Pakistan’s Nuclear Journey: From Disparity to Deterrence

Pakistan’s pursuit of nuclear weapons capability emerged from a complex interplay of geopolitical realities, particularly the enduring conventional military imbalance with India and the profound impact of the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War. This traumatic loss of East Pakistan in 1971 served as a pivotal catalyst. The defeat underscored Pakistan’s conventional vulnerability and instilled an urgent sense of necessity for a strategic equalizer to ensure national survival and prevent future dismemberment. This experience created an unwavering political and public consensus across successive regimes that nuclear weapons were not merely an option but an existential imperative. Bhutto’s famous declaration, “We will eat grass, but we will get our own bomb,” vividly captures this desperate resolve, indicating a willingness to endure extreme hardship for nuclear capability. This deep-seated national trauma is crucial for understanding the program’s resilience against international pressure and its framing as a matter of national dignity and self-defense. It also sheds light on Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine, particularly its refusal to adopt a “no-first-use” policy, as the nuclear arsenal is seen as the ultimate guarantor against a repeat of 1971.

The strategic imperative for Pakistan was further amplified by India’s 1974 “Smiling Buddha” nuclear test. On May 18, 1974, India conducted what it described as a “peaceful nuclear explosion” (PNE), marking a significant shift in regional dynamics and establishing India as the sixth nuclear power globally, and the first outside the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. This event provided a “new momentum” to Pakistan’s nascent nuclear program, which had been formally initiated by Bhutto on January 20, 1972, in direct response to the 1971 war.

Beyond merely accelerating Pakistan’s nuclear efforts, India’s 1974 test provided Pakistan with a powerful and publicly defensible justification for its covert nuclear program, both domestically and internationally.

The Architects of Pakistan’s Nuclear Program

Pakistan’s nuclear program was a multi-decade endeavor, shaped by the strategic vision and determined efforts of several key political leaders and scientific figures. Each played a distinct yet interconnected role in advancing the nation’s nuclear capabilities.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto: The Visionary Founder of Nuclear Program

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto is widely recognized as the “main architect” of Pakistan’s nuclear program, initiating it formally on January 20, 1972, shortly after the devastating 1971 war. His commitment was clear: to have a nuclear device ready by the end of 1976. Bhutto convened a pivotal meeting of senior scientists and engineers at Multan in January 1972, where he “orchestrated the nuclear weapons programme and rallied Pakistan’s academic scientists to build an atomic bomb in three years for national survival”. At this crucial gathering, Bhutto appointed Munir Ahmad Khan, a nuclear physicist with prior experience at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), as Chairman of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), entrusting him with the program’s leadership. Under Bhutto’s direction, the “Theoretical Physics Group” (TPG) was established in December 1972, drawing parallels to the United States’ “Manhattan Project”.

Bhutto’s vision extended to civilian nuclear infrastructure, as he inaugurated the KANUPP-I nuclear power plant in November 1972, laying foundational elements for broader nuclear development. His advocacy for nuclear weapons predated the 1971 war; as Foreign Minister in the 1960s, he had “aggressively advocated the option of ‘nuclear weapons programmes'” as early as 1965, though these initial attempts were dismissed. His famous declaration, “We will eat grass, but we will get our own bomb,” encapsulated his unwavering resolve and the existential commitment to developing a defensive nuclear capability. In 1976, the government, under Bhutto, strategically separated the uranium enrichment program from PAEC, moving it to the Engineering Research Laboratories (ERL) and appointing Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan as its senior scientist. This “dual-track” approach, with PAEC pursuing broader nuclear energy and research and the covert KRL/ERL aggressively focusing on procurement and rapid uranium enrichment, was a deliberate strategic design. This compartmentalization allowed for accelerated progress in fissile material production by leveraging Khan’s unique procurement skills.

General Zia-ul-Haq: Consolidation and Covert Advancement

Following Bhutto’s overthrow in 1977, General Zia-ul-Haq, who assumed power as Chief Martial Law Administrator and later President, continued and consolidated the atomic bomb program, making it a key component of his regime’s agenda. The supervision of the critical Kahuta Project, a central uranium enrichment facility, was passed to Lt General Zahid Ali Akbar Khan under Zia’s administration. During Zia’s rule, Pakistan significantly accelerated its efforts to produce fissile material, notably acquiring a gas centrifuge complex by the late 1970s. By 1984, the Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) achieved the capability to detonate a nuclear bomb using highly enriched uranium. By 1986, Pakistan was believed to have produced enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon, and by 1987, it acquired the ability to carry out an explosion. Zia successfully leveraged Pakistan’s position as key US ally in the Afghan-Soviet war to avoid the direct sanctions.

The consistent and overarching military oversight, particularly evident under Zia, indicates that the military acted as the ultimate custodian and guarantor of the program’s continuity and strategic direction, ensuring its resilience against political transitions and international pressure. Despite significant international pressure, including 25 demarches lodged by the Reagan administration by 1986, Zia persisted with the program. His alleged statement to Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1987, “If your forces cross our borders by an inch, we are going to annihilate your cities,” underscored his firm commitment to nuclear deterrence.

Nawaz Sharif: The Decision to Nuclear Test

Nawaz Sharif, as Prime Minister, made the decisive choice to conduct Pakistan’s nuclear tests on May 28, 1998 (Chagai-I) and May 30, 1998 (Chagai-II), in direct response to India’s Pokhran-II tests earlier that month. Despite facing “immense external pressure and offers to abandon the program,” Sharif chose to proceed, a decision that cemented Pakistan’s status as the seventh nuclear-armed state and the first in the Muslim world. His decision was widely viewed domestically as representing “the aspirations and national interests of the entire nation,” making Pakistan’s geographical borders “impregnable forever”.

Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan: The Scientific Backbone

Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, a German-trained metallurgist, played a “pivotal role” in developing Pakistan’s uranium enrichment capabilities, particularly through the establishment of the Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) in Kahuta. He joined the program in 1976, bringing with him crucial knowledge and gas centrifuge blueprints acquired from his work at URENCO in the Netherlands. Under his direction, KRL rapidly advanced, achieving modest uranium enrichment by 1978 and the capability to detonate a highly enriched uranium (HEU) bomb by 1984. By 1986, Pakistan was believed to have produced enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon, with the ability to conduct an explosion by 1987.

Chagai-I and Chagai-II: Pakistan Enters the Nuclear Club

The year 1998 marked a critical juncture in South Asian nuclear history. India conducted a series of five nuclear tests at Pokhran on May 11 and 13, codenamed Pokhran-II. These tests, following India’s 1974 “Smiling Buddha” explosion, were perceived by Pakistan as a “blatant defiance of international expectations” and a “direct threat to Pakistan’s existence”. The perceived threat was exacerbated by aggressive rhetoric from Indian leaders, particularly from the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), immediately after their tests. For instance, L.K. Advani, India’s Home Minister, publicly called on Pakistan to roll back its anti-India policy and even hinted at “hot pursuit” military raids into Azad Jammu and Kashmir. Similarly, Minister for Parliamentary Affairs Madan Lal Khurana threatened war. These statements, coupled with intense clashes at the Line of Control (LOC) in Kashmir, were interpreted by Pakistan as a clear signal of India’s intent to adopt a more forceful approach in the region.

Faced with this “existential decision” and immense external pressure to abstain, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif chose to assert Pakistan’s “sovereign right to self-defence”. On May 28, 1998, Pakistan announced it had successfully conducted five nuclear tests, codenamed Chagai-I, in the Ras Koh Hills of the Chagai district, Balochistan. These initial tests involved weapons-grade uranium devices. The reported total yield for these tests was up to 40 KT. Two days later, on May 30, 1998, Pakistan conducted a sixth test, Chagai-II, in the Kharan Desert.³This test involved an implosion-type boosted-fission military-grade plutonium device, with a maximum yield of 25 kilotons of TNT. These tests were framed by Pakistan not as acts of aggression but as acts of “restraint and responsibility,” primarily aimed at “restoring strategic balance in South Asia”. May 28 is annually commemorated as Youm-e-Takbeer, symbolizing Pakistan’s national resolve and unity.

In immediate response to both India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear tests, the United States, as mandated by the Glenn Amendment (section 102 of the Arms Export Control Act of 1994), “immediately placed both nations under economic sanctions”. These sanctions aimed to deter further testing, influence behavior, target governments, and minimize damage to US interests. Specific US sanctions included: termination or suspension of foreign assistance (e.g., $21 million for India, most assistance to Pakistan already prohibited), termination of foreign military sales, halting new US government credits and credit guarantees (from EXIM, OPIC, CCC), and opposition to non-basic human needs (BHN) loans from International Financial Institutions (IFIs) with support from the G-8 nations. Executive Orders were also issued to prohibit US banks from extending loans or credits to the governments of India and Pakistan, and export of dual-use items controlled for nuclear or missile reasons was denied.

Consequences: Deterrence and Regional Stability

The 1998 nuclear tests fundamentally altered the strategic landscape of South Asia, establishing a new era of nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan. Pakistan’s primary objective was to achieve “credible minimum deterrence” (MCD) against India, a doctrine officially named “N-deterrence” and serving as the foundational principle for its atomic weapons program. This doctrine is designed to dissuade India from taking any military actions against Pakistan, particularly to prevent a repeat of the 1971 war. Pakistan views its nuclear capability as guaranteeing peace and ensuring that its sovereignty and national security cannot be undermined.

The presence of nuclear weapons in both India and Pakistan introduced the complex concept of the “stability-instability paradox”. This theory suggests that while nuclear weapons create stability at the highest level of conflict by making large-scale war too costly, they can simultaneously lead to instability at lower levels of violence.

Pakistan’s adoption of a “full spectrum deterrence” doctrine and its emphasis on the development and deployment of tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) further underscore its intent to lower the nuclear threshold and deter even limited Indian conventional incursions. These low-yield nuclear weapons are intended to counter India’s ‘Cold Start’ doctrine, which envisions swift, shallow incursions into Pakistani territory below the nuclear threshold. 

Since the 1998 nuclear tests, India and Pakistan have engaged in several military confrontations, most notably the Kargil War in 1999 and the 2001-2002 military standoff (Operation Parakram). The Kargil War, fought just a year after Pakistan’s nuclear tests, did not escalate to nuclear exchange, which some analysts interpret as an early validation of the stability-instability paradox. Nuclear parity introduced credible constraints on full-scale conventional war scenarios, which dictated that both sides recalibrate their military doctrines under the nuclear threshold. 

However, the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence in preventing all forms of conflict has been debated. While nuclear weapons deter threats against vital interests or state survival due to the concept of mutually assured destruction (MAD), they may not deter conventional force for “lesser interests”. This means that states can “safely use conventional force to try to achieve lesser interests, where the strategic logic of nuclear weapons breaks down”. This phenomenon explains the continuation of much of Pakistan and India’s rivalry since 1998. For instance, despite nuclear weapons, India’s “Cold Start” doctrine and discussions of “limited war” against Pakistan have continued.

Recent military confrontations, such as the 2016 Indian strikes on suspected militant strongholds in Pakistani-administered Kashmir and the 2019 Balakot airstrikes, indicate a gradual erosion of the tacit threshold that previously contained official military responses to Kashmir. The May 2025 India-Pakistan conflict, which saw missiles and drones fired at military facilities in each other’s heartland for the first time since the 1971 war, marked a significant escalation that challenged the stability of deterrence.

Despite these challenges, both India and Pakistan have officially affirmed their commitment to “credible minimum deterrence” for defensive purposes and maintaining strategic stability in the region. Pakistan’s leadership emphasizes that its nuclear capability is solely for defensive purposes and serves as a guarantor of peace.

Conclusion

Pakistan’s journey to becoming a nuclear power on May 28, 1998, was a direct consequence of a profound conventional military disparity with India, exacerbated by the traumatic 1971 war and India’s 1974 nuclear test. 

The program’s development was a multi-generational effort, driven by political leaders like Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who initiated the program with a clear mandate for national survival; General Zia-ul-Haq, who consolidated and covertly advanced it under military oversight; and Nawaz Sharif, who made the decisive choice to test in 1998. Scientific figures such as Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan played a pivotal role in developing the uranium enrichment capabilities and establishing a sophisticated clandestine procurement network. The “dual-track” nature of Pakistan’s program, with parallel civilian and covert military efforts, and the consistent military oversight ensured its resilience against political transitions and international pressure. 

The 1998 Chagai-I and Chagai-II tests, conducted in direct response to India’s Pokhran-II tests, solidified Pakistan’s status as a nuclear-armed state. These tests were presented as acts of “restraint and responsibility” aimed at restoring strategic balance in South Asia. The immediate international reaction was swift, with the imposition of economic sanctions, particularly by the United States and G-8 nations. However, these sanctions were largely eased within months, reflecting a pragmatic international approach that prioritized broader geopolitical interests over strict non-proliferation enforcement.

The establishment of nuclear deterrence has introduced a complex “stability-instability paradox” in South Asia. While large-scale conventional war has been deterred, lower-level conflicts and proxy warfare persist.

Usama Khan

Usama Khan holds a degree in International Relations from the University of Exeter and works as an academic. His research focuses on South Asian history, political dynamics, militancy, and civil conflicts.

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