The recent talks in Turkey, intended to ease tensions between Pakistan and the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA), reportedly included a significant proposal from the IEA: to include the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) as a direct negotiating party. Pakistan’s firm rejection of this proposal was not a simple diplomatic maneuver, it was a crucial defense of state sovereignty and a stark refusal to engage in an act of political legitimization that would have serious strategic consequences.
This incident lays bare the complex interplay between sovereign states and violent non-state actors.
Legitimacy, Agency, and the Recognition Trap
Negotiation between a sovereign state and a non-state actor is never a simple discussion, it is a profound political act centered on the transfer of legitimacy. Legitimacy is the currency of power. For a state, it is assumed. For an insurgent group like the TTP, it must be acquired. A seat at a negotiating table, particularly on foreign soil and mediated by another regime, is the most potent form of acquisition. It accomplishes three things instantly: it grants recognition, elevating the group from a shadowy network of militants to a political entity with a name and a leadership; it creates parity, symbolically placing the insurgents on a level playing field with the state’s representatives; and it provides a platform, allowing the group to broadcast its grievances and political demands to a global audience, bypassing the “terrorist” label.
Beyond this foundational concept, however, other theories are at play. The most significant is the Principal-Agent Problem. Many in Pakistan maintain that the IEA acts as the Principal and the TTP as its Agent. The IEA uses TTP-sponsored violence as a tool of foreign policy to extract concessions from Islamabad. The IEA, conversely, is desperate to shed this narrative. By proposing to mediate between Pakistan and the TTP, the IEA was attempting a masterful strategic shift, to recast itself from a patron to a neutral arbiter. This move would delink the IEA from responsibility for TTP attacks, allowing it to claim it is part of the solution, not the source of the problem.
This leads to the Recognition Trap. States are viscerally aware that once legitimacy is granted, it is almost impossible to revoke. Pakistan has fallen into this trap before, engaging in previous rounds of negotiations with the TTP that yielded no lasting peace and were instead exploited by the militants to regroup and re-arm. Granting such recognition is doubly dangerous for a state like Pakistan, which faces multiple ethno-nationalist and other insurgencies. It also fundamentally misrepresents the TTP, which is not a broad-based organization representing a majority of Pakistanis, but a violent, fringe ideological group. If this group, through a campaign of violence, can bomb its way to the negotiating table, what message does that send to BLA terrorists or other separatist groups? It establishes a clear, state-sanctioned pathway where violence is rewarded with political recognition. Pakistan’s refusal was a refusal to activate this moral hazard again.
Defending Sovereignty
Islamabad’s rejection was not just predictable; it was strategically non-negotiable for several reasons.
First, it is an issue of sovereignty. While Pakistan maintains the TTP is backed by the IEA and operates from Afghan safe havens, the group’s origins are primarily Pakistani, and its attacks occur on Pakistani soil, largely concentrated in the border regions. For Pakistan to negotiate with this group on foreign soil, at the behest of the very government it holds responsible for sponsoring them, would be a profound abdication of its authority. It would legitimize the TTP’s cross-border operations and imply that Pakistan’s security challenges are open to international mediation, a status it firmly rejects, rather than a problem of state-sponsored terrorism to be handled directly with Kabul.
Second, it refuses to absolve the IEA of responsibility. By rejecting the IEA’s role as mediator, Pakistan forcefully re-asserted the principal-agent narrative. The message from Islamabad is clear: Our dispute is not with the TTP; our dispute is with you, the IEA, for harboring, supporting, and failing to restrain them as per your commitments under the Doha Agreement. Engaging the TTP directly would have allowed the IEA to step back and absolve itself of any obligation to dismantle the TTP’s infrastructure. Pakistan’s refusal keeps the diplomatic and military pressure squarely on Kabul, where it believes the root of the problem lies.
Third, it is a rejection of the TTP’s core demands. The TTP’s goals are not just political, they are existential. The group explicitly rejects the Constitution of Pakistan. To sit across from them is to entertain this rejection. It legitimizes their anti-constitutional stance and provides a platform for demands, such as the withdrawal of the military from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa or the imposition of their interpretation of Sharia, that the Pakistani state simply cannot, and will not, consider.
What the TTP Stood to Gain
For the TTP, the IEA’s proposal was a strategic win. Had Pakistan accepted, the TTP would have gained more in a single diplomatic gesture than it has in over a decade of violence.
The primary gain, as discussed, is legitimacy. The TTP would have been transformed overnight from a proscribed terrorist entity into a recognized political-military movement, a partner in a peace process. This would have been an unparalleled propaganda victory, massively boosting insurgent morale and serving as a powerful recruitment tool.
Furthermore, it would have created a direct channel to the state that bypasses its alleged patrons in Kabul. The TTP would no longer be just a proxy; it would be its own political actor, capable of making demands, securing ceasefires, and potentially negotiating for concessions like prisoner releases or a return to the tribal districts, all under the veneer of a legitimate political process. It would have been the first step toward de-proscription and international recognition.
The Afghan Taliban’s Strategic Gambit
The IEA’s motivation in this gambit was sophisticated and twofold.
First, the IEA is engaged in its own desperate quest for international legitimacy. By successfully positioning itself as a neutral regional mediator, it would have demonstrated its capacity for constructive statecraft. It would have signaled to the world that it is not just a rogue regime harboring terrorists but a responsible government capable of resolving complex regional disputes. This would have been a powerful chip to play in its efforts to unlock frozen assets, gain UN recognition, and secure foreign aid.
Second, and more critically, it was an attempt to delink from the TTP problem permanently. The IEA is trapped between its ideological and historical ties to the TTP and its international obligations to prevent cross-border terrorism. This duality is unsustainable. By becoming a mediator, the IEA could escape this bind. It could no longer be blamed for TTP attacks; instead, it could piously claim it was facilitating peace and that the failure to achieve it was due to Pakistani intransigence. It was a calculated move to shed its responsibility as a patron and adopt the much safer, and more prestigious, mantle of arbiter.
What Pakistan Gained from No
By refusing to walk into the trap, Pakistan may not have solved its TTP problem, but it successfully re-established the narrative and defended its core interests. The primary gain was the unambiguous re-assertion of the principal-agent dynamic. Pakistan’s no put the world on notice that it holds the IEA directly responsible for the violence emanating from its soil.
It also maintained the integrity of its sovereign position: terrorism is a criminal and military problem to be dismantled, not a political grievance to be negotiated with on equal terms. This clarity is vital for preserving the morale of its own security forces and for its diplomatic engagements with other world powers, like China and the United States, who are also invested in the region’s security.
Also See: Afghan Taliban and Cross Border Terrorism in Pakistan
