Fall of Haqqani: ISKP’s Deadly Checkmate or Taliban’s Inner War?

The assassination of Khalilur Rahman Haqqani, Afghanistan’s Minister of Refugees, comes at a pivotal moment when his ministry was relocating Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Hafiz Gul Bahadur (HGB) factions from Pakistani regions to Ghazni.

The circumstances beg the question: who orchestrated this attack? Was it TTP-HGB factions, Kandahari rivals within the Taliban, or sympathizers of TTP-HGB within the Haqqani network itself? Or does the responsibility lie squarely with the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), which has strategically targeted the Haqqanis in a broader game of internal destabilization?

The Context: A Fragile Beginning of Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations

As of December 2024, Pakistan and Afghanistan had taken significant steps to thaw their frosty ties. However, the Ministry of Refugees’ operations to relocate TTP-HGB groups from Pakistan to Ghazni created ripples across Afghanistan’s political and security landscape.

• High-Level Pakistani Security Delegation Visit
  • Senior Pakistani military officials visited Kandahar and Kabul to engage with Afghan counterparts, signaling a willingness to cooperate on mutual security challenges.
    
• TTP-HGB Relocation
  • By providing safe havens in Ghazni, Khalilur Rahman Haqqani’s ministry sought to manage an influx of fighters. However, this move likely disrupted ISKP’s recruitment strategies and influence among refugee populations, making Haqqani a prime target.
    
• Internal Rivalries
  • The relocation of Pakistan-origin fighters also heightened suspicions within the Taliban factions, particularly among Kandaharis, who have historically been at odds with the Haqqanis over their Pakistani connections and political ambitions.
    
• Appointment of Mohammad Sadiq
  
  • Ambassador Mohammad Sadiq, a seasoned diplomat and Pakistan’s Special Representative for Afghanistan, was reappointed to bridge bilateral gaps.
  • His visit to Afghanistan, scheduled in late December 2024, had to be postponed following Haqqani’s assassination, reflecting the chilling impact of this tragedy on diplomatic efforts.
  • These steps marked a cautious yet promising trajectory in bilateral relations. However, the killing of Khalilur Rahman Haqqani threatens to derail this fragile progress. This high-profile killing raises serious questions about its timing, motives, and the actors involved, with potential consequences for both nations’ fragile rapprochement.

Pakistan’s Deputy Prime Minister Ishaq Dar expressed that Pakistan is “deeply shocked” by the killing of Khalil Rahman Haqqani, the Taliban’s acting Minister for Refugees, and six others in a terrorist attack in Kabul.

Haqqani, a senior figure in the Haqqani network—a faction accused of significant attacks during the Afghan war—served as a minister since the Taliban took power after the 2021 U.S. withdrawal. The U.S. State Department had previously identified him as a key operative in the group.

Dar condemned the attack via X, offering condolences and reaffirming Pakistan’s stance against “terrorism in all its forms and manifestations.” He added that Pakistan was in communication with the Taliban-led Afghan government to gather further details about the incident.

Also See: ISIS-K Threat Surge: Afghan Crisis and Spillover into Pakistan

Haqqanis: The Primary Target of ISKP

Over the years, ISKP has executed numerous high-profile assassinations targeting Haqqanis, their areas of influence, and their governance portfolios:

• Interior Ministry and Security Portfolio: Sirajuddin Haqqani, acting Interior Minister and head of the Haqqani network, oversees Afghanistan’s internal security. This position makes the network a direct threat to ISKP’s expansionist ambitions, both territorial and ideological. ISKP has repeatedly attacked this sector, including the 2022 bombing near the Ministry of Interior headquarters, 2023 attack outside Afghanistan Foreign Ministry and other key government offices in Kabul.
• Symbolic and Geopolitical Targets: Haqqani-controlled regions like Kabul and Logar, or areas where the network has a strong administrative presence, frequently witness ISKP attacks. Moreover, recently the ISKP attacks include symbolic strikes on mosques, refugee offices, and Sufi gatherings – primarily the symbols emblematic of governance to destabilize Haqqani dominance.
  

Khalilur Rahman Haqqani’s Killing: A Convergence of Targets

The recent assassination of Khalilur Rahman Haqqani reflects ISKP’s precision in striking at:

1. Governance Portfolios: As Minister of Refugees, Haqqani was actively involved in relocating refugees, including those associated with Pakistan’s Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP). This operation potentially threatened ISKP’s recruitment pipelines and influence among displaced populations.
2. Leadership and Networks: Haqqani’s pivotal role in the Taliban regime made him a high-value target. The attack also neutralized two bodyguards, weakening his immediate circle of security and further exposing Taliban vulnerabilities.
3. Symbolic Messaging: The attack on a mosque during prayers amplified the psychological impact, portraying the Taliban leadership as incapable of protecting even their sanctuaries.
   

The Bounty Factor: Haqqanis as International Targets

The Haqqanis have long been in the crosshairs of international actors, particularly the U.S. and India:

• Khalilur Rahman Haqqani had a $5 million bounty placed by the U.S., labeling him as one of the most wanted terrorists.
• Sirajuddin Haqqani, similarly, carries a $10 million bounty. This makes ISKP’s attacks on Haqqanis align conveniently with narratives pushed by adversaries like India and the U.S., portraying the group as a destabilizing force in Afghanistan.
  

Propaganda and Denial: A Familiar Cycle

As expected, ISKP’s claim of responsibility for Haqqani’s assassination was swiftly followed by the Afghan interim government’s attempt to shift the blame onto Pakistan. Historically, this blame-shifting has been amplified through Indian media outlets, which serve to bolster the narrative that Islamabad sponsors ISKP.

• Selective Propaganda: Afghan officials, including Zabiullah Mujahid, have repeatedly alleged that ISKP operates from Pakistani territory. One such claim came on September 30, 2024. However, such claims ignore the group’s known operational hubs in eastern Afghanistan, including Nangarhar and Kunar, which were established long before Pakistan’s alleged involvement.
• Convenient Oversight: Afghanistan’s intelligence apparatus under the Taliban, particularly in Kabul, has failed to neutralize ISKP cells. Despite this, the regime’s spokespersons insist on accusing Pakistan, diverting attention from internal security failures. By framing ISKP as a tool of Pakistan’s intelligence agencies, these narratives deflect attention from ISKP’s Afghan roots and operational autonomy.
  

Strategic Implications of Haqqani Targeting

The death of Khalilur Rahman Haqqani further exacerbates the rifts within the Taliban:

1. Kandahar vs. Kabul Divide: The Kandahari faction, dominant in southern Afghanistan, has increasingly sidelined the Kabul-based Haqqanis. This divide weakens the Taliban’s unified front against ISKP and other insurgent threats.
2. Internal Security Compromised: By targeting Haqqanis, ISKP undermines the Taliban’s ability to maintain internal security, exposing vulnerabilities in governance and eroding public confidence in the regime.

• Since 2021, ISKP has conducted over 300 attacks across Afghanistan as per OSINT, targeting civilians, mosques, and Taliban officials.

3. Propaganda Value:
   1. The assassination fuels narratives propagated by adversarial media outlets, particularly in India, linking Pakistan to destabilizing activities in Afghanistan.
      

ISKP’s Calculated Rise: Facilitated Chaos

Since the appointment of Shahab al-Muhajir as ISKP chief in 2020, the group has expanded its operations significantly in Kabul, particularly during Amrullah Saleh’s tenure as Kabul’s security head. Under the National Directorate of Security (NDS), ISKP not only consolidated networks but also executed attacks that were conveniently attributed to the Haqqanis:

• Educational Centers and Civilian Targets: ISKP’s attacks on Kabul University and other non-military sites during Saleh’s tenure coincided with increased crackdowns on the Haqqani network.
• Weaponization of Blame: The repeated attribution of attacks to Haqqanis during this period reflects a coordinated effort to discredit the group and limit its influence. By leveraging the blame on this faction, ISKP aimed to discredit the Haqqanis within both the Taliban’s internal politics and the broader Afghan public.
• Exploiting the Haqqani-Kandahari Rift:

The fault line between the Haqqani network and Kandahari leaders of the Taliban is another critical aspect that ISKP sought to exploit. While Kandahari figures were traditionally seen as the core of the Taliban’s governance, the Haqqanis gained prominence due to their alliance with Pakistan and control over Afghanistan’s security apparatus. This led to tension within the Taliban’s ranks, with Kandahari leaders wary of the Haqqanis’ growing influence. ISKP, understanding these internal dynamics, historically targeted the Haqqanis specifically under Amrullah Saleh, positioning themselves as a counterforce to their rise.

Conclusion

ISKP’s methodical targeting of the Haqqani network and its governance sectors reveals a dual strategy: weakening the Taliban from within while exacerbating external tensions. By striking at Haqqanis, ISKP not only destabilizes internal security but also feeds propaganda narratives used by adversaries like India and factions within Afghanistan to isolate Pakistan. The assassination of Khalilur Rahman Haqqani marks another chapter in this calculated campaign, deepening the fault lines within Afghanistan’s fragile power structure and complicating regional peace efforts.

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