Pakistan has simmered with unease these past few days; The serenity of Bannu Cantonment vanished on July 15, 2024, shattered by a suicide bombing attack carried out by Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), leaving eight security personnel dead. Smoke lingered in the air, a grim reminder of the violence. On July 16, 2024, the whispers of another incident in Dera Ismail Khan (DIK) soon followed, echoing the tremors of unrest.
Beyond the Bannu Attack
But the physical threats were not the only ones Pakistanis faced. Amidst the security concerns, a different kind of storm brewed online. Dr. Moeed Pirzada, a prominent figure, took to Twitter, his message a spark igniting a social media firestorm. He pointed a finger at a Twitter account, linking it to Pakistan’s intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), and accused it of spreading disinformation. The account, he claimed, was behind an unsubstantiated rumor about India’s involvement in an assassination attempt on Donald Trump. The problem?
The accusation lacked any concrete proof, feeling more like a desperate attempt to navigate the murky waters of online narratives. This raised questions about the quality of arguments churned out by some Pakistani intellectuals, and a deeper mystery – why pin the blame on the nation’s own intelligence agency? The question, left unanswered, lingered in the air, a chilling reminder of the murky depths where truth and manipulation danced a deadly waltz. Now, with tensions simmering on both the physical and digital fronts, Pakistanis await the next move, a nation caught in the crossfire of online chaos and real-world violence.
As Pakistan now simmers on both physical and digital fronts, the Bannu attack serves as a stark reminder of the ongoing fight against extremism. Yet, the physical wounds are just one part of the story. Pakistan grapples with a disturbing reality – the tacit support the Afghan interim government seems to be extending to the TTP.
The UN Assessment Report: A Warning on Afghan Support for the TTP
The United Nations (UN) paints a clear picture. On July 8, 2024, the 15th report of the ISIL (Daesh) & Al-Qaeda/Taliban Monitoring Team was submitted to the UN Security Council. It depicts the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), an alliance of extremist groups, as “the largest terrorist group” in Afghanistan. The report further details the group’s growing support from the country’s Interim rulers to conduct cross-border attacks in Pakistan. This assessment comes amid a dramatic surge in TTP-led terror attacks. According to the report, TTP attacks against Pakistani security forces and civilians have resulted in hundreds of deaths in recent weeks.
The Simmering Threat of Al Qaeda’s Resurgence
Al Qaeda’s presence also casts a long shadow. The Monitoring Team’s claim that “the Taliban have done much to constrain the activities of Al-Qaeda and their affiliates” seems dubious in light of Al Qaeda’s expanding infrastructure in Afghanistan. The report reveals training camps operating in Kandahar and Takhar provinces, adding to those identified in 10 other provinces over the past year. The organization further notes that Al Qaeda “still uses Afghanistan as a permissive haven under the Taliban.”
The Afghan Interim Government’s support for the TTP encompasses several key areas, as outlined in the UN report:
- Weapons and Training: The Taliban have supplied weapons to the TTP and facilitated training, particularly with support from Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS).
- Financial Support: The Taliban reportedly provide TTP leader Noor Wali Mehsud with a monthly stipend of 3.5 million Afghanis ($50,500). Concerns remain that excessive pressure on the TTP could push them towards collaboration with ISIL-K.
- Safe Havens: The Taliban’s policy regarding the TTP has shifted. They now facilitate guest houses in Kabul for TTP leaders and issue passes for senior figures, granting ease of movement and immunity from arrest. This positive relationship is intended to ensure a continued alliance with the Taliban and dissuade defections to ISIL-K. On March 5th, 2024, Mehsud himself informed media outlets of a recent meeting with Hibatullah Akhundzada, the Taliban leader, although the Taliban denied this claim.
- Operational Support: The Taliban have allowed the TTP to conduct terrorist operations in Pakistan, according to the UN report, often utilizing Afghan fighters. The report estimates the TTP’s strength at around 6,000-6,500 fighters, making them the largest of the two dozen or so groups that enjoy freedom of movement under the Taliban regime. The report further states that “TTP has intensified attacks against Pakistan, significantly increasing from 573 in 2021 to 715 in 2022 and 1,210 in 2023, with the trend continuing into 2024.”
This surge in violence is a cause for alarm. Pakistan has a long and bloody history with terrorism.
A 2023 annual security report issued by the Centre for Research and Security Studies revealed a record six-year high, with 1,524 violence-related fatalities and 1,463 injuries from 789 terror attacks and counter-terrorism operations in 2023. KP and Balochistan were the primary centers of violence, accounting for over 90% of all fatalities and 84% of attacks.
In 2024, in response to the renewed threat, Pakistan launched a rare cross-border counterterrorism operation codenamed “Azm-e-Istehkam,” meaning “Resolve for Stability,” in June 2024. This operation aims to address the root causes of militancy and prevent future attacks. However, in a defiant move, the TTP countered by launching their own operation, “Azm-e-Shariat” (Resolve for Islamic Law). This highlights the TTP’s continued commitment to their extremist ideology and their willingness to challenge the Pakistani state.
Moreover, the recent arrest of two high-value TTP commanders, Nasrullah (aka Maulvi Mansoor, TTP Shura Member) and Idris (aka Irshad), in June 2024, revealed connections indicating TTP funding from India’s Research and Analysis Wing (RAW). Furthermore, Sarah Adams’ podcast with Shawn Ryan provided evidence linking the Afghan Taliban, TTP, and India against Pakistan.
A Looming Proxy War on Afghan Soil?
These developments paint a concerning picture of a potential proxy war brewing on Afghan soil.
While negotiations for TTP relocation away from the Af-Pak border were underway in 2023, they initially stalled due to the Pakistani repatriation drive. However, in June 2024, just before the United Nations Doha Conference, the TTP move from Khost and Patika to Ghazni was reportedly confirmed, reportedly funded by Pakistan itself. This move sparked controversy, leaving many to question in terms of Afghan Interim Government’s seriousness in tackling the TTP issue as a result of Pakistan and China’s backdoor diplomacy after the Bisham Attack. Was it a genuine attempt to de-escalate tensions by distancing the TTP from the border? Or was it a strategic concession? That remained a query.
The answer likely lies somewhere in between. But Pakistan is again standing at a point it has been since the takeover of Kabul by the Afghan Taliban. Since then, the TTP insurgency has inflicted heavy casualties, and the specter of a resurgent Al Qaeda adds another layer of complexity. On the other hand, engaging with the Taliban regime remains a contentious issue within Pakistan, with many wary of their ties to the TTP.
The relocation to Ghazni, though geographically further from the border, does little to address the core issue of Afghan support for the TTP. Ghazni province still borders Pakistan’s Balochistan, a known stronghold for TTP militants. Furthermore, reports suggest the Taliban may be using this opportunity to bolster the TTP’s ranks with fresh recruits.
Pakistan’s call for decisive action against the TTP by the Afghan government has largely fallen on deaf ears. The recent demarche to the Afghan embassy in Islamabad, following the Bannu attack, highlights the growing frustration. Pakistan cannot afford to remain passive in the face of this existential threat.
The international community also has a role to play. The UN report serves as a stark warning, a call for a unified front against terror outfits operating in Afghanistan. Pakistan cannot shoulder this burden alone. Increased international pressure on the Taliban to dismantle TTP safe havens and sever ties with the group is crucial for regional stability.
The coming months will be critical. Pakistan’s ability to quell the TTP threat, while navigating its complex relationship with Afghanistan, will determine the future trajectory of the region. The specter of a wider regional conflagration looms large, a chilling reminder of the devastating consequences of inaction.
