The resignation of Sheikh Hasina in August 2024 was not simply a domestic upheaval for Bangladesh,it sent shockwaves throughout South Asia. For India, this political transition marked the abrupt end of a golden era of bilateral cooperation. Hasina was New Delhi’s most dependable partner in the neighbourhood, advancing connectivity, counter-terrorism, and trade in line with India’s “Neighbourhood First” policy. India enjoyed secure borders, extensive economic linkages, and a diplomatic buffer against Beijing’s rising influence under Hasina.
Her resignation was ignited by months of popular unrest in Bangladesh, due to the ongoing deterioration of governance and economic distress, and has left India scrambling for alternatives. The Nobel peace laureate Muhammad Yunus is heading the interim government, and duking it out across the full spectrum of multi-alignment – engaging all of the major powers, including China and the US. In light of this, there is a compelling strategic question facing India; can India recreate its strategic depth in Bangladesh by catalyzing Dhaka’s engagement with the Quad?
India’s Strategic Loss After Hasina: A Broken Friendship
India’s commitment with Hasina’s administration represented a diplomatic success. Despite having trusted bilateral trade of USD 13.19 billion in FY 2023, bilateral initiatives under the auspices of increased connectivity through projects like the Akhaura–Agartala rail link helped to establish fruitful bilateralism. Under Hasina’s government, India also engaged Bangladesh on matters of energy, security, and even water-sharing, all of which arguably cemented Indian trust, connectivity, and advantage in Bangladesh.
Hasina’s downfall altered that situation. Even though the interim government has not reneged on every agreement, it has delayed new projects and ostentatiously expressed interest in diversifying its strategic alliances. More troublingly, China has entered the fray with a goal of replacing India’s economic ties to Bangladesh by offering to restructure loans and invest billions of dollars.With this shift to reliance on China’s renewed financial support, New Delhi worries that years of goodwill may be lost if Beijing’s softness on Dhaka grows. India now faces a simple challenge: not to let Bangladesh fall completely under China’s influence while protecting its maritime and economic interests in the Bay of Bengal.
The Bay of Bengal: India’s Maritime Frontier
The Bay of Bengal is clearly becoming a geostrategic hotspot, acting as the conduit from the Indian Ocean to Southeast Asia. It is a critical conduit of energy shipments, hosts a vast number of submarine cables, and has considerable chokepoints. For India, controlling this maritime space is of utmost importance in order to counterbalance China’s influence in the soon-to-be-defined Indo-Pacific.
Bangladesh has a 710-km coastline, so Dhaka impacts India’s regional maritime calculus. The evolving infrastructure footprint of Beijing–particularly at Payra Port–is being seen as an increasing strategic challenge.
Why Bangladesh Matters for the Quad and India’s Regional Strategy
The Quad is not a formal military pact, but a group of nations (India, US, Japan, and Australia) to collaborate on protecting maritime security, building resilient supply chains, and promoting a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific region.In policy circles all sorts of ideas for either expanding the Quad or a new Quad+ model involving important regional countries have been discussed.
Bringing Bangladesh into this space for India would achieve three important objectives:
1. Recoupling Broken Trust and Strategic Depth
Post-Hasina, Dhaka’s political realignment has whittled away at India’s diplomatic comfort zone. Quad engagement, through joint opportunities and initiatives in maritime security, climate resilience, and digital infrastructure, offers India a chance to re-cultivate trust with Bangladesh. Multilateral agreements afford India a chance to establish trust with Bangladesh sooner than bilateral engagements without being perceived as dominant force – everything is done together and there is a perception of shared responsibility as opposed to Indian burdensomeness which is a constant concern for its neighbors with considerations of “big-brother politics” in Dhaka.
2. Countervailing China’s Growing Footprint
This shall come as no surprise that China has made Bangladesh as one of the key nodes of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) amongst South Asian countries. Amongst all other nations, the Chinese are the dominant financiers of infrastructure, energy and digital within Bangladesh, creating all kinds of economic dependencies on Dhaka. Quad cooperation and coordination is a channel to offer alternative possession of connectivity and infrastructure financing that emboldens Dhaka’s autonomy without forcing the country to adopt any express policy against China.
3. Securing the Bay of Bengal as an Indo-Pacific Hub
Bangladesh should participate in maritime domain awareness programs, disaster-response exercises, and green shipping initiatives in order to help strengthen the Bay of Bengal against security challenges from piracy and gray-zone challenges. For India, this is not just a matter of influence, but of defending important sea lanes that fuel its economy.
Bangladesh’s strategic position as a littoral state adds emphasis to its important role in Indo-Pacific frameworks, especially as the Sino-Indian rivalry continues.
China’s Counter: Loans, Leverage, and Warnings
China showed its clear and immediate response to the discussion. In 2024, Beijing warned Dhaka against joining the Quad and called it an “anti-China clique”. At the same time, China offered economic incentives, such as debt relief and investment, to the interim government. The combination of economic carrots and signaling suggests Beijing’s commitment to limit the Quad’s eastward direction.
China’s extensive presence in Bangladesh – embracing everything from infrastructure projects to military collaboration – gives it leverage. Should India fail to provide an alternative to the Quad, Beijing will solidify this leverage and cement Dhaka into a state of asymmetric dependence.
Would This Strategy Win Back Dhaka?
The key question remains: Will Quad engagement allow India to recover its previously lost influence in Dhaka? The answer to whether Quad engagement will allow India to regain its lost influence in Dhaka, depends on how it is done. India’s historical edge in Bangladesh was trust and proximity to Bangladesh. Quad engagement can build trust, and, unlike previous interactions with China’s coercive approach, shows India is offering much more than just geographical proximity. Quad engagement can signal to Dhaka that India is prepared to cooperate as a partner with Dhaka in the future, while still offering access to a global network.
India must also not frame its Quad engagement with Bangladesh as “choosing sides” between China and India. Dhaka is very good at strategic hedging, and if any policy is perceived as forcing Dhaka to choose sides and limit its agency, the policy or strategy would backfire. Rather, India should portray Quad engagement as supplementary to Bangladesh’s economic and security agenda, which includes adaptation to climate change, technology transfer, and supply-chain resilience—none of which China is likely to provide much in the way of public goods.
In addition to local engagement in Dhaka, India’s Act East and SAGAR connectivity projects and regional arrangements like BIMSTEC also provide a type of institutional architecture that is unlikely to be perceived as threatening.
Conclusion: Quad as a Strategic Reset Button
Sheikh Hasina’s exit dismantled a decade of predictability in India-Bangladesh relations. For India, the challenge is not just about salvaging influence—it is about preventing the Bay of Bengal from becoming a Chinese lake. The Quad, while not a panacea, offers a credible framework for India to reset its neighborhood policy and rebuild its broken partnership with Dhaka.
But time is short. China has already entrenched itself, and Dhaka’s new leadership values flexibility over allegiance. If India moves with nuance and speed, framing Quad engagement as a platform for shared prosperity rather than containment, it could transform a strategic loss into a historic opportunity.
The real question is not whether Bangladesh will join the Quad tomorrow—it is whether India will craft a vision compelling enough for Dhaka to lean west when it matters most.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own. They do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of the South Asia Times.
