Offensive doctrines lie at the heart of Indian defence policy. It aims to punish the enemy through the use of force that relies on large army formations and strives to inflict punitive costs on the adversary. The doctrinal evolution, organizational development, and wartime experiences highlight how offensive doctrines embedded in Indian defence policy. India’s war experiences in the 1962 Sino-Indian War, the 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pakistani War, led to the development of the Sundarji Doctrine. In order to defeat Pakistan in a limited conflict scenario, this doctrine placed a strong focus on the necessity of an offensive posture. However the operationalization of this doctrine never happened amid political and strategic shortcomings. Later on in 2001 Operation Parakram was planned after the attack on Indian parliament; it exposed gaps in the Sunderji doctrine where Indian armed forces failed to launch an offensive against Pakistan amid slow troop mobilization along the India-Pakistan border. To address these strategic limitations, India introduced the Cold Start Doctrine in 2003, aiming to engage in a limited war with Pakistan below the nuclear threshold. Although India denied the existence of CSD until 2017, former Chief of Army Staff Gen. Bipin Rawat acknowledged it. This doctrine required the Indian army to split into eight integrated battle groups (IBGs), which would need to respond within 72 hours of receiving orders. These forces would launch simultaneous surprise attacks on eight distinct locations. However, Pakistan countered CSD restored the strategic balance in South Asia with the induction of the Nasr missile, a strategic weapon tested in 2011. The Nasr missile system can carry a low-yield nuclear warhead, designed to be transportable, with a short-range of 60 kilometers.
Under the Modi-led BJP regime, a significant doctrinal shift occurred, wherein false flag operations were employed as a justification to execute offensive actions against Pakistan. To set a new normal of launching a swift offensive against Pakistan in the pretext of false flag operations, India officially introduced the Joint Doctrine of Indian Armed Forces (2017), proposed the formation of Integrated Theatre Command, and Land Warfare Doctrine (2018), (proposed the formation of Integrated Battle Groups). However, India’s 2016 and 2019 surgical strikes were unable to yield favorable results. These doctrines aimed to institutionalize jointness by integrating the Army, Navy, and Air Force and to prepare armed forces for network-centric warfare and joint operations to enhance rapid response capabilities. Institutional development also goes hand in hand with doctrinal evolution. To head the theatre command the post of Chief Defence Staff was created. Bipin Rawat was the first Chief Defence Staff appointed in 2019.
In the same vein, along with the doctrinal evolution, Indian military modernization, in the technological domain, paced up in the last decade, securing the S-400 Air Defense System deal with Russia, the Rafael jet deal with France in 2016. This decade was marked by the delivery of 36 Rafael jets and the first three squadrons of S-400 to India from 2021 to 2023. Furthermore, it also imported military hardware, including missiles, radars, surveillance, and combat drones from Israel, worth 2.9 billion dollars.
The Pahalgam incident in May 2025 provided India with the opportunity to again test its modernized military might against Pakistan. It launched Operation Sindoor targeting Pakistan with air and missile strikes. In retaliation, Pakistan launched Operation Bunyanum Marsoos, which targeted multiple Indian military installations, destroying their S-400 defense systems at Adampur and Bhuj, BrahMos missile storage sites at Beas and Nagrota, and knocking down seven jets, along with multiple drones, exposing critical gaps in India’s operational readiness. The acquisition of modern technologies under the modernization drive proved insufficient as India lacked operational capabilities. The May escalation also exposed how India lacks behind Pakistan in multi-domain warfare. Following the escalation, new military doctrines such as Joint Doctrine for Cyber Space Operations and Amphibious Operations were introduced to overcome the lapse. Furthermore, in Operation Bunyanun Marsoos Pakistan stood firmly as a whole nation vis-à-vis India integrating civil, military, industrial, and technological elements to create synergized effects across all domains.
To address the operational gaps in a conflict situation, on August 27, 2025 India introduced another Joint Doctrine for Multi Domain Operations: A Whole of Nation Framework. It integrates the military with civilian institutions, technology, industry, and information space to respond to future conflicts. To achieve strategic convergence and decision superiority, this ideology stresses simultaneous operations across land, air, sea, space, cyber, and cognitive domains.
Over time India has been employing offensive doctrines to outmaneuver Pakistan in the conventional war domain. However, its doctrines and strategies have always backfired due to operational gaps. Following the May 2025 escalation, the Indian Prime Minister declared that any future terror attack on Indian soil would be considered as an act of war portraying Operation Sindoor as a ‘new normal.’ Contrary to this assertion, India’s sustained offensive posture significantly narrowed its strategic options in the aftermath of bombings in New Delhi and IIOJK in Nov 2025. The May 2025 conflict has once again rehyphenated India Pakistan equation at a time when India was portraying itself as a major power. The offensive doctrinal approach left India with an invidious all-or-nothing choice in the use of military force: either start a major conventional war or abstain from action.
