India’s provision of humanitarian aid to Afghan refugees repatriated from Pakistan is a recent attempt to showcase its compassion for refugees, especially Afghans. However, this gesture, recognized by the Taliban’s Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation, sharply contrasts with India’s past involvement in the Afghan conflict and its broader history of handling humanitarian crises and refugee situations. Despite projecting an image of humanitarianism and hospitality, rooted in the principle of “Atithi Devo Bhava,” India’s policies, from its support of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to its treatment of Sri Lankan Tamil, Bengali, and Rohingya refugees, reveal a contradictory approach shaped more by geopolitical and domestic factors than purely humanitarian concerns.
India’s Stance on the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan
Throughout the Cold War, India maintained a strong, Soviet-leaning foreign policy, a relationship solidified by the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. The Soviet Union was perceived as a steadfast supporter of India in the United Nations Security Council, particularly on contentious issues like the Kashmir dispute and India’s nuclear ambitions, and served as a crucial arms supplier.
India’s strong diplomatic support for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which resulted in the death and displacement of millions of Afghans, is a well-established historical fact. India consistently abstained from voting in favor of all UN resolutions that condemned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. When asked, India’s Permanent Representative to the UN, Brajesh Mishra, stated that India had “no reason to disbelieve the Soviet commitment to withdraw troops” when requested by the Kabul government. India’s diplomatic rhetoric often downplayed or implicitly justified Soviet actions by constantly targeting and condemning Afghan resistance fighters as foreign acts of intervention.The Refusal to Welcome Afghan Refugees
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 triggered one of the largest humanitarian crises in modern history. Over five million Afghans fled to neighboring Pakistan and Iran, and another two million were internally displaced within Afghanistan. At its peak in the late 1980s, over six million Afghans were refugees, primarily due to fear of the Soviet army, the pro-Soviet regime, and widespread destruction of homes and livelihoods.
In stark contrast to its neighbors, India took in a very limited number of Afghan refugees. While Pakistan and Iran hosted millions, India’s total number of Afghan refugees never exceeded more than a few thousand.
Contrasting Refugee Treatment:
India’s approach to refugee crises has varied significantly across different groups, illustrating a complex interplay of religious and ethnic discrimination, strategic calculation, and domestic politics.
1971 Bangladeshi Refugees
During the 1971 Bengal crisis, the Indian government encouraged a large number of Bengalis to migrate to the Indian states of West Bengal and Assam, potentially to create a pretext for humanitarian intervention and direct Indian military involvement in what was then East Pakistan. Following the war, most of these refugees were repatriated, but some remained. The issue of these Muslim and Hindu Bengali refugees has since become a contentious political matter, particularly in Assam. It is within this historical context that the Indian government passed the Citizenship (Amendment) Act (CAA) in 2019.
The CAA controversially provides a route to Indian citizenship solely for non-Muslim immigrants, specifically Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, Parsis, and Christians, who arrived from Bangladesh (as well as Pakistan and Afghanistan) before December 31, 2014, citing religious persecution. Consequently, while Bengali Hindus from the 1971 refugee influx or subsequent migrations may now have a path to regularization and citizenship, Bengali Muslims, who also fled the same violence, are explicitly excluded from these provisions. This exclusion effectively renders them permanent “illegal immigrants” and leaves them vulnerable to identification and potential deportation based solely on their religious identity.
Sri Lankan Tamil Refugees
Waves of Tamil refugees fled the Sri Lankan civil war, particularly after 1983, seeking asylum in India. An estimated 200,000 Sri Lankan Tamils took refuge, primarily in Tamil Nadu. While India provided asylum, these refugees faced significant challenges and marginalization. Refugees experienced restrictions on movement, a lack of full integration or citizenship, and prolonged legal uncertainty. Access to education privileges, initially available, was notably withdrawn after 1991. Concerns about forced repatriation also arose, with threats of deportation and internment in special camps. The Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) 2019 explicitly excludes 58,000 Sri Lankan Tamil refugees from accelerated citizenship pathways, despite their long residence in India, rendering thousands of these refugees stateless with no access to education, health and other basic facilities.
Rohingya Refugees
The Rohingya, a Muslim ethnic minority from Myanmar, have faced decades of violence, discrimination, and persecution, leading to a massive wave of violence in 2017 that forced over 742,000 to flee. India has adopted a very hostile and inhumane stance towards this influx. The Indian government consistently classifies Rohingyas as “illegal immigrants” rather than refugees. The Supreme Court has upheld the government’s right to expel foreigners, citing “serious concerns about the threat to the country’s internal security.” This classification leads to threats of deportation and actual deportations to Myanmar or Bangladesh, despite the international principle of non-refoulement, which prohibits returning individuals to a place where their lives or freedom are threatened.
Rohingyas in India face precarious legal status, limited access to services, and extreme vulnerability. Many reside in “squalid camps” and are denied “basic rights and protection,” making them “extremely vulnerable to exploitation, sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), and abuse.” The CAA 2019 further exacerbates their vulnerability by explicitly excluding Muslim refugees from accelerated citizenship, highlighting a discriminatory policy. India’s actions, including forced returns into the sea near Myanmar, are viewed by the UN as a “blatant disregard for the lives and safety of those who require international protection” and a “serious violation of the principle of non-refoulement.”
https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/05/alarmed-reports-rohingya-cast-sea-indian-navy-vessels-un-expert-launches
In summary
The differing responses to these refugee groups illustrate a clear pattern: India’s “compassion” is not universal but highly conditional. It is extended more readily when there are perceived strategic gains, as seen in the 1971 Bangladeshi crisis and current aid for Afghan refugees, or when the refugees align with a particular religious or ethnic identity.
A Contradictory Compassion? India’s Stance on Refugees
India’s provision of humanitarian aid to Afghan refugees repatriated from Pakistan is a recent attempt to showcase its compassion for refugees, especially Afghans. However, this gesture, recognized by the Taliban’s Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation, sharply contrasts with India’s past involvement in the Afghan conflict and its broader history of handling humanitarian crises and refugee situations. Despite projecting an image of humanitarianism and hospitality, rooted in the principle of “Atithi Devo Bhava,” India’s policies, from its support of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to its treatment of Sri Lankan Tamil, Bengali, and Rohingya refugees, reveal a contradictory approach shaped more by geopolitical and domestic factors than purely humanitarian concerns.
India’s Stance on the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan
Throughout the Cold War, India maintained a strong, Soviet-leaning foreign policy, a relationship solidified by the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. The Soviet Union was perceived as a steadfast supporter of India in the United Nations Security Council, particularly on contentious issues like the Kashmir dispute and India’s nuclear ambitions, and served as a crucial arms supplier.
India’s strong diplomatic support for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which resulted in the death and displacement of millions of Afghans, is a well-established historical fact. India consistently abstained from voting in favor of all UN resolutions that condemned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. When asked, India’s Permanent Representative to the UN, Brajesh Mishra, stated that India had “no reason to disbelieve the Soviet commitment to withdraw troops” when requested by the Kabul government. India’s diplomatic rhetoric often downplayed or implicitly justified Soviet actions by constantly targeting and condemning Afghan resistance fighters as foreign acts of intervention.The Refusal to Welcome Afghan Refugees
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 triggered one of the largest humanitarian crises in modern history. Over five million Afghans fled to neighboring Pakistan and Iran, and another two million were internally displaced within Afghanistan. At its peak in the late 1980s, over six million Afghans were refugees, primarily due to fear of the Soviet army, the pro-Soviet regime, and widespread destruction of homes and livelihoods.
In stark contrast to its neighbors, India took in a very limited number of Afghan refugees. While Pakistan and Iran hosted millions, India’s total number of Afghan refugees never exceeded more than a few thousand.
Contrasting Refugee Treatment:
India’s approach to refugee crises has varied significantly across different groups, illustrating a complex interplay of religious and ethnic discrimination, strategic calculation, and domestic politics.
1971 Bangladeshi Refugees
During the 1971 Bengal crisis, the Indian government encouraged a large number of Bengalis to migrate to the Indian states of West Bengal and Assam, potentially to create a pretext for humanitarian intervention and direct Indian military involvement in what was then East Pakistan. Following the war, most of these refugees were repatriated, but some remained. The issue of these Muslim and Hindu Bengali refugees has since become a contentious political matter, particularly in Assam. It is within this historical context that the Indian government passed the Citizenship (Amendment) Act (CAA) in 2019.
The CAA controversially provides a route to Indian citizenship solely for non-Muslim immigrants, specifically Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, Parsis, and Christians, who arrived from Bangladesh (as well as Pakistan and Afghanistan) before December 31, 2014, citing religious persecution. Consequently, while Bengali Hindus from the 1971 refugee influx or subsequent migrations may now have a path to regularization and citizenship, Bengali Muslims, who also fled the same violence, are explicitly excluded from these provisions. This exclusion effectively renders them permanent “illegal immigrants” and leaves them vulnerable to identification and potential deportation based solely on their religious identity.
Sri Lankan Tamil Refugees
Waves of Tamil refugees fled the Sri Lankan civil war, particularly after 1983, seeking asylum in India. An estimated 200,000 Sri Lankan Tamils took refuge, primarily in Tamil Nadu. While India provided asylum, these refugees faced significant challenges and marginalization. Refugees experienced restrictions on movement, a lack of full integration or citizenship, and prolonged legal uncertainty. Access to education privileges, initially available, was notably withdrawn after 1991. Concerns about forced repatriation also arose, with threats of deportation and internment in special camps. The Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) 2019 explicitly excludes 58,000 Sri Lankan Tamil refugees from accelerated citizenship pathways, despite their long residence in India, rendering thousands of these refugees stateless with no access to education, health and other basic facilities.
Rohingya Refugees
The Rohingya, a Muslim ethnic minority from Myanmar, have faced decades of violence, discrimination, and persecution, leading to a massive wave of violence in 2017 that forced over 742,000 to flee. India has adopted a very hostile and inhumane stance towards this influx. The Indian government consistently classifies Rohingyas as “illegal immigrants” rather than refugees. The Supreme Court has upheld the government’s right to expel foreigners, citing “serious concerns about the threat to the country’s internal security.” This classification leads to threats of deportation and actual deportations to Myanmar or Bangladesh, despite the international principle of non-refoulement, which prohibits returning individuals to a place where their lives or freedom are threatened.
Rohingyas in India face precarious legal status, limited access to services, and extreme vulnerability. Many reside in “squalid camps” and are denied “basic rights and protection,” making them “extremely vulnerable to exploitation, sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), and abuse.” The CAA 2019 further exacerbates their vulnerability by explicitly excluding Muslim refugees from accelerated citizenship, highlighting a discriminatory policy. India’s actions, including forced returns into the sea near Myanmar, are viewed by the UN as a “blatant disregard for the lives and safety of those who require international protection” and a “serious violation of the principle of non-refoulement.”
https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/05/alarmed-reports-rohingya-cast-sea-indian-navy-vessels-un-expert-launches
In summary
The differing responses to these refugee groups illustrate a clear pattern: India’s “compassion” is not universal but highly conditional. It is extended more readily when there are perceived strategic gains, as seen in the 1971 Bangladeshi crisis and current aid for Afghan refugees, or when the refugees align with a particular religious or ethnic identity.
SAT Commentary
SAT Commentary
SAT Commentaries, a collection of insightful social media threads on current events and social issues, featuring diverse perspectives from various authors.
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