Realism is one of the oldest paradigms of international relations. Since Thucydides, Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz discussed that the international system is anarchic, there is no central authority that can establish any rules and states act by protecting their survival and safety first.
In this context, peace can be considered to be a tactical balance that is achieved by deterrence, power equilibrium, and commitments that can be fulfilled. Inextricably linked with realism is the notion of sovereignty, which refers to a state’s right use of force to protect its autonomy. When sovereignty is threatened, either by the intervention of a foreign power or the action of transnational non-state actors, the realist premise of self-help re-emerges. States victimized by asymmetric threats securitize diplomacy and embrace doctrines of conditional engagement and deterrence.
Proxy politics in modern conflicts complicates this realist scenario. Proxies are non-state entities that act on behalf of, or in support of, a state’s strategic interests in an adversary’s domain. The Indian use of Afghan ground as a staging area for anti-Pakistan operations is a case in point across South Asia. India has attempted to exploit Afghanistan’s volatility using the cover of networks and espionage inside Afghanistan, specifically through the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), to encircle and destabilize Pakistan. In the face of this theoretical context, Pakistan’s new Doctrine of Verifiable Peace is an approach of realist pragmatism that acknowledges the boundaries of faith and the necessity of verification in attaining regional stability and peace.
From Fraternal Solidarity to Strategic Deterrence
The time-tested concept of fraternal solidarity on the basis of shared religion, culture and geography has been adhered to in Pakistan in its dealings with Afghanistan. Islamabad has been providing unparalleled humanitarian, economic and diplomatic assistance to the people of Afghanistan since the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in 1979; up to millions of refugees were being hosted by Islamabad who helped the international community in assisting Afghanistan. This policy was not hegemonic in mindset but moral and regional in order to preserve sanity on its western border and to prevent the collapse of another Muslim state. Pakistan extended a positive initial contact to Kabul, calling for regional collaboration and economic integration, and post-conflict reconstruction on the first day after the Taliban regime seizure, even though the nation was under the Taliban’s rule in 2021. Nevertheless, the Taliban regime has continued to vitiate this goodwill by tolerating the presence of anti-Pakistan militant outfits, particularly the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the attacks of which have killed hundreds of civilians and security organs.
What makes the task tougher is the clandestine employment of the Afghan soil by the Indian intelligence networks, which are attempting to employ terrorism as a tool to vitiate Pakistan, employing it as a form of proxy war. Islamabad has altered its strategic equation today, which was solidarity to deterrence in this new security scenario.
Under the new doctrine, sovereignty, verification and credible defense ranks higher than dealing with trust. Pakistan has now become interested in dismantling terrorist sanctuaries, realizing the assurances of the Afghans and making sure that no foreign power uses Afghan soil for subverting its security. This transformation is not a regression to brotherhood but a realism reasserting peace based not on sentiments but on responsibility.
Pakistan’s Doctrine of Verifiable Peace
Pakistan’s new Doctrine of Verifiable Peace is based on the belief that unverified diplomacy breeds insecurity. Peace here is not conceived as the absence of conflict but as the existence of enforceable, monitored commitments among nations. The doctrine is based on three linked principles. First, the guarantee of safety that is referred to as verification, Islamabad is demanding verifiable demolition of the TTP hideouts and establishments working in Afghanistan. Metaphorical flight or mouthed promises are no longer acceptable; Pakistan needs actual, observable results. Second, conditional diplomacy, interaction with the Taliban government is feasible only under terms of demonstrated compliance and not on an assumption of good will because of the realism of the idea of cooperation as long as it is grounded on mutual security interests. Third, mediation and third-party control and bringing in Türkiye and Qatar into the ongoing Istanbul peace process. Pakistan, in doing so, aims to instill credibility, monitoring, and accountability. Combined, this doctrine delineates Pakistan’s shift from sentimental foreign policy strategies to an empiricist-led diplomacy, one based on verification, deterrence, and strategic prudence.
The Taliban’s Complicity and the Proxy Paradox
The focal point of tension in Pakistan–Afghanistan relations at present stems not just from the Taliban’s equivocal behavior vis-à-vis the TTP, but from India’s strategic use of Afghan space as a proxy interface against Pakistan.
Despite expediting oral commitments to deter cross-border terrorism, attacks launched from Afghan territory have continued with amplified sophistication. Pakistan security institutions have repeatedly produced evidence of RAW-backed networks functioning through Afghan middlemen. This reinforces the claim that Afghanistan, under the current Taliban regime, has become an active conduit for India’s asymmetric warfare strategy against Pakistan. This dynamic embodies what may be termed the proxy paradox, whereby, while Pakistan historically supported Afghanistan’s stability in a spirit of brotherhood, the post-2021 environment has allowed India to weaponize the Taliban regime’s instability to undermine Pakistan’s internal security.
Pakistani authorities, such as Defence Minister Khawaja Asif, have consistently asserted that India’s Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) continues to use ungoverned Afghan spaces to conduct false flag attacks and instigate trouble in Pakistan. From a realist point of view, this is the quintessential security dilemma, whereby Pakistan’s self-defensive and counterterror strategies are reframed as aggression and India’s subversive activities go on under the guise of regional outreach and development assistance. The Taliban’s recent proposal to put the TTP on the agenda in peace talks further reveals this externally generated agenda. Islamabad regards such overtures as a bid, mounted through Indian manipulation, to seek legitimacy for anti-Pakistan terrorist syndicates masquerading as reconciliation. Therefore, Pakistan’s insistence on not yielding on the issue of the TTP is not diplomatic intransigence but strategic prudence, an insistence that peace without verification translates into vulnerability, not stability.
Regional Mediation and the Multipolar Diplomatic Order
The Istanbul peace negotiations bring into the peace process the entry of Muslim middle powers, namely Türkiye and Qatar. They act as mediators, thus projecting the growth of a multipolar diplomatic order where regional states assume the role of conflict resolvers. This alliance with Turkiye, Qatar and Saudi Arabia yields three strategic advantages to Pakistan.
In the first place, it internationalizes the process of validation and maintains the cultural, religious, and political identity intact, ensuring that the peace enforcement systems are understood in the broader Muslim world. Secondly, it counters the charges of unilateralism by rooting the objectives of counterterrorism and the security of Pakistan’s border in a multilateral framework. Third, it raises the moral credibility of the Pakistani position through situating its Doctrine of Verifiable Peace in the arena of Islamic cohesion and regional responsibility. These aspects merged together render Islamabad diplomatically legitimate and impart upon it a potent message that its venture in pursuing peace in Afghanistan is justified on principle and procedurally responsible. From International Relations perspective this can be understood as a convergence point between constructivist diplomacy and classical realism, in which power driven negotiations are reinforced using religious identity and shared norms.
Strategic Restraint and the Logic of Deterrence
Pakistan restrains and its restraint to critics is perceived as weakness. But restraint in realist theory is a means of measured deterrence. The reason that Pakistan prefers to negotiate rather than escalate is a demonstration of sound cost benefit analysis and not indecision. Defence Minister Asif issued a threat to go to war in the event of the failure of the negotiations, which was a conditional threat of war, and peace was maintained but preparations were being undertaken in the event that it collapsed. This is the articulation of so-called defensive realism that seeks to defend itself with the symmetric application of force and diplomatic signals.
Verification as a Regional Security Norm
Pakistan’s request for verification of its own can become the norm of regional security. Third-party monitoring, sharing and joint borders are some verification systems that can institutionalize responsibility in South Asian counterterrorism. This aligns with the Cold War-era arms control rationale where evidence of sanctions was required to sustain peace between rivals.
Conclusion
The Pakistan Doctrine of Verifiable Peace suggests a realist thought refinement into regional policy. It executes the sovereignty in a verification and turns diplomacy into a deterrence tool. By declining untested promises and insisting on an empirical responsibility, Pakistan demonstrates seriousness and maturity, and it desires peace without illusion.
In the age of proxy wars and global terrorism, Pakistan’s doctrine demonstrates that realism is not the enemy of peace but its prerequisite. The theory of verifiable peace thus constitutes a type of responsible sovereignty, a pattern of state behavior whereby peace is sought through evidence, deterrence, and defense of valid national interests.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own. They do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of the South Asia Times.
