launched a deadly attack on Pakistani forces in Mangochar, Kalat district, reigniting discussions about fractures within Baloch insurgent groups. However, in a surprising shift, the attack was claimed not by Bashir Zeb Baloch’s faction but by Hyrbyair Marri’s London-based group. The Pakistan Institute for Peace and Security Studies (PICSS) highlighted this in a recent report, indicating growing divisions within the militant landscape. Marri’s faction, once dominant, had suffered setbacks after the defection of key commander Aslam Achu in 2016-17, followed by his assassination in 2019. The Kalat attack suggests that Marri’s faction is attempting a resurgence.
The BLA’s Internal Power Struggle
For years, the BLA was the dominant Baloch insurgent group, but internal rifts between Bashir Zeb Baloch and Hyrbyair Marri have fragmented the movement. Marri’s faction, once powerful, declined after key leaders defected or were eliminated. The Mangochar attack, in which militants reportedly held the town for hours, burned a bank, and killed 18 Frontier Corps (FC) personnel, suggests an attempt to reassert dominance. But who is funding this revival?
Digital Platforms & Terrorist Propaganda: The Double Standard
Social media platforms have enforced sweeping bans on designated terrorist groups like Hamas and Hezbollah, citing compliance with international counterterrorism laws. Yet, X allowed a BLA-affiliated account to host a live Space session. If policies against terrorist propaganda exist, why is the BLA an exception?
Pakistan’s Response: A Nationwide Crackdown
Pakistan’s security apparatus is reportedly preparing for its most extensive counterterrorism operation yet, targeting BLA’s command and control in both urban and rural areas. Intelligence and law enforcement agencies (LEAs) are set to launch a sweeping crackdown spanning Karachi, Kalat, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK). This campaign will be reinforced by stricter border control measures to disrupt militant movements.
The Larger Geopolitical Web: India’s Alleged Role
The resurgence of BLA factions has also reignited concerns about external support. In December 2023, Sarfraz Ahmed Bungulzai, a surrendered Baloch National Army (BNA) commander, revealed that India was actively supporting terrorist activity in Balochistan. His statement aligns with earlier confessions from Indian intelligence operative Kulbhushan Yadav, who was arrested in Pakistan for espionage and terror financing. Sources tracking the terrorist groups activities in the western region of Pakistan have also linked BLA-TTP cooperation to external backing, with reports suggesting that Mehsud tribe members from the TTP are assuming leadership roles within the BLA.
The Killing of Mushtaq ‘Kohi’ in Kabul: A Warning Sign?
The recent assassination of Mushtaq alias Kohi, a senior commander of the BLA’s Majeed Brigade, in Kabul further suggests that the group’s safe havens are shrinking. With top operatives being eliminated in Afghanistan, the question arises: Is BLA losing its stronghold? And if so, why is X giving them a digital one?
Also See: Major Blow to BLA: Key Commander Mushtaq “Kohi” Taken Out in Kabul
What Lies Ahead?
The events unfolding in early 2025 paint a volatile picture. The resurgence of BLA-Azad, the targeted killings of its senior commanders, and Pakistan’s imminent counterterrorism sweep indicate a critical moment in the fight against terrorism. With Pakistan now moving to dismantle these networks, will digital platforms finally start holding all terrorist entities to the same standard, or will the selective enforcement continue?
@X, care to explain?
So, here’s a thought: Has the Government of Pakistan launched a formal complaint about a designated terrorist group (BLA) getting a digital podium on a platform owned by a current US government representative, especially when that X Space was used to amplify propaganda directly opposing the Pakistan Army’s statement on the Kalat incident? After all, whether it’s BLA or any other terrorist group, shouldn’t the rules be universal—consistently applied for all designated groups? Just a thought!
SAT Commentaries’ are social media threads by various authors, reproduced here for website use. Views are their own.
SAT Commentary
SAT Commentary
SAT Commentaries, a collection of insightful social media threads on current events and social issues, featuring diverse perspectives from various authors.
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