The Operational Reality on Ground.

For over a decade, Tirah Valley evolved into one of Pakistan’s most deeply entrenched terrorist sanctuaries, exploited by Kharij networks operating in conjunction with Afghan Taliban facilitators, narcotics traffickers, and a wider terror–crime–politics nexus embedded within civilian populations. This complex environment, where militants deliberately co-located with non-combatants, posed persistent risks of collateral damage and complicated counterterrorism efforts. Pakistan’s response has therefore been shaped not by conventional warfare, but by a sustained strategy of intelligence-based operations (IBOs) designed to neutralize threats while safeguarding civilian life.

IBOs are now the backbone of Pakistan’s counterterrorism architecture. In 2025 alone, law enforcement agencies (LEAs), intelligence services, and the Pakistan Army conducted 75,175 intelligence-based operations nationwide, an average exceeding 200 per day. These operations proved operationally effective, resulting in the elimination of 2,597 terrorists, the highest figure recorded in a single calendar year, including key Fitna-al-Khawarij (FAK) operatives. Continuous refinement of tactics, technology, surveillance, and precision strike capabilities has significantly enhanced operational efficacy while minimizing unintended harm.

Crucially, IBOs are also the least disruptive form of counterterrorism from a humanitarian perspective. Unlike large-scale operations, they do not entail mass displacement or population-wide suffering, thereby limiting the space for extremist narratives and the political exploitation of civilian hardship. Tirah Valley, infested with Kharij elements sustained by a drugs-based terror economy and protected by political patrons, has been subjected to this same intelligence-driven model.

In September, recognizing the risks posed by militants forcibly embedded within communities, using civilians as human shields, deploying quadcopters, and storing explosives and IEDs inside populated areas, a jirga was convened involving tribal elders, local military authorities, and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa government. Three options were deliberated: first, the jirga itself would engage the Kharij elements and demand their departure; second, security forces would continue or intensify IBOs; third, the local population could voluntarily relocate temporarily, allowing security forces to operate without civilian presence.

For nearly three months, tribal elders engaged directly with the Kharij terrorists, urging them to leave Tirah in accordance with public demand, cultural norms, and Pakhtunwali traditions. The extremists categorically refused, demonstrating their violent, lawless ideology and complete disregard for local customs. Following extensive deliberations, a consensual decision was reached for voluntary, temporary relocation aligned with traditional seasonal migration patterns. Approximately 19,000 families were identified; around 65 percent relocated voluntarily, while 35 percent chose to remain, largely to protect crops and livelihoods. At no point was coercion employed by security forces; the arrangement was mutually agreed and duly compensated by the government.

Claims of a large-scale military operation are contradicted by verifiable facts. No extraordinary troop buildup has occurred; six army units were present in Tirah previously and remain the same today, with no additional induction, an unmistakable indicator that no conventional operation is underway. Moreover, winter conditions and snowfall preclude campaigning seasons for major operations. Equally telling, there are no military-run screening centers or force-operated checkpoints for displaced populations, a standard feature of large operations. All registration and facilitation points are managed by civil administration, further underscoring the absence of forced displacement.

Operational realities also expose the dangers created by militant entrenchment within civilian spaces. In Tirah, an explosion at a bomb-making factory linked to the TTP splinter Tehreek-e-Lashkar-e-Islam Pakistan (TLIP) destroyed five houses, killing 25 people, 14 militants and 10 civilians, illustrating how militants’ use of human shields generates tragic collateral damage. Similarly, in Baka Khel, Bannu, a militant commander converted a jirga hall belonging to PTI leader Shah Muhammad Wazir into a militant hub, where an accidental blast caused extensive destruction.

These facts exist alongside a deteriorating security environment fueled by cross-border facilitation. Since January, 4,729 terrorist incidents have been recorded, predominantly in KP and Balochistan, with Afghan forces repeatedly firing on Pakistani check posts to facilitate terrorist infiltration. Since November 4 alone, 4,910 IBOs were conducted, killing 206 terrorists.

Within this context, propaganda and mismanaged provincial funds cannot obscure reality. Pakistan’s counterterrorism efforts in Tirah are guided by the Bagh Joint Action Plan, integrating targeted security operations with law enforcement presence, economic revival, and the safe return of displaced families. The record is clear and verifiable: Pakistan’s security forces operate with professionalism, precision, and restraint, dismantling extremist sanctuaries while upholding the primacy of human life, law, and civilian safety.