The reignition of hostilities in Yemen’s eastern Hadramout governorate represents a structural collapse of the 2019 Riyadh Agreement and a deepening rift within the anti-Houthi coalition. As Southern Transitional Council (STC) units, supported by the United Arab Emirates (UAE), push into territories held by Saudi-backed forces of the internationally recognized government, Yemen’s war within a war enters a volatile phase. This fragmentation threatens the fragile UN-led peace process, Red Sea security, and the territorial integrity of the Arabian Peninsula.
Hadramout is Yemen’s largest governorate, accounting for one-third of the country’s landmass and acting as its economic backbone through the Masila oil basin and ports like Mukalla. Current friction centers on the Wadi districts, where the First Military Region, composed of northern soldiers affiliated with the Islah party, remains entrenched. Since the STC’s formation in May 2017, leadership under Aidarous al-Zubaidi has viewed this presence as an occupation, with recent advances attempting to formalize the Southern Project to restore the pre-1994 South Yemen state.
A significant risk of this fragmentation is the exploitation of security vacuums by extremist groups. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) maintains a strong presence in eastern Yemen’s hinterlands. On April 2, 2015, AQAP fighters seized Mukalla, Yemen’s fifth-largest city. For nearly one year, until April 2016, AQAP effectively governed the city. It took a UAE-led offensive involving Hadhrami Elite Forces to liberate the city in late April 2016. This occupation demonstrated that divided security forces allow extremist networks to transform into quasi-states. Analysts fear the current standoff in the Wadi districts could provide AQAP the breathing room to regroup.
While Saudi Arabia and the UAE joined forces in March 2015 under Operation Decisive Storm,” their visions for Yemen have diverged. Riyadh shares a 1,458 km border with Yemen and views IRG legitimacy as the only barrier against permanent partition. Saudi Arabia has facilitated the Nation’s Shield forces, answerable to Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) head Rashad al-Alimi, to counter STC expansion. Conversely, Abu Dhabi’s interests are maritime. By supporting the STC and Elite Forces, the UAE secures influence along the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, protecting trade through the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait. This tension reached a boiling point in early 2026 as the STC bypassed the PLC to establish de-facto governance.
Weaponizing maritime chokepoints is no longer a theoretical risk. With Houthis targeting Red Sea shipping, a southern fracture adds unpredictability. The Bab-el-Mandeb handles roughly 10% of global seaborne oil and requires a stable littoral state.
Pakistan’s position on this issue reflects a sophisticated balancing act. Islamabad maintains a special relationship with Saudi Arabia via a bilateral security agreement while holding deep economic ties with the UAE. Islamabad’s support for Saudi leadership is rooted in border sanctity and counter-terrorism. Dealing with its own cross-border militancy, Pakistan’s Foreign Office emphasizes its commitment to the security of the Kingdom and announces its support for the territorial integrity of Yemen.
Yemen’s path forward requires moving away from militarized control of coastal regions toward integrated security forces. The 2022 formation of the PLC was intended to bridge these gaps, yet the council remains paralyzed by competing agendas. Stability in Hadramout is the litmus test for Yemen’s future. If the IRG and STC cannot find a power-sharing formula that addresses local grievances while maintaining unity, the country faces a permanent partition. This would not be a clean break but a multi-decade conflict destabilizing the security arc from the Red Sea to the Strait of Hormuz, impacting global energy prices and regional peace. The priority must remain phased, UN-led institutional reform that prioritizes the state over the militia. Stabilization requires unified command structures rather than competing armies to ensure local grievances are addressed through negotiation instead of force.
Yemen’s War Within a War
The reignition of hostilities in Yemen’s eastern Hadramout governorate represents a structural collapse of the 2019 Riyadh Agreement and a deepening rift within the anti-Houthi coalition. As Southern Transitional Council (STC) units, supported by the United Arab Emirates (UAE), push into territories held by Saudi-backed forces of the internationally recognized government, Yemen’s war within a war enters a volatile phase. This fragmentation threatens the fragile UN-led peace process, Red Sea security, and the territorial integrity of the Arabian Peninsula.
Hadramout is Yemen’s largest governorate, accounting for one-third of the country’s landmass and acting as its economic backbone through the Masila oil basin and ports like Mukalla. Current friction centers on the Wadi districts, where the First Military Region, composed of northern soldiers affiliated with the Islah party, remains entrenched. Since the STC’s formation in May 2017, leadership under Aidarous al-Zubaidi has viewed this presence as an occupation, with recent advances attempting to formalize the Southern Project to restore the pre-1994 South Yemen state.
A significant risk of this fragmentation is the exploitation of security vacuums by extremist groups. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) maintains a strong presence in eastern Yemen’s hinterlands. On April 2, 2015, AQAP fighters seized Mukalla, Yemen’s fifth-largest city. For nearly one year, until April 2016, AQAP effectively governed the city. It took a UAE-led offensive involving Hadhrami Elite Forces to liberate the city in late April 2016. This occupation demonstrated that divided security forces allow extremist networks to transform into quasi-states. Analysts fear the current standoff in the Wadi districts could provide AQAP the breathing room to regroup.
While Saudi Arabia and the UAE joined forces in March 2015 under Operation Decisive Storm,” their visions for Yemen have diverged. Riyadh shares a 1,458 km border with Yemen and views IRG legitimacy as the only barrier against permanent partition. Saudi Arabia has facilitated the Nation’s Shield forces, answerable to Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) head Rashad al-Alimi, to counter STC expansion. Conversely, Abu Dhabi’s interests are maritime. By supporting the STC and Elite Forces, the UAE secures influence along the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, protecting trade through the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait. This tension reached a boiling point in early 2026 as the STC bypassed the PLC to establish de-facto governance.
Weaponizing maritime chokepoints is no longer a theoretical risk. With Houthis targeting Red Sea shipping, a southern fracture adds unpredictability. The Bab-el-Mandeb handles roughly 10% of global seaborne oil and requires a stable littoral state.
Pakistan’s position on this issue reflects a sophisticated balancing act. Islamabad maintains a special relationship with Saudi Arabia via a bilateral security agreement while holding deep economic ties with the UAE. Islamabad’s support for Saudi leadership is rooted in border sanctity and counter-terrorism. Dealing with its own cross-border militancy, Pakistan’s Foreign Office emphasizes its commitment to the security of the Kingdom and announces its support for the territorial integrity of Yemen.
Yemen’s path forward requires moving away from militarized control of coastal regions toward integrated security forces. The 2022 formation of the PLC was intended to bridge these gaps, yet the council remains paralyzed by competing agendas. Stability in Hadramout is the litmus test for Yemen’s future. If the IRG and STC cannot find a power-sharing formula that addresses local grievances while maintaining unity, the country faces a permanent partition. This would not be a clean break but a multi-decade conflict destabilizing the security arc from the Red Sea to the Strait of Hormuz, impacting global energy prices and regional peace. The priority must remain phased, UN-led institutional reform that prioritizes the state over the militia. Stabilization requires unified command structures rather than competing armies to ensure local grievances are addressed through negotiation instead of force.
SAT Commentary
SAT Commentary
SAT Commentaries, a collection of insightful social media threads on current events and social issues, featuring diverse perspectives from various authors.
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