Deconstructing the Deprivation Myth

This article was originally published at Daily Times.

For more than seven decades, politics of Balochistan has been dominated by a single, emotionally charged claim; that the province has been systematically deprived, exploited and neglected by the federation. This assertion that is repeated endlessly by Sardar politicians, has become the cornerstone of Baloch nationalist rhetoric and over time a deeply internalized belief among the population. Yet when examined against fiscal data, constitutional arrangements, development indicators and political behaviour within the province, deprivation narrative reveals itself less as an objective reality and more as a carefully cultivated political instrument.

The Politics of Deprivation: How Grievance Became Strategy

From the 1950s onward, Balochistan’s dominant tribal elite learned to use grievance as leverage. Every crisis, insurgency or protest was framed as proof of federal injustice. The response from Islamabad was predictable; appeasement through enhanced funds, special grants, development packages and concessions often extended without strict monitoring or accountability. Rather than uplifting ordinary citizens, these inflows consolidated elite power. Sardars accumulated wealth, reinforced patronage networks and preserved feudal control over land and labour. Development was not merely neglected; it was often actively resisted because it threatened the very foundations of elite dominance.

The feudal structure of Baloch society made this strategy viable. In large parts of the province especially, Baloch-majority districts, Sardars exercised near total control over political participation. Elections were won not through performance but through lineage, coercion and dependency. Under such conditions, there was little incentive to build schools, hospitals, factories or roads. An educated, economically mobile population would weaken tribal authority. Poverty, isolation and dependency ensured obedience.

Deflection, Governance Failures and Narrative Consolidation

Over time, deprivation slogan served another critical function; deflection. Governance failures within the province corruption, weak service delivery, poor planning were consistently externalized. Public anger was redirected away from provincial elites and toward the federation. As decades passed, repetition transformed rhetoric into perceived truth. What began as elite bargaining gradually hardened into popular belief.

The 18th Constitutional Amendment and Fiscal Autonomy

This narrative should have collapsed after the 18th Constitutional Amendment of 2010. The amendment fundamentally restructured Pakistan’s federal system by devolving major subjects health, education, social welfare, local development, culture and many regulatory functions to the provinces. Since then, Balochistan has enjoyed unprecedented fiscal autonomy and administrative authority. Yet the rhetoric of deprivation continues unchanged, as if nothing shifted in 2010. This contradiction is telling.

NFC Award, Federal Transfers and Budget Realities

Fiscal data further undermines the claim of federal neglect. According to provincial budget figures, Balochistan generates only Rs 124.8 billion in its own revenues, yet its total provincial budget exceeds Rs 1 trillion. More than 90% of this budget comes from federal transfers, one of the highest dependency ratios in the country. Under NFC Award alone, Balochistan receives approximately Rs 713.6 billion, supplemented by straight transfers and special grants. In comparative terms, this is a disproportionately generous allocation relative to population.

Balochistan constitutes only 6.2% of Pakistan’s population (14.89 million) but covers 43.6% of the country’s landmass (347,190 sq km). This demographic and geographic reality is crucial. Per capita federal transfers to Balochistan are among the highest in Pakistan. A significant share of the Federal PSDP is also directed toward the province. The claim that Islamabad starves Balochistan of funds does not survive even basic scrutiny.

Development Indicators Since 1947: Data Versus Perception

Development indicators further complicate the deprivation thesis. At the time of independence in 1947, Balochistan had 114 schools, three major hospitals, six dispensaries and just 375 km of roads. Today, the province has over 15,000 schools, 12 universities, 5 medical colleges, 145 colleges, 13 cadet colleges and 321 technical institutes. The health sector now includes 13 major hospitals, 18 teaching hospitals, 33 DHQs, 756 BHUs, 541 dispensaries, 24 dialysis centers and multiple specialized facilities. The road network has expanded to approximately 25,000 km.

None of this suggests a province frozen in time or deliberately excluded from development. Balochistan’s literacy rate, around 42%, remains below the national average, but this gap is more plausibly explained by governance failures, dispersed population, cultural resistance to schooling in some areas and insecurity rather than by the absence of spending.

The argument of “resource exploitation” is equally misleading. Contrary to popular belief, natural gas remains the only significant resource extracted from Balochistan on a sustained basis. There is no oil extraction in the province. Most other minerals frequently cited in nationalist discourse remain unexploited, existing more as geological potential than as commercial reality. The image of a province being stripped of its riches is largely mythical; in truth, Balochistan’s resource sector reflects underutilization, not overextraction.

CPEC, Gwadar and the Question of Inclusion

Balochistan has always been ruled by Baloch chief executives. Despite large Pashtun and other non-Baloch ethnicities, critics often point to China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) as another example of exclusion, claiming it bypasses local communities. Yet CPEC’s flagship projects in Balochistan, particularly Gwadar Port, road infrastructure, ports and coastal highway, power projects and the Gwadar Free Zone represent the single largest development push in the province’s history. Billions of dollars have been invested in connectivity, electricity, water supply and urban infrastructure.

The problem however, is not the absence of opportunity but local absorption capacity. Multiple vocational and technical training programs were launched to prepare Baloch youth for employment in Gwadar and related projects. Hundreds were trained, yet most chose to migrate to Gulf countries instead of joining local industry. This is not unique to Balochistan; labor migration is a rational economic choice across Pakistan. But it undercuts the argument that opportunities do not exist.

State Integration Efforts and Social Resistance

Similarly, the state has made sustained efforts to integrate Baloch youth into national institutions. Army recruitment teams have gone to remote villages for induction. Educational initiatives brought students from underdeveloped districts to study in cantonment schools. Yet resistance often came from families unwilling to let children remain away from home. Even when students stayed, many preferred to take board examinations in their home districts due to a well-known culture of cheating. These are social and governance challenges, not evidence of deliberate deprivation.

Perhaps the most damaging consequence of the deprivation narrative is generational. What began as elite rhetoric has now been internalized by young Baloch students, often without exposure to fiscal data, constitutional realities or comparative indicators. The state’s long-standing defensive posture hesitant to challenge grievance narratives has inadvertently reinforced them. Silence allowed myth to masquerade as fact.

Governance, Accountability and Elite Responsibility

In that sense, the question is not whether Balochistan faces challenges, it clearly does, but whether the dominant explanation fully captures their roots. Poverty, insecurity, weak institutions and uneven development are real. But acknowledging challenges is not the same as endorsing a narrative that absolves those who have ruled the province for decades. Deprivation, where it exists, is not primarily imposed from Islamabad; it is sustained through elite capture, feudal control, misgovernance and deliberate resistance to modernization.

The persistence of the deprivation bogey has served a narrow class well, but it has done little for ordinary Baloch. Until political accountability shifts inward toward provincial governance and elite responsibility no amount of federal funding will transform outcomes. Development cannot flourish where grievance is more profitable than reform.

In that sense, deprivation in Balochistan is less a historical injustice than a political myth one sustained not by neglect alone, but by design.

Also See: Balochistan’s Challenge: Development, Dissent, and the Danger of Militant Exploitation