In his recent article, Obaidullah Baheer critiques the Pakistani state for the use of broad terrorism labels, the scapegoating of neighbors, and the refusal to address what he terms legitimate grievances. While his analysis of the human costs and complexities of conflict is valid, his central argument is fundamentally flawed. By ignoring the distinction between political actors and violent extremist groups and drawing a misleading comparison to the US intervention in Afghanistan, the article presents a dangerously skewed narrative. A comprehensive look at the facts reveals that Pakistan’s counter-terrorism strategy is not a blind imitation of past blunders, but a necessary and evolving response to a very real and existential threat.
A Domestic, Existential Fight
The most significant flaw in the argument is the simplistic comparison of Pakistan’s security context to the US “war on terror.” This comparison fundamentally misunderstands the nature of the conflict. The US wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were expeditionary, fought thousands of miles away from American soil against a non-state enemy. For the US, there was no existential threat to its homeland, it was an external actor that could, and eventually did, walk away.
Pakistan’s fight is fundamentally different; it is a domestic and existential one. It is a local actor with deep-seated historical, ethnic, and cultural ties to Afghanistan. The porous border divides Pashtun communities who share kinship, history, and a common language. This is not a distant, foreign intervention, but a conflict that spills over from a deeply interconnected neighbor. Since 2007, when the TTP was formally established, Pakistan has been in a protracted war on its own soil. According to the Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), the country recorded over 785 terrorist attacks in 2024 alone, resulting in nearly 2,000 casualties. Groups like the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), and others operating from Afghanistan have been involved in attacking civilians, security forces, and critical infrastructure. Pakistan experienced a 45% increase in terrorism-related deaths in 2024, the largest year-on-year increase in over a decade. Unlike a foreign power that can ultimately walk away from a conflict, Pakistan is fighting for the integrity of its own territory. It must secure its borders and eliminate these threats to prevent national disintegration. The comparison to US blunders is therefore misleading, as it fails to recognize the immense domestic pressure and survival imperative driving Pakistan’s strategy.
Civilian Grievances Do Not Justify Terrorism
The article’s insistence on treating groups like the TTP and BLA as “politically motivated rational actors who could be reasoned with” is a tragically misguided argument. While local grievances in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa are real and must be addressed, they do not justify the hijacking of trains, the bombing of mosques, or the massacre of civilians. These are not the actions of a group seeking political redress, they are acts of terrorism. The TTP, for instance, openly calls for the overthrow of the Pakistani state and the imposition of a strict religious rule. Similarly, the BLA’s objective is secession by force. Its history is rife with acts of violence against non-Baloch minorities, including the assassination of teachers and students and the targeting of foreign nationals.
For decades, Pakistan has tried to negotiate with these very groups, only to be met with betrayal and a surge in violence. The failed peace talks with the TTP in 2021-2022, facilitated by the Afghan Taliban, serve as a stark warning. These peace talks were actually used by the TTP to regroup and rearm, leading to a subsequent increase in terror attacks across the country. The terrorists’ maximalist demands are non-starters for any sovereign state. The TTP’s demands, in particular, reveal an agenda that goes far beyond addressing grievances and instead aims to carve out a parallel state. Their core demands include:
- The reversal of the merger of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, an action that would effectively resurrect a semi-autonomous region under their control.
- The imposition of their specific interpretation of Sharia law, a demand that is a direct rejection of the existing, democratically-ratified legal and constitutional framework of Pakistan. This is a crucial point. Pakistan’s 1973 Constitution is already an Islamic document, proclaiming the country as an “Islamic Republic,” declaring Islam as the state religion, and stipulating that all laws must be in conformity with the injunctions of the Quran and Sunnah. This constitution was a product of extensive debate and was unanimously ratified by representatives of all political and Islamic parties and sects. The TTP’s demand for Sharia is therefore not a call for more Islamic law, but a demand for their own, extremist version of Sharia, administered by them, separate from and in opposition to the Pakistani state.
- The unconditional release of their imprisoned fighters
Similarly, the BLA’s demands for outright secession reveal a parallel ambition to dismantle the state’s territorial integrity. These are not the actions of a group seeking political redress through dialogue, they are demands of a group that wants to establish a state within a state. Military action is not the first choice, but a necessary response when dialogue is repeatedly sabotaged by the insurgents themselves. Until groups accept the constitution and renounce violence, military pressure is often the only tool that can compel them to the table.
Afghanistan’s Role and The Two-Way Street of Sovereignty
The article’s argument that Pakistan’s actions are a “deflection” of responsibility is undermined by the documented reality of cross-border terrorism. The United Nations has repeatedly documented the TTP’s presence and operational capabilities from within Afghanistan, confirming that these groups are not isolated, domestically-contained actors. The BLA is a US-designated terrorist organization whose leaders have found safe havens abroad. The recent incident in Zhob, Balochistan, provided stark evidence of this: Pakistani security forces killed 50 TTP fighters, 90% of whom were confirmed to be Afghan nationals. Their bodies were returned to Afghanistan after a tribal jirga, a clear indication that these individuals were not Pakistani citizens with grievances, but part of a foreign-based militant network.
The author criticizes Pakistan’s airstrikes as a violation of sovereignty, but this ignores that Afghan soil being used for attacks on Pakistan is already a grave violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty. International law on this matter is clear, that a state is responsible for non-state actors operating from its territory. In the past, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the case of Nicaragua vs The USA held that US support for the Contras was an illegal use of force. In light of this legal precedent, Afghanistan is responsible for stopping terrorist groups from its territory from operating against Pakistan. Afghanistan promised to do so in the Doha Agreement, and by breaking both international law and its commitments under the agreement, it is now reneging on that promise.
For Details Read : Proxy, Partner, or Pawn: Situating the TTP in Taliban Strategy
The Flawed Logic of Moral Equivalence
Another dangerous oversimplification in the article is the attempt to create a moral equivalence between the actions of terrorists and those of the state. The author equates militant killings with the tragic, accidental civilian casualties that occur during counter-terrorism operations. This is a false and deeply flawed argument. Militants deliberately target civilians, as evidenced by the BLA’s history of ethnic cleansing and the TTP’s attacks on schools and mosques. Pakistan’s security forces, by contrast, operate under a clear mandate to protect civilians, even as collateral damage can tragically occur. The state is accountable to its people and international law in a way that terrorist groups are not.
Blurring this distinction delegitimizes the state’s fundamental duty to protect its citizens and creates a false narrative that terrorists and the state are on equal footing. Furthermore, presenting these groups as misunderstood rebels with “grievances” provides them with a moral justification that acts as a form of soft support. This narrative, whether intended or not, helps to legitimize their violent cause, making it easier for them to recruit and operate by framing their terrorism as a legitimate political struggle.
A Long-Term Strategy
Contrary to the impression that Pakistan is blindly following a flawed “war on terror” model, its current strategy is far more nuanced. While military action is a necessary component, it is part of a broader, multi-dimensional plan. The National Action Plan (NAP) of 2014, which was a direct response to the heinous Army Public School Peshawar attack, outlined a 20-point framework that included not only military operations but also governance reforms, a crackdown on hate speech, and the rehabilitation of affected communities. This long-term approach is supported by a host of ongoing and planned socio-economic development projects aimed at addressing the very grievances the author highlights. For instance, in Balochistan, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) includes significant infrastructure and human development initiatives.
Similarly, in the former FATA regions, the government has shown a clear commitment to development through its own financial allocations. The federal government, through the Accelerated Implementation Programme (AIP), has released significant funds for the uplift of the merged districts. For the fiscal year 2024-25, the total allocation for the AIP stood at Rs. 42.315 billion. The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa government has also contributed substantially, with its proposed Annual Development Plan for 2025-26 allocating Rs. 547 billion for the province, with a specific focus on infrastructure, education, and health in the merged districts. Such initiatives show a clear commitment to addressing poverty, improving education, and creating economic opportunities as a crucial part of the counter-terrorism strategy.
The real danger is not “Pakistan’s war on terror approach,” but the romanticizing of violent groups as misunderstood rebels. The state cannot abandon its monopoly on violence, that is the very cornerstone of its sovereignty.
