The security architecture of South Asia has long been defined by what can be termed as Regional Security Complex , where the security dynamics of states are so interlinked that they cannot be analyzed in isolation. In this context, the recent rhetorical maneuvering by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) serves as a critical case study in cross-border proxy warfare.
Following a surge in international scrutiny, punctuated by high-profile terror-related arrests in the United States involving Afghan nationals, the TTP leadership has launched a synchronized strategic communications campaign. Leaders Omar Khorasani and Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud have aggressively reiterated a singular, curated message: their insurgency is strictly Pakistan-only, and they operate independently of Afghan soil.
While ostensibly a clarification of intent, an in-depth analysis through the lens of Principal-Agent Theory reveals these assertions to be a mechanism of plausible deniability constructed for the benefit of their patrons in Kabul. Far from being a localized insurgency, the TTP has evolved into a transnational entity, sustained by a workforce of Afghan fighters for whom the opportunity costs of peace are insurmountably high.
The relationship between the Afghan Taliban (the Principal) and the TTP (the Agent) is a textbook example of the Principal-Agent problem in state sponsorship of terrorism. The Afghan Taliban, seeking international legitimacy and relief from sanctions, faces a dilemma: it relies on the TTP for ideological legitimacy and tactical depth but suffers reputational costs when the TTP’s actions trigger international backlash.
The recent statements by JuA faction leader Omar Khorasani are an attempt to resolve this tension. By publicly asserting that their objectives are limited to the 100 percent implementation of Sharia in Pakistan and urging Afghans to remain obedient to the Kabul regime, the TTP is essentially signaling to the international community that the “Principal” (Kabul) is not responsible for the “Agent’s” (TTP) actions.
Contrary to Khorasani’s claim that TTP fighters operate from within Pakistan, empirical evidence points to a structural transformation of the group that can be termed the Afghanization of the TTP.
UN monitoring reports and intelligence assessments from 2024 and 2025 have not only identified command nodes in Kunar, Nangarhar, Paktika, and Khost but have also noted a shift in personnel. The insurgency is no longer exclusively composed of Pashtun tribesmen from the former FATA region; it has absorbed a significant cohort of Afghan nationals. Intelligence estimates suggest the TTP has swelled to roughly 6,500 fighters, making it the largest militant group in Afghanistan.
A critical mass of these fighters are former Afghan Taliban foot soldiers. Following the US withdrawal, the ideological and tribal porousness of the Durand Line allowed these combatants to seamlessly pivot from fighting NATO to fighting the Pakistani state. This demographic shift renders the Pakistan-only narrative logically bankrupt. When a group operates from Afghan bases, is funded by Afghan sources (with reports indicating monthly stipends flowing from Taliban coffers), and is staffed by Afghan nationals, it ceases to be a foreign guest, it becomes an Afghan state asset deployed for external projection.
To understand why the TTP endures, one must look beyond ideology to the Political Economy of Conflict, specifically the Greed vs. Grievance framework popularized by Paul Collier. While TTP propaganda emphasizes religious “grievance” (the implementation of Sharia), the engine of the insurgency is economic greed, or more accurately, economic survival.
The generation of fighters that waged war against the US coalition for twenty years possesses a high degree of conflict-specific capital (combat skills, bomb-making, ambush tactics) and near-zero peace-time capital (agricultural, administrative, or technical skills). In the post-war Islamic Emirate, the civilian economy has collapsed, and there are no jobs for tens of thousands of armed men whose only proficiency is asymmetric warfare.
For the Afghan Taliban, these unemployed fighters represent a severe internal threat, a potential pool of recruits for the rival Islamic State Khorasan (ISIS-K). Thus, the TTP along with ideological and strategic links, also serves as a jobs program for the unemployable veterans of the Afghan jihad. The war in Pakistan provides a salary, a purpose, and a continuation of the lifestyle they have known for decades. The TTP’s Jihad is effectively a mechanism to export the Afghan Taliban’s surplus labor force, preventing domestic unrest by engaging them in a foreign conflict.
The statements from Khorasani and Mehsud are a diplomatic fiction designed to navigate the constraints of the international system. They attempt to draw a Westphalian border between the Afghan Taliban and the TTP where none exists sociologically or operationally. The assertion that the TTP is solely focused on Pakistan is technically true in terms of target selection, but false in terms of origin and capability.
The machinery of terror, the manpower, the financing, and the sanctuary, is unmistakably Afghan. As long as the Afghan Taliban lacks the state capacity to reintegrate its unemployable workforce, and as long as it views the TTP as a strategic asset rather than a liability, the insurgency will remain a cross-border phenomenon, regardless of the denials issued. The Pakistan-only agenda is not a reality; it is a strategic deflection to insulate the Kabul regime while the war of attrition continues.
