Six Years After Balakot: The Shifting Contours of Deterrence in South Asia

In the early hours of February 26, 2019, Indian Air Force jets crossed into Pakistani airspace, targeting what New Delhi claimed was a Jaish-e-Mohammed training camp in Balakot. Pakistan, however, denied the presence of any such facility, stating that the strikes hit an uninhabited forested area, damaging nothing but trees. A day later, Pakistan responded with airstrikes of its own, downing an Indian MiG-21 and capturing its pilot. What followed was a tense standoff between two nuclear-armed rivals—one that, six years later, continues to shape South Asia’s security calculus in ways both predictable and unexpected.

Balakot and the Evolution of Deterrence: A Shift in Strategy?

The Balakot airstrike in 2019 was a pivotal moment in South Asia’s strategic landscape. While India presented it as a decisive military action, Pakistan’s swift retaliation reinforced the notion that the deterrence equation between the two nuclear-armed neighbors remained intact.

General (R) Naeem Khalid Lodhi, Former Defense Minister of Pakistan, asserts that Pakistan’s response validated its deterrence theory. “Our deterrence strategy was converted into a practical response, proving that we are prepared to respond across the spectrum of threats—whether conventional or unconventional,” he explains. He recalls that India initially considered the Sundarji Doctrine, aimed at deep thrust operations inside Pakistan, but abandoned it due to shortcomings in its air force. “They later developed the Cold Start Doctrine with shallow maneuvers and rapid deployment. To counter this, we expanded our deterrence posture—from full-spectrum deterrence to tactical nuclear assets and forward displacement of some of our cantonments.”

However, Lodhi believes that the battlefield has since shifted. “Now, India is waging a hybrid war—combining economic and political warfare at the international level with interference in our internal affairs. Their support for groups like the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) is part of this broader strategy,” he warns.

He cautions that Pakistan must reassess its deterrence posture in light of these evolving threats. “While we maintain strong deterrence against conventional and nuclear threats, we are lagging in sub-conventional deterrence. We must not only defend ourselves in this hybrid warfare environment but also develop offensive capabilities to counteract these tactics.”

A New Security Framework: More Than Just India-Pakistan?

For decades, the India-Pakistan conflict was seen as a bilateral affair. But, as Pravin Sawhney, a former Indian Army officer and editor of The Force magazine, argues, this dynamic changed after August 5, 2019, when India revoked Jammu and Kashmir’s special status. “China and Pakistan’s military ties deepened after that. The security framework is no longer just bilateral—it has become trilateral,” he explains. “China has explicitly stated its support for Pakistan’s territorial integrity. This means that today, deterrence in the region is no longer limited to India and Pakistan—it is shaped by China’s involvement.”

Sawhney believes that the growing partnership between Pakistan and China has redefined deterrence, shifting focus away from nuclear brinkmanship. “The obsession with nuclear weapons is misplaced. Conventional deterrence matters more because wars start when one side perceives the other as conventionally weak,” he says. “Post-Balakot, the security framework between Pakistan and China has strengthened, making the possibility of future Indian strikes highly unlikely.”

The Future of Limited Conflict: A Vanishing Possibility?

While Balakot was initially seen as a new precedent for limited strikes under a nuclear overhang, the possibility of such actions recurring appears increasingly remote. The reason? The China factor.

Sawhney argues that India’s strategic environment has drastically changed since 2019. “Balakot was a one-off, politically motivated operation with no military objective. Today, given China’s backing of Pakistan’s security framework, any future strike would carry the risk of Beijing’s involvement—whether kinetic or non-kinetic,” he says.

Pakistan Air Force: The Cornerstone of Deterrence?

One of the key lessons of the Balakot episode was the role of air power in modern conflict. The post-strike military maneuvering revealed that conventional deterrence—rather than nuclear capability—remains the primary factor shaping the security framework between India, Pakistan, and China.

“If there is another war—chances of which are zero—the lead will be Pakistan Air Force,” said Pravin Sawhney, a former Indian Army officer and editor of FORCE Magazine. “When I say this, it is about conventional deterrence. The PAF has already integrated the J-10, and with the J-35 coming in, Pakistan’s conventional capabilities will be a massive deterrence. This will give the PAF a lead role in ensuring territorial integrity and defense,” he added.

This sentiment is echoed by retired PAF Group Captain S.M. Hali, who sees Pakistan’s growing airpower as a significant deterrent in the region. “The Indian Air Force’s acquisition of Rafale jets was met with Pakistan’s procurement of J-10C aircraft. Then there’s the JF-17 Thunder, which is now being sought by several air forces worldwide. Pakistan is not lagging behind in air combat capability,” he says.

Sawhney argues that the shifting balance of power in aerial warfare post-Balakot is evident in PAF’s doctrinal shifts. “Pakistan has integrated artificial intelligence into their operational capabilities. The inauguration of the Artificial Intelligence Center in August 2020, with Chinese support, marks a significant leap in their preparedness. Pakistani pilots are trained at an elite level, as demonstrated during Operation Swift Retort. In an area with a high density of Indian troops, they successfully delivered precision strikes without causing casualties. They ensured a proportional response without crossing escalation thresholds, proving their ability to control the battlespace.” Sawhney noted.

Pravin Sawhney sees Pakistan’s air force not just as a deterrent but as the principal force shaping future conflicts. “Pakistan had never lost a fight, and evidence lies in the 1949 ceasefire line, which remains intact. The Pakistan, through good Electronic Warfare capabilities demonstrated upper hand at the operational level of war in Operation Swift Retort. Since then, PAF has been working on Cognitive EW (integration of AI in EW) to dominate the operational level against Indian Air Force.”

Hali, meanwhile, downplays India’s much-touted S-400 missile defence system, arguing that technological advancements in electronic warfare have mitigated its effectiveness. “Pakistan has the means to defend itself. The S-400 won’t give India a game-changing advantage. The belief that it can serve as an impenetrable shield is flawed. Countermeasures exist, and our air doctrine takes that into account.”

Furthermore, Hali is critical of India’s indigenous fighter jet program. “Tejas was obsolete even before it was launched. The Indian Air Force is already facing a deficit of 11 fighter squadrons, and now there are concerns about the F-35 being a financial burden rather than an asset. Even within India, there are concerns that the F-35 is a dud and that DRDO (Defence Research and Development Organisation) has become the ‘Dodo’ of defence research,” he remarks.

For both Sawhney and Hali, Pakistan’s conventional deterrence—particularly its air force—has become the decisive factor in the region’s strategic calculations. With China fully backing Pakistan’s security framework, the deterrence model has only strengthened, significantly reducing the likelihood of direct conflict.

The Kashmir Question: A Stalemate or a Road to Peace?

While military deterrence has dominated strategic discussions, the political future of Kashmir remains unresolved. Altaf Hussain Wani, Chairman of the Kashmir Institute of International Relations, asserts that six years after Balakot, little has changed for the people of Kashmir.

Highlights that India’s Balakot strike was significant because it was the first such cross-border airstrike since 1971, he argues that while India has repeatedly claimed to have carried out surgical strikes inside Azad Kashmir, no credible evidence has ever emerged to confirm such operations. “India claimed to have destroyed a militant training camp in Balakot, killing over 300 people, but local news agencies and foreign journalists who visited the site the next day did not verify these claims.”

Wani contends that the real impact of Balakot was not military but political. “For Indian military strategists, it may have been viewed as an offensive maneuver, but for most analysts, it was a tactical strategy aimed at domestic political gains. It projected the Indian government as one willing to go to any extent to defend its people, especially ahead of elections,” he explains. “However, Pakistan’s response took India and international observers by surprise, and the majority of Kashmiris celebrated Pakistan’s retaliation.”

The aftermath of Pulwama and Balakot, Wani notes, led to an even more securitized environment in Kashmir. “What was once a political struggle came under severe pressure. Political dissent was systematically crushed—land confiscations, mass arrests under UAPA, and the complete suppression of opposition voices instilled fear among Kashmiris, making even basic expressions of dissent risky.”

He further asserts that the revocation of Article 370 in August 2019 can be seen as a direct consequence of the Pulwama-Balakot crisis. “Already one of the most militarized regions in the world, Kashmir saw an even greater troop build-up. The security grid tightened, and the space for political activity was completely erased,” Wani explains. “The government in New Delhi not only took political mileage out of the Balakot episode but used it as a pretext to implement sweeping changes in Kashmir’s status.”

Also See: India Cornered: China’s Relentless Expansion Exposes New Delhi’s Helplessness

Language, Perception, and the Future of Deterrence

As the discourse on deterrence evolves, the way it is framed—both politically and academically—matters. Haleema Khalid, Editor and Research Lead of South Asia Times, critiques the language used in South Asia’s security discourse. “Deterrence is often framed in absolutist terms—either you have it, or you don’t. But in reality, it’s fluid. India and Pakistan both engage in deterrence signalling, yet the actual balance shifts based on perception, technology, and alliances,” she explains.

She also highlights the danger of over-reliance on historical narratives. “Every generation in South Asia grows up with a version of deterrence shaped by past conflicts. But history does not always repeat itself in the same way,” she warns. Instead, Khalid argues that the strategic security framework of today is shaped as much by narratives and perception-building as by conventional or nuclear deterrence. “We cannot ignore the role of strategic communication, hybrid warfare, and the weaponisation of information in shaping deterrence at the non-kinetic level. The battlefields of today extend far beyond airstrikes or military doctrines; they now include digital spaces, economic levers, and influence operations. Whether it’s Pakistan countering Indian narratives on Kashmir or India leveraging international partnerships for strategic signalling, deterrence today is as much about controlling the story as it is about controlling the battlefield.”

Khalid emphasizes that deterrence in the modern era is no longer just a function of military capability—it is deeply intertwined with alliances, diplomatic signalling, and narrative dominance. “The power to influence how events are perceived, whether by international actors or domestic audiences, is becoming an essential tool of statecraft,” she asserts. “Ignoring this shift would mean misreading the very nature of contemporary security dynamics.”

A New Normal?

Six years after Balakot, the battlefield has changed. The airstrikes of 2019 once seemed like a turning point, a moment that could redefine military engagements under a nuclear overhang. But today, the calculus of conflict in South Asia is shaped by far more than warplanes and missile systems. It’s about alliances, perception, and the quiet but powerful forces of hybrid warfare.

For Pakistan, the challenge is no longer just deterring conventional attacks but countering the slow, insidious threats of economic coercion, political interference, and proxy conflicts. For India, the limits of military brinkmanship are becoming clearer, with China’s deepening security ties with Pakistan reshaping the region’s balance of power. And for Kashmir, the story remains one of occupation, resistance, and an uncertain future.

War is not just fought on battlefields anymore. It is waged in narratives, in economic deals, in cyber operations, and in the spaces where global opinion is shaped. The question now is not whether another Balakot will happen—but whether South Asia’s rivals will continue down a path of perpetual conflict or recognize that deterrence, in this new era, is as much about winning the story as it is about winning the fight.