Hunter Biden, the son of former U.S. President Joe Biden, recently offered a critical assessment of the American military exit from Afghanistan during an appearance on a podcast. During the podcast, he described the 2021 withdrawal as an obvious failure in its execution and noted that his father agrees the process could have been handled better. This admission serves as a starting point for an analytical post-mortem on an event that fundamentally restructured regional security and the international order.
The withdrawal went beyond a standard military move and functioned as a severe political shock. While the goal to end the twenty-year conflict was a long-standing policy objective, the execution lacked proper contingency planning for the rapid collapse of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces. By the time the Taliban entered Kabul on August 15, 2021, which was two weeks before the official US deadline, the administrative vacuum was absolute. The tragedy at Abbey Gate, which resulted in the deaths of 13 US service members, was a direct consequence of a compressed timeline that left elite forces guarding a single, vulnerable bottleneck. This operational failure signaled a broader lack of coordination between intelligence assessments and tactical reality. In the United States, historical patterns suggest that once a government decides to disengage from a conflict, the process often prioritizes the speed of exit over the long-term stability of the departing state.
We saw a similar phenomenon in 1973 with the US disengagement from Vietnam following the signing of the Paris Peace Accords. The United States pursued a policy of Vietnamization, which involved the rapid transfer of combat responsibility to the South Vietnamese army while simultaneously reducing the American footprint. Just as in Kabul, once the decision to leave was solidified, the US moved toward total disengagement. This trajectory reached its nadir during the fall of Saigon in April 1975, when North Vietnamese forces captured the capital just two years after the UScombat withdrawal. The iconic images of helicopters evacuating personnel from rooftops mirrored the chaotic scenes at Hamid Karzai International Airport decades later. In both instances, the rush for the exits essentially undercut the ability of local partners to sustain the mission independently.
The impacts of the withdrawal were both diverse and devastating. Neighboring Pakistan saw a direct surge in cross-border militancy. Terrorist-related incidents in Pakistan increased significantly after 2021, driven largely by the emboldened Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan. Economically, Afghanistan entered a state of freefall. The sudden cessation of foreign aid, triggered a humanitarian catastrophe. Foreign aid previously accounted for 43% of the country’s GDP. By early 2024, the UN World Food Program estimated that 23.7 million Afghans, or more than half the population, required humanitarian assistance. This economic collapse, coupled with a massive brain drain of the educated class, has crippled the country’s civil infrastructure.
A central tenet of the 2020 Doha Agreement was the Taliban’s pledge to form an inclusive government and prevent the use of Afghan soil by terrorist organizations. Data from the post-withdrawal era indicates a total rejection of these terms. The Taliban’s cabinet remains an all-male entity that has systematically erased women and minorities from public life. Human Rights Watch has documented at least 800 instances of extrajudicial killings and arbitrary arrests of former government employees since the takeover.
Furthermore, the resurgence of Al-Qaeda and the proliferation of ISIS-K have turned Afghanistan into a difficult area for global intelligence. The 2022 strike on Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in a safe house in central Kabul provided definitive proof that the Taliban had ignored their counter-terrorism obligations. Without a boots-on-the-ground presence, the international community is forced to manage a rising threat via over-the-horizon capabilities, which are inherently limited in their effectiveness.
To understand the failures of the 2021 exit, it is useful to look at the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989. While the Soviet war was also considered a failure, the retreat itself was tactically superior to the American exit. General Boris Gromov oversaw a phased, orderly departure that took nearly a year to complete.
Unlike the 2021 collapse, the Soviets left the Najibullah government with sufficient military hardware and infrastructure to survive on its own for three years. The Soviet forces maintained control of key supply lines until the final units crossed the Friendship Bridge. The contrast is stark. The Soviets left a functional, albeit fragile, client state that only collapsed after the Soviet Union itself dissolved and cut off financial aid. In 2021, the US-backed government collapsed in a matter of days.
While the strategic desire to end the conflict may have been justified by the exhaustion of two decades of war, the execution was a failure of historic proportions. The 2021 withdrawal did not just end a war, it inaugurated a new era of suffering for the Afghan people and created a regional security void that the world is still struggling to navigate.
The Enduring Consequences of America’s Exit from Afghanistan
Hunter Biden, the son of former U.S. President Joe Biden, recently offered a critical assessment of the American military exit from Afghanistan during an appearance on a podcast. During the podcast, he described the 2021 withdrawal as an obvious failure in its execution and noted that his father agrees the process could have been handled better. This admission serves as a starting point for an analytical post-mortem on an event that fundamentally restructured regional security and the international order.
The withdrawal went beyond a standard military move and functioned as a severe political shock. While the goal to end the twenty-year conflict was a long-standing policy objective, the execution lacked proper contingency planning for the rapid collapse of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces. By the time the Taliban entered Kabul on August 15, 2021, which was two weeks before the official US deadline, the administrative vacuum was absolute. The tragedy at Abbey Gate, which resulted in the deaths of 13 US service members, was a direct consequence of a compressed timeline that left elite forces guarding a single, vulnerable bottleneck. This operational failure signaled a broader lack of coordination between intelligence assessments and tactical reality. In the United States, historical patterns suggest that once a government decides to disengage from a conflict, the process often prioritizes the speed of exit over the long-term stability of the departing state.
We saw a similar phenomenon in 1973 with the US disengagement from Vietnam following the signing of the Paris Peace Accords. The United States pursued a policy of Vietnamization, which involved the rapid transfer of combat responsibility to the South Vietnamese army while simultaneously reducing the American footprint. Just as in Kabul, once the decision to leave was solidified, the US moved toward total disengagement. This trajectory reached its nadir during the fall of Saigon in April 1975, when North Vietnamese forces captured the capital just two years after the UScombat withdrawal. The iconic images of helicopters evacuating personnel from rooftops mirrored the chaotic scenes at Hamid Karzai International Airport decades later. In both instances, the rush for the exits essentially undercut the ability of local partners to sustain the mission independently.
The impacts of the withdrawal were both diverse and devastating. Neighboring Pakistan saw a direct surge in cross-border militancy. Terrorist-related incidents in Pakistan increased significantly after 2021, driven largely by the emboldened Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan. Economically, Afghanistan entered a state of freefall. The sudden cessation of foreign aid, triggered a humanitarian catastrophe. Foreign aid previously accounted for 43% of the country’s GDP. By early 2024, the UN World Food Program estimated that 23.7 million Afghans, or more than half the population, required humanitarian assistance. This economic collapse, coupled with a massive brain drain of the educated class, has crippled the country’s civil infrastructure.
A central tenet of the 2020 Doha Agreement was the Taliban’s pledge to form an inclusive government and prevent the use of Afghan soil by terrorist organizations. Data from the post-withdrawal era indicates a total rejection of these terms. The Taliban’s cabinet remains an all-male entity that has systematically erased women and minorities from public life. Human Rights Watch has documented at least 800 instances of extrajudicial killings and arbitrary arrests of former government employees since the takeover.
Furthermore, the resurgence of Al-Qaeda and the proliferation of ISIS-K have turned Afghanistan into a difficult area for global intelligence. The 2022 strike on Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in a safe house in central Kabul provided definitive proof that the Taliban had ignored their counter-terrorism obligations. Without a boots-on-the-ground presence, the international community is forced to manage a rising threat via over-the-horizon capabilities, which are inherently limited in their effectiveness.
To understand the failures of the 2021 exit, it is useful to look at the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989. While the Soviet war was also considered a failure, the retreat itself was tactically superior to the American exit. General Boris Gromov oversaw a phased, orderly departure that took nearly a year to complete.
Unlike the 2021 collapse, the Soviets left the Najibullah government with sufficient military hardware and infrastructure to survive on its own for three years. The Soviet forces maintained control of key supply lines until the final units crossed the Friendship Bridge. The contrast is stark. The Soviets left a functional, albeit fragile, client state that only collapsed after the Soviet Union itself dissolved and cut off financial aid. In 2021, the US-backed government collapsed in a matter of days.
While the strategic desire to end the conflict may have been justified by the exhaustion of two decades of war, the execution was a failure of historic proportions. The 2021 withdrawal did not just end a war, it inaugurated a new era of suffering for the Afghan people and created a regional security void that the world is still struggling to navigate.
SAT Commentary
SAT Commentary
SAT Commentaries, a collection of insightful social media threads on current events and social issues, featuring diverse perspectives from various authors.
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The Enduring Consequences of America’s Exit from Afghanistan
The 2021 US withdrawal from Afghanistan was more than the end of a long war, it was a poorly executed exit that triggered the rapid collapse of the Afghan state. The fall of Kabul, the Abbey Gate attack, and the return of militant groups exposed serious gaps in planning and coordination.
The Afghan Crucible
Recent reporting underscores Afghanistan’s transformation into a strategic hub for transnational jihadist networks. Far from being a localized security problem, the Afghan landscape now functions as an ideological, logistical, and digital anchor linking extremist affiliates across Africa, Southeast Asia, and beyond, signaling the collapse of regional containment and the rise of a globalized threat architecture.
Economic Statecraft and the New Geography of Power in Regional Politics
Strategic competition has moved beyond decisive wars toward a subtler synthesis of economic leverage, proxy networks, and calibrated force. Infrastructure, finance, and trade routes now function as instruments of power, quietly reshaping regional orders while preserving the façade of restraint. In this environment, security is no longer confined to the battlefield but embedded in supply chains, data networks, and development choices, forcing states to rethink deterrence, sovereignty, and resilience.
The Manufacturing of a False Equivalence
As scrutiny mounts over the Taliban’s tolerance of TTP sanctuaries, Kabul has attempted to deflect blame by alleging that ISIS-K operates from Pakistan. This false equivalence ignores the historical origins of ISIS-K in eastern Afghanistan, its sustained campaign of violence against Pakistan, and verified intelligence showing that the group’s operational depth remains rooted inside Afghan territory.