Imran Khan’s Call For Overseas Pakistanis To Halt Remittances Backfires

Overseas Pakistanis defy Imran Khan’s call to halt remittances, sending record $3bn in January to support families. [Image via AP/File]

Islamabad, Pakistan – In December last year, former Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan issued an unlikely threat to the country’s government: After spending more than 15 months behind bars on what he called “politically motivated charges” and following multiple failed protests, he warned that he would launch a civil disobedience movement.

“As part of the movement, we will urge overseas Pakistanis to limit remittances and start a boycott campaign,” read a message posted on Imran Khan’s account on X.

With a precariously balanced economy, with the country seeking new loans and debt rollovers from key allies such as Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and China, turning off the valve of remittances from overseas Pakistanis could, in theory, bring the government to its knees.

Heeding that call, 28-year-old Muhammad Waseem, a devoted supporter of Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party who works in Doha, Qatar, telephonedhis family in Punjab, Pakistan, to tell them he would be temporarily halting the monthly instalments of cash he was sending them since moving to the Middle East last August.

“I was sending close to 4,000 Qatari riyals [300,000 Pakistani rupees or $1,096] every month to support my family, but as soon as I heard what Imran Khan said, I informed them that I wouldn’t be sending money,” Waseem told Al Jazeera.

Waseem, a barber by profession, said he planned to save the money and rely on his elder brothers, who run a dairy business in Rahim Yar Khan, a city in southern Punjab, to support the family for some time.

“But I think I’ll have to resume sending them some money next month because my brothers have asked me to help out,” he added, though he said he planned to send less money than he used to.

Waseem is far from alone in his unwillingness to stop sending money back home, despite his initial enthusiasm.

Khan, who was Pakistan’s prime minister from August 2018 until April 2022, when he was deposed through a parliamentary vote of no confidence, is known to enjoy wide support among the country’s diaspora, from the Middle East to North America.

But despite Imran Khan’s demand to stop remittances by overseas Pakistanis, recent figures from Pakistan’s central bank suggest that the country’s remittances, a key pillar of its economy, increased by 25 percent in January compared with the same month in 2024.

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According to data released by the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP), overseas Pakistanis sent more than $3bn in remittances in January. This marked the second consecutive month that remittances exceeded the $3bn mark.

Khan, the numbers suggest, may be losing the battle to use remittances as a weapon against the government.

In fact, 2024 saw Pakistan receive the highest annual remittance total in its history, reaching $34.1bn, a 32 percent increase from 2023, when overseas Pakistanis sent home $25.7bn.

Ahmed Kabeer, originally from Lower Dir in the northwestern province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and now working in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, explained that, for him, sending money back to Pakistan was not a matter of political preference but a necessity.

Kabeer moved recently to Saudi Arabia to join his two brothers, who have been living there for the past seven years.

“The sole reason we leave our families is to earn money for them and send it back. We don’t have land, businesses, or any other means of income. That’s why my brothers moved here, and now, I have followed in their footsteps,” Kabeer told Al Jazeera.

A recent graduate of the University of Swat, Kabeer is seeking job opportunities in both Riyadh and Jeddah to avoid being a burden on his brothers, who work as labourers.

“They work 12-hour shifts and collectively send back between 2,000 to 3,000 Saudi riyals [150,000-225,000 Pakistani rupees or $533-$800] every month. It was only because of their money that I was able to study at a university,” he added.

The fifth of 12 siblings, Kabeer is also a PTI supporter and sympathises with Imran Khan’s call to limit remittances of overseas Pakistanis. However, he says that when faced with the choice between supporting Khan or his family, “it is no choice at all.”

“It’s easy to demand that we stop sending money. We are here for our families, and if we don’t support them, why are we here at all? It’s about our siblings, our parents, our children; we have to send the money back home,” he said. “If I tell my mother I can’t send her money because Khan asked me not to, she’ll probably tell me to go sit in jail with him,” he added, laughing.

Raja Babar Sarwar, a restaurant owner in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, echoed similar sentiments. He has been living in Jeddah since 2011, along with his brother-in-law.

A father of three, Sarwar, who hails from Peshawar, said that his sole reason for working abroad was to provide for his family and ensure their wellbeing.

“I really don’t care about politics or what any leader is saying. We are not here to do politics, we are here to earn,” Sarwar told Al Jazeera.

Running a restaurant serving Pakistani cuisine to a diverse clientele, Sarwar employs a staff of eight to 10 people, all from different parts of Pakistan.

“I know for a fact that each of my workers sends anywhere between 1,500 to 2,000 SAR [110,000-150,000 Pakistani rupees or $400-$533] back home. My brother-in-law and I send around 4,000 SAR [300,000 Pakistani rupees or $1,066] to our families every month,” he said.

Sajid Amin Javed, a senior economist at the Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI) in Islamabad, suggested that none of this was surprising.

Most remittances sent by overseas Pakistanis, particularly those in Gulf countries, are meant to support vulnerable families back home, he said.

“The money sent by Pakistani nationals back home is essentially involuntary. They have to send it to cover their household expenses. Barring a few exceptions, they don’t have a choice in the matter,” Javed told Al Jazeera.

However, Javed pointed to additional factors behind the recent surge in remittances.

“After the rupee appreciated against the US dollar last year and with a now-stable currency rate, overseas Pakistanis have to send more money to meet their families’ expenses,” he explained.

The Pakistani rupee, which was Asia’s worst-performing currency against the US dollar, depreciating by more than 60 percent between 2022 and 2024, has now stabilised between 278 and 280 rupees per US dollar for the past 12 months.

With the government enforcing strict controls and cracking down on illegal money transfer channels, increased confidence in official banking systems has also led to higher remittance flows, the economist highlighted.

“The nature of Pakistani remittances is inelastic to political narratives, as they are driven by household consumption needs. While some individuals, particularly strong supporters, may follow their leader’s advice, the vast majority of Pakistani senders have no choice but to continue supporting their families,” Javed said.

This news is sourced from Al Jazeera and is intended for informational purposes only.

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