A premier research and media lab where research meets media, and South Asia's vibrant story unfolds
Pakistan has rarely been free of the dread of an impending crisis, as history demonstrates. The nation\’s quest for survival has been fascinating and perilous since its inception. But, it must tenaciously hold onto the hope that gave it birth.
The geopolitical rivalry between India and Pakistan in the Afghan theater is not the only rationale for India\’s readiness to step up and boost international collaboration on counterterrorism issues. There are vested interests for other regional actors as well.
Given its ambitions for a more assertive role in the global order, it is imperative to mention India\’s contested, historically monopolistic dominance of South Asia. This also alludes to the support it offers to proxies in the region.
Despite numerous violent conflicts between India and Pakistan since the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) was ratified in 1960, the two neighbors have not yet engaged in any water wars. The treaty has, however, come under fresh scrutiny in recent days.
The spectre of the 2002 Gujarat Riots has loomed large over Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Despite consistent denials of state complicity, a new BBC documentary has raised questions that have haunted the country for two decades.
In light of the controversy over the cancellation of a cricket series between Australia and Afghanistan, it is crucial to ask whether sports are truly apolitical or if their non-political nature is only a concession to the world\’s most powerful lobbies.
Despite the recent escalation in hostilities that the TTP threat has sparked between Pakistan and Afghanistan, there is as yet a little possibility that Pakistan will use kinetic action across the border, and even less likely that Afghanistan would respond equitably even if it did.
Soon after the start of the civil war in East Pakistan in March 1971, Indira Gandhi consulted her army chief, Gen. Manekshaw, about a military campaign in East Pakistan. Manekshaw stated that the Indian army was not prepared for an offensive operation in East Pakistan or for the inevitable Pakistani military counterthrust in West Pakistan and that it would take six to seven months to prepare for conflict on both fronts. New Delhi also considered it essential to have a Bangladeshi force, the Mukti Bahini, deeply involved in any military action in East Pakistan and recognised that it would take some time to organize and train these units for both guerrilla and conventional warfare (Sisson and Rose). The Indian army participated fully in the civil war. It trained the Mukti Bahini (which reached an active strength of 100k by November 1971), and it suffered about 5000 casualties while fighting alongside the Mukti Bahini against Pakistani forces in East Pakistan. The months from March to October weakened the Pakistan Army a lot, which was facing huge losses, logistical difficulties, and consistent battles all over East Pakistan. Manekshaw decided in March or April that a military campaign against East Pakistan would begin in November or December, after the monsoon. According to Srinath Raghavan, India ramped up its aggression in October and started penetrating and capturing territory inside East Pakistan to a depth of 10 miles. After capturing East Pakistan territory, the Indian forces retreated and left the Mukti Bahini soldiers in the posts. The idea was to capture important salients in East Pakistan that would assist in the eventual full-fledged military intervention. Finally, on November 22, India launched a full-fledged attack on East Pakistan, and from then on, the Indians started holding the captured territory themselves and deputed the Mukti Bahini to conduct reconnaissance and other behind-the-scenes activities. On the Pakistani side, there was utter confusion regarding Indian intentions in East Pakistan during the civil war months. Yahya Khan refused to believe that India would attack East Pakistan despite the fact that Pakistani intelligence had procured India’s military plans regarding the campaign against East Pakistan as early as August 1971. Our generals were also perplexed about Indian war objectives. Did India just want to “liberate” a sizable chunk of territory inside East Pakistan and establish an Awami League government there? Or did they want to utterly defeat the Pakistani Army and force them to surrender or withdraw from East Pakistan? In hindsight, this debate seems a bit odd. Particularly since, by October, India had seized approximately 7,700 square kilometers of East Pakistan territory and turned it over to the Mukti Bahini. Nevertheless, this debate refused to die out until early December 1971. As a result of this uncertainty, Commander Eastern Command Gen. Niazi was not permitted to abandon far-flung border areas in order to redeploy his scant forces for a more robust defense of important areas, especially the vital Dhaka triangle. In comparison to the western front, the relative strength of forces on the eastern front was significantly lopsided in favor of India. According to Sarbans Singh, “(Lt. General) Aurora [commander of Indian Eastern Command] had at his disposal close to half a million men and women of the army, paramilitary forces, and the Bangladesh forces, including the Mukti Bahini, under his command, more than any lieutenant general had ever commanded before or since.” Indian army divisions and many independent brigades faced three incomplete infantry divisions of the Pakistan army. The Indian army outnumbered the Pakistani army’s 40 000 or so men by a factor of four. Regarding firepower, the difference was even greater (1:8). Because the heavy weapons of the two divisions sent to East Pakistan after March remained in West Pakistan, a single Pakistani division in the Lahore sector possessed more artillery and armored firepower than the entire Eastern Command. The disparity was even greater in the air, with 14 Pakistani aircraft facing approximately 150 Indian combat aircraft. The Pakistan Navy was virtually absent from East Pakistan, and the Bay of Bengal was under complete Indian control, with the Indian aircraft carrier Vikrant leading East Pakistan’s naval siege. It had been estimated and accepted within Pakistan\’s military hierarchy that the navy and air force wouldn’t be able to operate after the first 24 hours of the outbreak of a full-scale war. Thus, an outnumbered Pakistan Army had to fight a war without air or naval support in a land where the bulk of the population was alienated and a robust Mukti Bahini was wreaking havoc on the logistics and lines of communication. The outcome was a foregone conclusion. East Pakistan\’s garrison’s only hope was to hold out for as long as possible in order to provide time for our army in the West to register spectacular victories and force the Indians to the negotiating table before the destruction of East Pakistan by the Indian military. Interestingly, Eastern Command’s military deployment ran counter to this plan. To fight for an extended period of time, the Pakistani army had to abandon numerous salient border areas that were difficult to defend and focus on more important locations such as urban centers and communication hubs. It was imperative to defend Dhaka and deploy sizable forces there because Dhaka was the center and the heart of East Pakistan. A sizable Pakistan force in Dhaka could have fought on for several weeks by engrossing the Indians in urban warfare. But Niazi kept his forces strung out and spread along the borders till the very end. He had selected the “fortress strategy” for East Pakistan’s defense. According to this strategy, several important towns were given the status of fortresses. The army was to concentrate in these places (where rations and ammunition were stocked for a period of 30–60 days) and then continue fighting till the bitter end. But the problem was: how to get to the fortresses (located dozens of miles away from the border) under Indian air supremacy with Mukti Bahini behind our lines? It
Obviously, the figures of 3 million killed and 2 lakh raped in the “Genocide” in East Pakistan are rumors.
But why was this rumor circulated? Why has the Awami League made it an article of faith? Why does the Indian government propagate this lie incessantly all over the world?
The conventional narrative about Operation Searchlight goes like this: The mighty Pakistan Army started smashing the hapless Bengalis, who never stood a chance. This is pure fiction.
A premier research and media lab, where every story counts, every data point matters!
COPYRIGHT 2024 – SOUTH ASIA TIMES
