Recent remarks by the Afghan Taliban’s chief spokesperson, Zabihullah Mujahid, concerning Pakistan-Afghanistan relations present a narrative steeped in selective reasoning rather than substantive policy insight. The claims, which attempt to portray Pakistan as an internally divided and unreliable neighbour, conveniently ignore the documented, persistent, and primary driver of the current bilateral impasse, Kabul’s demonstrable failure to honour its counter-terrorism commitments.
The unfortunate stalemate in relations is not a product of Pakistani political whims or a fabricated civil-military divide. It is the direct and unavoidable consequence of Kabul’s refusal to dismantle the cross-border terror infrastructure operating freely from Afghan soil.
Mr. Mujahid’s statements conspicuously overlook the core catalyst for the present tension. The primary source of friction is the escalating campaign of cross-border terrorism orchestrated by the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), from sanctuaries within Afghanistan.
This is not a vague allegation. It is a reality supported by a painful trail of evidence, intelligence reports, and the blood of Pakistani civilians and soldiers. The tension reached a critical point during the Istanbul talks, which represented a significant diplomatic opportunity. Pakistan’s request was neither radical nor unreasonable: a formal, verifiable agreement compelling Kabul to locate, dismantle, and permanently eradicate the TTP and BLA sanctuaries.
Kabul’s refusal to sign such an agreement was, and remains, the single greatest obstacle to normalising relations. A verifiable mechanism is crucial. It implies a structured process of joint intelligence sharing, on-ground verification, and transparent reporting to ensure that dismantled camps are not simply relocated. Kabul’s rejection of this framework signals, at best, an unwillingness to confront its TTP allies and, at worst, an implicit endorsement of their war against Pakistan. Either interpretation is unacceptable for a neighbouring state that has borne the brunt of this proxy war for years.
A favoured talking point from Kabul, repeated by Mr. Mujahid, is the allegation of a civil-military divide within Pakistan’s policymaking apparatus. This narrative is a convenient, albeit baseless, tool used to deflect criticism and sow confusion.
On matters of national security, particularly an existential threat as potent as TTP-sponsored terrorism, Pakistan’s stance is institutionally unified. There is no daylight between the civilian government and the military leadership. Both share one unambiguous policy: regional peace, economic integration, and stable borders are contingent upon verifiable, irreversible Afghan action against all terror outfits operating from its territory.
This is Pakistan’s national policy, formulated by the civilian government and endorsed by all state institutions. To suggest otherwise is a deliberate attempt to muddy the waters and avoid accountability. Pakistan’s national security imperatives are data-driven and cohesive, not subject to the fictional internal politics that Kabul wishes to project.
The temporary, security-mandated closures of crossings at Torkham and Chaman are consistently mischaracterised by Kabul as a form of political pressure. This is a gross distortion of reality. These are not political levers; they are essential security measures taken by a sovereign state to protect its borders and its people.
Since the Taliban’s return to power in 2021, Pakistan has endured over 1,000 cross-border attacks originating from Afghanistan. This staggering figure includes infiltration attempts by TTP and IS-Khorasan (ISKP) operatives, sniper attacks on border posts, and IED ambushes on security patrols.
When infiltration attempts are identified and neutralized along the border, the only responsible action is to secure that border. These closures are a direct response to specific, actionable intelligence regarding militant movement. To leave these vital arteries open in the face of such threats would be a dereliction of duty.
This security-first approach is further complicated by a persistent ideological challenge. Even now, many senior Taliban leaders, including ministers, publicly deny the very existence of the internationally recognized Pak-Afghan border (the Durand Line). They frequently refer to it as a hypothetical or imaginary line and claim Pakistani territory as part of Afghanistan. This irredentist rhetoric is not just political posturing; it directly fuels cross-border tension, encourages illegal crossings, and undermines the foundational principles of bilateral sovereignty upon which stable relations must be built.
Despite these profound security challenges, Pakistan remains Afghanistan’s top trading partner. In the fiscal year 2024-25, bilateral trade surpassed USD 1.6 billion, reaching nearly $2 billion. This fact alone invalidates any claim of a political blockade. Pakistan’s policy of controlled border management is designed to achieve two parallel goals: ensure legitimate commerce continues to flow, while simultaneously curbing the well-documented illegal movement of weapons, drugs, and militants that thrives on porous borders.
Perhaps the most disingenuous of Mr. Mujahid’s claims is the portrayal of the 2021-2022 period under Prime Minister Imran Khan as a “golden age” of smooth relations. This narrative, which conveniently acts in unison with the propaganda of a specific political party within Pakistan, is a masterclass in revisionist history. The reality is that this period was defined by Pakistan’s unilateral goodwill, which was systematically exploited by the Taliban to entrench the TTP.
Following the Taliban’s takeover, the PTI-led government pursued a policy of engagement. It advocated tirelessly on international forums for the new Kabul administration, provided humanitarian aid, and initiated diplomatic overtures, including prisoner-release gestures and countenancing deeply flawed local peace initiatives.
And what was the result of this goodwill? According to a 2024 UN Monitoring Team Report, the TTP—far from being constrained—used this smooth” period to consolidate its power. Data and graphs from the period clearly show that attacks were already on a sharp upward trajectory between 2021 and 2022.
This escalation did not happen in a vacuum. The same UN report detailed how the Taliban’s General Directorate of Intelligence (GDI) actively facilitated the TTP. This support included providing three new guest houses in Kabul for TTP leaders, issuing senior TTP figures with passes to grant them ease of movement and immunity from arrest, and even providing weapons permits.
What Mr. Mujahid describes as cooperation was, in fact, Pakistan’s strategic restraint and the diplomatic space it extended to Kabul. This space was not reciprocated. The Taliban leadership demonstrably failed to make the transition from a militant group to a responsible state, prioritising its ideological bonds with the TTP over its sovereign obligations to its neighbour.
Regarding the Kunar River, Pakistan’s position is clear and consistent with international law. We fully recognize Afghanistan’s sovereign right to development, including on its water resources. However, this right is not absolute; it is governed by established international water-sharing norms and the obligation to prevent significant downstream harm.
Downstream water flows from the Kunar are a lifeline for major agricultural zones in Pakistan. All Pakistan expects is adherence to these norms and a transparent mechanism for data sharing, enabling both countries to manage a vital, shared resource responsibly. This is a call for technical cooperation, not a political dispute.
Pakistan’s expectations remain unchanged, pragmatic, and non-negotiable. Verbal assurances, which have been repeatedly violated, are no longer sufficient. The only basis for a reset in relations is a set of written, monitorable guarantees that Afghan soil will not be used by the TTP, BLA, ISKP, or any other terrorist entity.
The goal is not to isolate Afghanistan. The goal is to establish secure borders that enable the resumption of unrestricted trade and the dignified, safe return of Afghan nationals. Pakistan continues to engage through the facilitation of partners like Türkiye and Qatar, balancing diplomatic firmness with an open channel for dialogue.
Ultimately, peace and stability are a two-way street. Mr. Mujahid’s rhetoric cannot mask the reality on the ground. Peace will follow only when Kabul’s words give way to verifiable action, and Afghanistan finally fulfils its most basic counter-terror obligations to Pakistan and the wider region.
Zabihullah Mujahid’s Rhetoric and the Reality of Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations
Recent remarks by the Afghan Taliban’s chief spokesperson, Zabihullah Mujahid, concerning Pakistan-Afghanistan relations present a narrative steeped in selective reasoning rather than substantive policy insight. The claims, which attempt to portray Pakistan as an internally divided and unreliable neighbour, conveniently ignore the documented, persistent, and primary driver of the current bilateral impasse, Kabul’s demonstrable failure to honour its counter-terrorism commitments.
The unfortunate stalemate in relations is not a product of Pakistani political whims or a fabricated civil-military divide. It is the direct and unavoidable consequence of Kabul’s refusal to dismantle the cross-border terror infrastructure operating freely from Afghan soil.
Mr. Mujahid’s statements conspicuously overlook the core catalyst for the present tension. The primary source of friction is the escalating campaign of cross-border terrorism orchestrated by the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), from sanctuaries within Afghanistan.
This is not a vague allegation. It is a reality supported by a painful trail of evidence, intelligence reports, and the blood of Pakistani civilians and soldiers. The tension reached a critical point during the Istanbul talks, which represented a significant diplomatic opportunity. Pakistan’s request was neither radical nor unreasonable: a formal, verifiable agreement compelling Kabul to locate, dismantle, and permanently eradicate the TTP and BLA sanctuaries.
Kabul’s refusal to sign such an agreement was, and remains, the single greatest obstacle to normalising relations. A verifiable mechanism is crucial. It implies a structured process of joint intelligence sharing, on-ground verification, and transparent reporting to ensure that dismantled camps are not simply relocated. Kabul’s rejection of this framework signals, at best, an unwillingness to confront its TTP allies and, at worst, an implicit endorsement of their war against Pakistan. Either interpretation is unacceptable for a neighbouring state that has borne the brunt of this proxy war for years.
A favoured talking point from Kabul, repeated by Mr. Mujahid, is the allegation of a civil-military divide within Pakistan’s policymaking apparatus. This narrative is a convenient, albeit baseless, tool used to deflect criticism and sow confusion.
On matters of national security, particularly an existential threat as potent as TTP-sponsored terrorism, Pakistan’s stance is institutionally unified. There is no daylight between the civilian government and the military leadership. Both share one unambiguous policy: regional peace, economic integration, and stable borders are contingent upon verifiable, irreversible Afghan action against all terror outfits operating from its territory.
This is Pakistan’s national policy, formulated by the civilian government and endorsed by all state institutions. To suggest otherwise is a deliberate attempt to muddy the waters and avoid accountability. Pakistan’s national security imperatives are data-driven and cohesive, not subject to the fictional internal politics that Kabul wishes to project.
The temporary, security-mandated closures of crossings at Torkham and Chaman are consistently mischaracterised by Kabul as a form of political pressure. This is a gross distortion of reality. These are not political levers; they are essential security measures taken by a sovereign state to protect its borders and its people.
Since the Taliban’s return to power in 2021, Pakistan has endured over 1,000 cross-border attacks originating from Afghanistan. This staggering figure includes infiltration attempts by TTP and IS-Khorasan (ISKP) operatives, sniper attacks on border posts, and IED ambushes on security patrols.
When infiltration attempts are identified and neutralized along the border, the only responsible action is to secure that border. These closures are a direct response to specific, actionable intelligence regarding militant movement. To leave these vital arteries open in the face of such threats would be a dereliction of duty.
This security-first approach is further complicated by a persistent ideological challenge. Even now, many senior Taliban leaders, including ministers, publicly deny the very existence of the internationally recognized Pak-Afghan border (the Durand Line). They frequently refer to it as a hypothetical or imaginary line and claim Pakistani territory as part of Afghanistan. This irredentist rhetoric is not just political posturing; it directly fuels cross-border tension, encourages illegal crossings, and undermines the foundational principles of bilateral sovereignty upon which stable relations must be built.
Despite these profound security challenges, Pakistan remains Afghanistan’s top trading partner. In the fiscal year 2024-25, bilateral trade surpassed USD 1.6 billion, reaching nearly $2 billion. This fact alone invalidates any claim of a political blockade. Pakistan’s policy of controlled border management is designed to achieve two parallel goals: ensure legitimate commerce continues to flow, while simultaneously curbing the well-documented illegal movement of weapons, drugs, and militants that thrives on porous borders.
Perhaps the most disingenuous of Mr. Mujahid’s claims is the portrayal of the 2021-2022 period under Prime Minister Imran Khan as a “golden age” of smooth relations. This narrative, which conveniently acts in unison with the propaganda of a specific political party within Pakistan, is a masterclass in revisionist history. The reality is that this period was defined by Pakistan’s unilateral goodwill, which was systematically exploited by the Taliban to entrench the TTP.
Following the Taliban’s takeover, the PTI-led government pursued a policy of engagement. It advocated tirelessly on international forums for the new Kabul administration, provided humanitarian aid, and initiated diplomatic overtures, including prisoner-release gestures and countenancing deeply flawed local peace initiatives.
And what was the result of this goodwill? According to a 2024 UN Monitoring Team Report, the TTP—far from being constrained—used this smooth” period to consolidate its power. Data and graphs from the period clearly show that attacks were already on a sharp upward trajectory between 2021 and 2022.
This escalation did not happen in a vacuum. The same UN report detailed how the Taliban’s General Directorate of Intelligence (GDI) actively facilitated the TTP. This support included providing three new guest houses in Kabul for TTP leaders, issuing senior TTP figures with passes to grant them ease of movement and immunity from arrest, and even providing weapons permits.
What Mr. Mujahid describes as cooperation was, in fact, Pakistan’s strategic restraint and the diplomatic space it extended to Kabul. This space was not reciprocated. The Taliban leadership demonstrably failed to make the transition from a militant group to a responsible state, prioritising its ideological bonds with the TTP over its sovereign obligations to its neighbour.
Regarding the Kunar River, Pakistan’s position is clear and consistent with international law. We fully recognize Afghanistan’s sovereign right to development, including on its water resources. However, this right is not absolute; it is governed by established international water-sharing norms and the obligation to prevent significant downstream harm.
Downstream water flows from the Kunar are a lifeline for major agricultural zones in Pakistan. All Pakistan expects is adherence to these norms and a transparent mechanism for data sharing, enabling both countries to manage a vital, shared resource responsibly. This is a call for technical cooperation, not a political dispute.
Pakistan’s expectations remain unchanged, pragmatic, and non-negotiable. Verbal assurances, which have been repeatedly violated, are no longer sufficient. The only basis for a reset in relations is a set of written, monitorable guarantees that Afghan soil will not be used by the TTP, BLA, ISKP, or any other terrorist entity.
The goal is not to isolate Afghanistan. The goal is to establish secure borders that enable the resumption of unrestricted trade and the dignified, safe return of Afghan nationals. Pakistan continues to engage through the facilitation of partners like Türkiye and Qatar, balancing diplomatic firmness with an open channel for dialogue.
Ultimately, peace and stability are a two-way street. Mr. Mujahid’s rhetoric cannot mask the reality on the ground. Peace will follow only when Kabul’s words give way to verifiable action, and Afghanistan finally fulfils its most basic counter-terror obligations to Pakistan and the wider region.
SAT Editorial Desk
SAT Editorial Desk
Your go-to editorial hub for policy perspectives and informed analysis on pressing regional and global issues.
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