The past couple years, a chilling sense of déjà vu has settled over Pakistan’s tribal regions, yet with a stark difference. For years, a fragile calm had held, offering brief respites from the relentless shadow of violence. But that quiet has slowly shattered, intensifying a trend of violence that had been building for some time.
A surge in violence has ripped through the borderlands, marking an escalation that has reached alarming new levels in the last couple of years. The month of July, for instance, offered a grim snapshot of this reality. It began with the roadside bomb blast on July 2nd, claiming the lives of Assistant Commissioner Faisal Ismail and his colleagues, a stark reminder of the ever-present danger. Just two days later, on July 4th, the army retaliated, announcing it had killed 30 TTP terrorists attempting to infiltrate from Afghanistan. These intense clashes followed a deadly late June attack that had already claimed 13 soldiers, setting a grim precedent for the weeks that followed.
When the Afghan Taliban came back into power in August 2021, many in the region, long scarred by decades of conflict, clung to a desperate hope for peace. This hope was fanned by the Afghan Taliban’s Interim Government (IEA), which offered strong assurances of their commitment to regional stability, pledging that Afghanistan would not become a sanctuary for terrorists or a launchpad for attacks against other nations in the Doha agreement.
Yet, that initial optimism has steadily eroded over the past four years. What began as a mere trickle of cross-border incidents has swelled into a torrent of TTP attacks on Pakistan, often carried out by militants who had retreated into Afghanistan after successful Pakistani operations post-2015. According to reports of the UN and many independent experts, these attacks launched from Afghan soil suggest more than just passive tolerance by the Afghan Taliban; they point to active support.
This escalating crisis forces urgent questions to the forefront. Why does the IEA, a de facto state authority seeking international legitimacy, crucial humanitarian aid, and stable diplomatic relations, consistently refuse to act against the TTP? Why do they continue to operate with what appears to be an insurgent mentality, seemingly unwilling or unable to shed their insurgent roots and behave as a responsible state actor? What complex internal and external forces shape the Taliban’s behavior, and how do these dynamics influence their relationship with the TTP? Untangling these intricate motivations is essential to understanding the renewed bloodshed on Pak-Afghan borders and charting any viable path forward for a region trapped in this brutal cycle.
The Resurgence
The period following the Afghan Taliban’s return to power has been defined by a dramatic and sustained resurgence of the TTP, reversing years of hard-won security gains by Pakistan.
The Afghan Taliban’s seizure of power was immediately perceived as a boost and a strategic win for the TTP. This empowerment was not just symbolic. One of the IEA’s first acts upon entering Kabul and other cities was to open the prisons, releasing thousands of inmates. Among them were scores of hardened TTP militants and senior leaders, including the group’s former deputy emir, Maulvi Faqir Muhammad, who had been incarcerated for eight years.
This mass release, celebrated with large TTP motorcades in eastern Afghanistan, instantly swelled the group’s ranks with experienced commanders and fighters, serving as a powerful symbolic endorsement from the victorious IEA. Operating from these newly secured safe havens, the TTP has since enjoyed complete operational freedom in Afghanistan, a liberty it uses to plan, coordinate, and launch attacks against Pakistan.
The operational freedom granted to the TTP is starkly reflected in the security statistics from Pakistan. The years since August 2021 have seen a violent reversal of a multi-year decline in terrorism that Pakistan had achieved through costly military operations like Zarb-e-Azb and Radd-ul-Fasaad.
Year 2021 saw 207 terrorist attacks, a 42% increase over 2020, resulting in 335 deaths. The TTP alone was responsible for 87 of these attacks, an 84% increase in its activity from the previous year. The trend accelerated alarmingly in 2022, which recorded 262 terrorist incidents, a 27% increase from 2021, claiming 419 lives and injuring 734 people. The year was marked by 14 suicide bombings, a sharp rise from five in the preceding year.
The violence intensified further in 2023. PIPS documented a 17% rise in terrorist incidents and a staggering 65% increase in related fatalities compared to 2022. In total, 306 attacks, including 23 suicide bombings, killed 693 people and wounded 1,124. The TTP and its direct affiliates were the primary perpetrators, responsible for over 82% of all terrorism-related deaths. A U.S. State Department report corroborated this trend, noting that terrorist attacks and casualties in Pakistan were more than 50% higher in 2023 than in 2022. The year 2024 witnessed a 70% increase in terrorist attacks compared to the previous year, with a total of 521 incidents. This intensified wave of violence claimed 852 lives. In just the first half of the year 2025 , 282 civilians and security personnel were killed in various attacks across the country.
The TTP’s renewed campaign exhibits a clear strategic and geographic focus. Attacks are overwhelmingly concentrated in the provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and Balochistan, which share a long, porous border with Afghanistan, the primary staging ground for these operations. Another notable aspect is the language the TTP employs to frame its war. By framing its campaign as a legitimate struggle against a tyrannical state and its security forces, rather than a war on the general population or part of a broader global jihad, the TTP seeks to rebrand itself, reduce public backlash, and attract greater support and recruitment.
This strategic positioning complicates the Pakistani state’s efforts to mobilize unanimous public condemnation and muddies the international narrative. It allows the Afghan Taliban’s inaction to be perceived less as harboring terrorists and more as a reluctance to intervene in what appears to be a political conflict in Pakistan. This position is contested bt the fact that 75% of suicide bombers in 2023 were Afghan nationals, a charge that directly points out the IEA’s failure to control its borders, territory, and population.
The direct causal link between the Afghan Taliban’s actions and this surge in violence is undeniable. The sequence of events, the IEA’s capture of Kabul, the immediate release of TTP prisoners, and the subsequent and sustained escalation of attacks, demonstrates that the TTP’s resurgence was not an accidental byproduct of regional chaos. It was directly enabled by the Afghan Taliban’s deliberate choice to prioritize its ideological allies over its state-to-state obligations.
Why, then, is the Afghan Taliban supporting them? What connects the two groups? The answer is neither simple nor straightforward.
The Ties That Bind
The Afghan Taliban’s refusal to sever ties with the TTP cannot be understood without appreciating the deep, multi-layered bonds that unite the two movements. Their relationship transcends a simple alliance of convenience, it is rooted in a shared worldview, a sacred oath of allegiance, common ethnic identity, and a history of mutual support forged in two decades of war.
At their core, the Afghan Taliban and the TTP are ideological brethren. Both movements are products of the Deobandi school of Sunni Islam and adhere to the Hanafi school of jurisprudence. They share the ultimate political objective: the establishment of an Islamic emirate governed by their interpretation of Islam. For the TTP, the Afghan Taliban’s Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan is not just an inspiration but the literal blueprint for the state they seek to create in Pakistan. This shared ideological foundation means they view the world, their enemies, and their objectives through the same lens, creating a powerful and enduring solidarity.
The most significant formal link between the two groups is the TTP’s bay’ah, or oath of allegiance, to the supreme leader (Amir al-Mu’minin) of the Afghan Taliban. This is not a recent development, the TTP has pledged fealty to the IEA’s leader since the Pakistani group’s formation in 2007. Immediately following the fall of Kabul in 2021, TTP leader Noor Wali Mehsud publicly renewed this oath to IEA Emir Hibatullah Akhundzada. This oath, or bay’ah, carries profound religious and political weight, signifying not just loyalty, but a spiritual covenant.
This oath fundamentally transforms the nature of the relationship and the political calculus involved. From the IEA’s perspective, the TTP is not a “foreign terrorist group” but a subordinate branch of their own movement operating across the Durand Line. Senior Pakistani military officials acknowledged this reality, describing the Afghan Taliban and the TTP as two sides of the same coin.
This creates a fundamental paradigm clash: Pakistan approaches the issue from a modern framework of state sovereignty and cross-border terrorism, demanding the Afghan Taliban act against a threat to its neighbor.The Afghan Taliban, however, view the matter through the lens of an Islamic Emirate where Pakistan’s demand to crack down on the TTP can be interpreted as a demand to attack and kill their own sworn allies. In their worldview, this would be an act of fratricide and a betrayal of a sacred religious oath, making it an almost unthinkable concession.
Ideology is reinforced by ethnicity. Both movements are predominantly Pashtun, the ethnic group that straddles the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. They are therefore deeply influenced by Pashtunwali, the unwritten, pre-Islamic tribal code of conduct that governs social life. Two central tenets of Pashtunwali are melmastia (hospitality and protection offered to any guest) and nanawatai (the granting of sanctuary or asylum to anyone who asks, even an enemy). To turn on the TTP, who sought and received sanctuary in Afghanistan, would be a profound violation of this deeply ingrained cultural and ethnic honor code, bringing shame upon the IEA in the eyes of its own core constituency.
The current dynamic is a direct consequence of historical reciprocity. Following the US-led invasion in 2001 that toppled the first Islamic Emirate, it was sections or armed groups from Pakistani tribal areas, many of whom would later coalesce to form the TTP, who provided the defeated Afghan Taliban with critical support.
They offered sanctuary, established safe havens in Pakistan’s tribal areas, and supplied logistical support, bases, and fresh fighters for the two-decade-long insurgency against US/NATO and Afghan government forces. TTP went as far as carrying out multiple independent attacks in Afghanistan in support of Afghan Taliban, including the famous Camp Chapman attack in 2009. The IEA’s leadership has openly acknowledged this historical debt.
The Calculus of Inaction
Beyond the foundational bonds of ideology and shared history, the Afghan Taliban’s refusal to act decisively against the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is driven by a cold and pragmatic calculus rooted in strategic imperatives. This calculus is shaped by the existential threat posed by the Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP), the TTP’s utility as leverage against Pakistan, the internal factionalism of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA), and the influence of regional and extra-regional powers. At its core, the issue is not just one of unwillingness but also of structural incapacity.
A Fractured Emirate and the Limits of Control
The IEA’s governance model is riddled with contradictions. Officially, the system is autocratic and centralized, with supreme authority concentrated in the hands of the Emir Hibatullah Akhundzada in Kandahar. But the reality is far messier. The Taliban functions as a coalition of loosely aligned factions with distinct tribal, ideological, financial, and political interests. This fragmentation predates the fall of Kabul in 2021.
Even during the insurgency against NATO and successive Afghan governments, various Taliban commanders operated with significant autonomy, coordinating loosely under the Taliban umbrella while maintaining their own power centers. Throughout the two decades of war, these factions operated with independent sources of funding, backing from various foreign patrons, and were often engaged in a continual power struggle with the central Taliban leadership attempting to assert unified control.
Far from being a weakness alone, this internal fragmentation also serves a strategic purpose. It allows the central leadership to maintain plausible deniability. Commitments made at the top can be undermined by local actors on the ground, creating a useful ambiguity that the Taliban has long exploited in its dealings with foreign powers. This “diplomatic fog” enables the Taliban to appear responsive to international expectations while avoiding actions that could provoke dissent within its own ranks.
Three main power centers define the Taliban’s current internal landscape. First is the ultraconservative Kandahar-based faction led by Akhundzada, which remains ideologically rigid and deeply isolationist. Second is the comparatively pragmatic group of officials based in Kabul, who favor international engagement and economic normalization. Third, and perhaps most critical to the TTP issue, is the Haqqani Network (HQN), led by Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani. The HQN operates as a semi-autonomous faction within the IEA, with its own independent financial networks, longstanding ties to global jihadist actors dating back to the anti-Soviet war, and significant influence in eastern Afghanistan.
The Haqqani Network also has deep-rooted familial, operational, and ideological ties to the TTP. These connections make it highly unlikely that Sirajuddin Haqqani, or those aligned with him, would support or enforce a crackdown on their long-time allies. This factional loyalty is more than just historical; it is a calculated investment in the future.
Having once depended on these factions for their own survival, many Taliban commanders view the TTP as a vital insurance policy. It serves as a guarantee of reciprocal sanctuary and support should their government in Kabul fall and they are once again forced into the role of an insurgency. Any crackdown would be therefore seen not just as a betrayal of an ally, but as the destruction of a crucial lifeline. Any such action would thus inevitably fracture the Taliban’s internal cohesion, risk tribal retribution, and be practically impossible to enforce from the top.
ISKP and the Risks of Alienating the TTP
Further complicating the picture is the persistent threat posed by ISKP, the Taliban’s most dangerous internal adversary. ISKP rejects the Taliban’s legitimacy, branding them apostates for negotiating with the United States, and has launched numerous deadly attacks targeting senior Taliban figures. Its campaign of terror represents both an ideological and physical challenge to the IEA’s survival.
Within this context, a crackdown on the TTP carries enormous risks. According to a journalist from Afghanistan,
“The number of TTP fighters currently inside Afghanistan may be as high as 30,000, including both Pakistani and Afghan nationals. Many of them are battle-hardened and possess years of combat experience.”
A forceful move against the group could drive a significant number of these fighters into ISKP’s arms, dramatically strengthening the latter’s ranks and potentially triggering a new wave of violent conflict inside Afghanistan. This is not a hypothetical concern: ISKP’s early ranks were filled with splinters from the TTP, including its first emir, Hafiz Saeed Khan, a former TTP commander from Orakzai Agency.
Even if a defection to ISKP does not occur, the TTP itself poses a serious challenge to Taliban unity. According to a source,
“In recent months, when pressured to consider negotiations with the Pakistani state by some leaders of the Afghan Taliban, TTP commanders have reminded their Afghan counterparts of the sacrifices they made during the Taliban’s own war and the promises some high-ranking leaders made to them to protect and support them.”
With TTP fighters embedded throughout Afghanistan and often integrated within Taliban units or networks, any crackdown would not only be difficult to execute but could also provoke infighting.
This explains why the IEA’s inaction toward the TTP stems from both inability and unwillingness. The Kandahar leadership lacks the operational command to force powerful factions like the Haqqanis to act. Meanwhile, widespread sympathy for the TTP within the Taliban’s ranks ensures that any attempt to act against them would be viewed as betrayal. In such a fragmented system, where trust, tribalism, and loyalty run deep, taking decisive action against a group like the TTP could fracture the entire movement.
Paradoxically, the Taliban now views the TTP as the lesser of two evils. An active, IEA-aligned TTP is seen as a buffer against ISKP’s growth. Recent efforts by the TTP to unify its splintered factions have reportedly reduced the recruitment pool available to ISKP. By retaining the loyalty of TTP fighters, rather than alienating them, the Taliban ensures that a key rival does not gain strength. In this light, preserving ties with the TTP, even at the cost of escalating tensions with Pakistan, appears to be a central component of the IEA’s survival strategy.
Asymmetric Leverage
But beyond internal concerns, the TTP also serves as a powerful external asset in the IEA’s broader strategic playbook, particularly in relation to Pakistan. Now that the Taliban controls the state apparatus, it has inherited longstanding Afghan positions on regional disputes, most notably the Durand Line. This colonial-era border, which separates Afghanistan from Pakistan, has never been officially recognized by any Afghan government. The IEA continues this tradition, taking a nationalist posture and actively contesting Pakistani control along the frontier by dismantling border fences and resisting formal demarcation.
In this context, the TTP becomes a convenient and effective asymmetric tool. The group’s own rejection of the Durand Line and its frequent cross-border attacks on Pakistani forces serve the IEA’s agenda. This allows the Taliban to assert indirect pressure on Pakistan while maintaining plausible deniability. The TTP’s operations degrade Pakistani authority in the border regions and complicate Islamabad’s internal security calculations, offering the Taliban valuable leverage in wider bilateral negotiations.
Thus, while Islamabad sees the TTP as a terrorist threat to its sovereignty, the IEA views the group as a useful buffer against ISKP, a guarantor of internal loyalty, and a lever of strategic influence. These competing calculations make it unlikely that the Afghan Taliban will take any serious action against the TTP in the near future.
What emerges, then, is a picture of complexity, not collusion. The Taliban’s refusal to move against the TTP is not simply about shared ideology or historical solidarity. It is a decision rooted in factional realities, survival instincts, and strategic prioritization. The cost of cracking down on the TTP, loss of internal unity, increased ISKP threat, and diminished regional leverage, is simply too high for the Taliban to pay at this moment in time.
The Proxy, The Partner, The Pawn
So, is the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan a proxy, a partner, or a pawn in the Afghan Taliban’s grand strategy? The reality is that the TTP is not one of these things but all three simultaneously.
It is a pawn in the IEA’s larger strategic game, deployed as a crucial buffer against the rival ISKP and used to exert pressure on Pakistan’s frontiers. It is a proxy through which the IEA can wage a deniable, asymmetric campaign to challenge Pakistan’s authority in borderlands. Most fundamentally, however, the TTP is a partner, an ideological partner bound by a sacred oath of allegiance, a shared history of struggle.
This multifaceted relationship is what makes the problem so intractable. Pakistan approaches the issue from the framework of modern statehood, demanding a neighbouring government fulfils its sovereign duty. The Afghan Taliban, however, has yet to make the full transition to governance and continues to operate with an insurgent’s mindset.
Their actions are dictated not by a coherent central policy, but by the competing logics of a fractured revolutionary coalition. Within this structure, powerful factions maintain their own funding streams and direct ties to various TTP groups, cultivating them as reliable allies. This serves a dual purpose: it maintains leverage in the present and secures loyal partners for a future where the Taliban might once again be an insurgency rather than a government..
The result is a dangerous and enduring impasse. The Afghan Taliban’s refusal to act is not a temporary oversight but a structural reality—a limitation rooted in their identity, history, and organisational structure. As long as the IEA’s survival depends on placating its hardline factions, leveraging the TTP as a strategic asset, and upholding the ideological bonds that grant it legitimacy, its role as a sanctuary for anti-Pakistan militancy will persist.
That said, subtle shifts have begun to emerge on the diplomatic front. Some IEA officials, both publicly and in private, have started to acknowledge the need of good relations with Pakistan. Their statements suggest an increasing awareness that ongoing violence not only undermines regional stability but also jeopardises Afghanistan’s hopes for economic development and international legitimacy.
However, any meaningful change will take time. It requires the transformation of the IEA from a loose coalition of factions with competing centres of power into a more centralised and coherent governing authority. While current signals remain tentative and at times contradictory, they point to internal debates that may gradually open space for a recalibration of the Taliban’s stance towards groups like the TTP.
