Afghan Taliban and Cross Border Terrorism in Pakistan

Pakistan is witnessing a renewed wave of terrorist violence, marking a dangerous escalation in its internal security landscape. The Center for Research and Security Studies (CRSS) warned that 2025 could become the country’s deadliest year in over a decade, with 2,414 people killed in the first nine months alone, a figure nearly matching the total fatalities of 2024. The sharp increase in militant attacks, particularly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, underscores a growing cross-border threat since the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan.

In recent months, Islamabad has repeatedly confronted the Taliban regime, accusing it of harbouring and aiding the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a charge that Kabul continues to deny. However, a recent policy brief by the Institute of Regional Studies (IRS), titled “Cross-Border Terrorism in Pakistan: Evidence of Afghan Infiltration within TTP Tashkeels (Groups)”, provides compelling evidence of this support. The report details how Afghan nationals now constitute a majority within TTP infiltration groups, with the Taliban regime actively facilitating their movement, financing, and training. It warns that Afghanistan, under the Taliban, has effectively become a principal enabler of anti-Pakistan militancy, posing an unprecedented threat to Pakistan’s internal stability and border security.

The policy brief presents a compelling analysis of the rising threat of cross-border terrorism drawing upon verifiable intelligence, field reports, and multilateral data. Such empirical data makes a valuable contribution to Pakistan’s counterterrorism policy discourse. The revelation that 70-80pc of infiltrators are Afghan nationals, compared to less than 10pc prior to 2021, underscores a fundamental transformation of Pakistan’s western border into an active terrorism corridor. The confirmation of Taliban-issued travel passes and financial support to militants further validates Islamabad’s concerns about state-level facilitation. This factual precision gives Pakistan a solid evidentiary base to internationalise its grievances through multilateral channels such as the OIC, SCO, and United Nations forums.

Given the intensity of recent attacks, the first and most practical step should be controlling border infiltration and strengthening physical defences. Effective fencing, modern surveillance, and clear rules of engagement for frontier forces can reduce the entry of militants. Once the border is better managed, Pakistan can then move towards addressing internal threats like sleeper cells and extremist sympathies.

Yet, while border management is the most visible front, the threat itself is complex and multi-layered. It is important to elaborate that counterterrorism cannot be sustained solely through fencing or surveillance; rather, these measures must serve as part of a broader strategy that moves in phases that first focuses on stabilising the borders, then moves toward dismantling internal militant networks, and ultimately builds long-term social and ideological resilience to prevent future resurgence.

The Afghan-TTP connection is not just operational, it is ideological and strategic. The Taliban support the TTP for three main reasons. First, both groups share deep ideological ties. Second, the Taliban use the TTP to maintain independence and leverage against Pakistan. Third, they see the TTP as a useful force to counter the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), their main internal rival. While this may serve the Taliban’s domestic interests, it severely damages Pakistan’s security. In other words, the Taliban’s internal stability is being maintained at the cost of Pakistan’s safety.

A related but underexplored concern is the extent to which recent terror incidents involve Afghan refugees who remain in Pakistan. If even a small proportion of them are exploited by militant networks, then fencing alone will not suffice. This underscores the need for a security policy that distinguishes between genuine refugees and potential infiltrators without alienating vulnerable communities. Afghanistan’s refusal to recognise the Durand Line as a permanent boundary also blurs distinctions between civilians and infiltrators. For Pakistan, this creates a real dilemma: keeping refugees could mean internal risks but deporting them might increase threats from across the border and international criticism.

The IRS brief also mentions fusion cells i.e. joint coordination units that combine intelligence and law enforcement efforts. While this idea is good in theory, in practice such cells can be fragile. Without political neutrality, advanced technology, and clear accountability, they risk becoming ineffective bureaucratic setups. Similarly, financial monitoring through systems linked to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) can help track terror funding, but heavy reliance on these mechanisms carries risks. Overly strict enforcement might harm legitimate trade and remittance flows, both of which are crucial for Pakistan and Afghanistan’s fragile economies.

Pakistan has tried to use its economic leverage in the past. In 2023, it imposed a 10 percent fee on Afghan imports passing through its ports to pressure the Taliban into acting against terrorist groups. However, TTP attacks only increased afterward, showing that economic measures alone are not enough. Diplomatic talks between Islamabad and Kabul have also failed to produce meaningful results. Now, as the Taliban leadership signals growing openness toward engagement with India, Pakistan must reassess its leverage strategy. Continued reliance on economic pressure could prove counterproductive if Kabul finds alternative regional partners.

A better way forward would be to internationalise verified intelligence. Pakistan should share evidence and United Nations Security Council (UNSC) reports with key partners such as the UN, OIC, EU, US, and China. This would highlight Afghanistan’s failure to meet its counterterrorism obligations and build collective pressure on the Taliban regime to act against militant groups. Such a step would strengthen Pakistan’s diplomatic hand without direct confrontation.

Finally, while hard security measures are necessary, they must be balanced with community engagement and de-radicalisation efforts. Local populations in border regions should not feel targeted or alienated, as that could create sympathy for militant causes. Instead, Pakistan should promote locally sensitive deradicalisation campaigns and information programs to discourage extremist recruitment, particularly among Afghan youth.

In conclusion, Pakistan faces a difficult but clear choice. It cannot eliminate terrorism overnight, but it can make it harder for militants to enter and operate. Strengthening border control and managing infiltration are the most achievable and least politically damaging first steps. Once that foundation is secure, Pakistan can move toward dismantling internal networks and promoting long-term peace through intelligence cooperation and soft-power initiatives.